Cold Calculation: Ukraine's Recent Offensive Successes Trade Force For Speed

"Hit 'em where they ain't." That tactical wisdom was borne of lightning cavalry raids into the enemy's rear to sow destruction and confusion during the US Civil War.

In practical terms, it means identifying undermanned, poorly defended sectors where sparse, vulnerable Russian units with limited artillery, armor and drone support can be overwhelmed by relatively small units of fast, highly mobile troops carried by strong but readily sacrificed armor. The Russians like to mass overwhelming force in priority areas, which leaves many other sectors open to attack. Simultaneous decimation of local logistics makes the Kremlin defenders' tasks even harder. These targeted attacks and counterattacks have resulted in disruption of Russian plans, diversion of resources and expanded Ukrainian opportunities. JL 

Yevhenia Martinyuk reports in Euromaidan Press:

Ukrainian forces stormed into Russia’s Belgorod Oblast. This high-risk move exposes Russia's Sumy assault flanks to attack and reveals Ukraine’s brutal new tactical reality: for the past six months, they’ve been deliberately sacrificing armor to punch through Russian defenses, representing a cold strategic calculation: trading size for speed: "advancing 3-7 kilometers and capturing a position." These battalion-sized attacks target vulnerabilities: poorly defended areas where artillery isn’t fully deployed. Before striking, Ukrainians hit supply chains, leaving enemy positions under-resourced. As in Kursk, small mechanized group tactics (prepare) for larger breakthroughs as targeted counterattacks disrupt Russian momentum and create diversions, leading to expanded Ukrainian control zones.

In a bold escalation, Ukrainian forces have stormed into Russia’s Belgorod Oblast even as they lose ground in Kursk. This high-risk chess move forces Russian commanders into an impossible position—they must decide whether to continue pushing toward Ukraine’s Sumy Oblast while potentially exposing their flanks to Ukrainian attacks.

Defense analyst Yan Matveev has revealed Ukraine’s brutal new tactical reality: for the past six months, they’ve been deliberately sacrificing armor to punch through Russian defenses.

“They knew many armored vehicles, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles would have to be left on the battlefield,” Matveev explains. Far from battlefield failure, these losses represent cold strategic calculation.

Ukraine’s commanders have essentially accepted a blood price for forward progress—trading expensive Western-supplied equipment for territorial gains in a grinding war where traditional tactics have failed. Euromaidan Press summarized Matveev’s analysis, asking whether these new tactics are worth the cost and if they could ultimately help Ukraine secure a victory.

Ukraine’s new combat math: speed over size

What’s a typical attack? The classic formula demands a three-to-one advantage—three times the soldiers and equipment to overcome defenders while accepting triple the casualties.

 

“Russian forces employ consecutive waves of attacks—one wave is destroyed, then they send the next, wearing down the enemy to eventually take positions,” says Yan Matveev. This approach burns through resources before securing any gains.

Conventional wisdom says: without massive reserves, don’t attack. Insufficient forces risk wasting soldiers’ lives.

“But Ukrainian generals thought differently, proposing attacks by fast mechanized groups, whose main advantage is speed,” the analyst explains.

This tactic was clearly demonstrated in Kursk Oblast offensives near Berdin on 5 January and toward Fanaseevka and Cherkasskaya Konopelka on 6 February.

“Losing equipment instead of people—trading specific combat vehicles for limited, specific results: advancing 3-7 kilometers and capturing a village or a single position,” Matveev concludes.

Ukrainian offensive on the village of Berdin in Kursk Oblast in February 2025. Screenshot from Reporting from Ukraine video

Bradley IFVs lead Ukraine’s lightning assaults

Each attack deploys about an infantry battalion with 15-25 equipment pieces. At the heart are Bradley IFVs, which appear in virtually every assault.

 

The formation typically includes one to three engineering vehicles for breach clearing, plus mine-resistant MRAPs like the American Maxxpro or armored personnel carriers like the Striker and Ukrainian BTR-4E Bucephalus.

BTR-4 combat vehicle. Photo: Screenshot from Yan Matveev’s video

Tanks?

“They play a secondary role, sometimes not appearing at all—they’re slow, heavy, and offer little transport capability. The transport function comes first,” Matveev explains. “The main task is rapidly moving infantry into the attack area and, if possible, providing fire support.”

Engineering vehicles push aside concrete barriers and clear minefields, inevitably taking casualties—one or two vehicles lost per pass. Then come the Bradleys, well-protected against mines. When they do hit explosives, infantry simply bail out. These abandoned vehicles, ramps open, now litter the Belgorod border—silent evidence that troops have already disembarked and pushed forward.

Source: ISW maps

Equipment losses don’t stop Ukraine

Once through the lines, the column races toward open terrain, ideally onto a good road, accelerating toward the target. This is when Russian drones begin their attacks. The critical task? Stay focused—abandon damaged vehicles and keep moving with the infantry. If the border breach is already made, half the battle is won. The objective lies just 2-3 kilometers away, manageable on foot through fields. Ideally, troops reach a settlement, disembark infantry, and send surviving armor back to prepare for the next wave.

Success requires three key elements:

• High-quality equipment—fast, well-protected, reliable
• elite infantry—special forces or experienced assault troops, fully armed and equipped
• and solid engineering support (during the Fanaseevka advance in Kursk, Ukrainian forces even brought their own bridge).

Ukraine’s mine-clearing vehicle. Photo: Screenshot from Yan Matveev’s video

 

These attacks target specific vulnerabilities—poorly defended border areas with sparse troops or recently captured territories where artillery isn’t fully deployed and supply lines remain weak. Before striking, Ukrainians hit supply chains with drones, leaving enemy positions under-resourced. The small attack force size maximizes the crucial element of surprise.

“Any mechanized assault looks similar overall, but the devil is in the details,” Matveev says.

In the summer of 2023, the Ukrainian forces tried similar mechanized attacks but prioritized force over speed. They deployed too many slow tanks, chose ineffective routes, failed to reach roads quickly, and lost the element of surprise.

“Ukraine isn’t entirely to blame. Delays in Western supplies significantly impacted preparation of the attacking forces,” the expert concludes.

Russian assaults: too slow or too fragile

Putin’s forces swing between two flawed extremes: heavily armored crawlers or unprotected speedsters. Their “barn-like” tanks and BMPs (with welded drone protection) advance in slow formations—perfect drone targets. This brute force only works after multiple waves or when Ukraine lacks air defenses.

The alternative? Speed without protection—motorcycles and civilian vehicles from Bukhanka vans (a Russian-made utility vehicle) to old Zhigulis (a Soviet-era sedan). The drawbacks are obvious: extreme vulnerability to air and ground fire. Machine guns stop these assaults cold. Mine clearance is impossible. The vehicles are noisy, may not trigger anti-tank mines, and can’t break through the barbed wire that Ukraine now deploys extensively.

Russian assault on a civilian vehicle. Photo: Screenshot from Yan Matveev’s video

 

Russia’s greatest weakness? Poorly trained, inadequately equipped infantry used as cannon fodder. “Of course, the Russian army has experienced soldiers and units. But they are few, and they’re spread thin,” says Matveev.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive proves the model

Ukraine first deployed small mechanized groups during the Kursk breakthrough but on a larger scale: multiple units struck the border simultaneously, then main forces followed once breaches were secured.

This operation represents a tactical evolution born of necessity. Ukraine minimized heavy equipment in favor of speed—adapting after months of defending against overwhelming Russian resource superiority.

When Putin’s resources began to dwindle, Ukraine returned to mechanized groups. The Berdin and Fanaseevka offensives were rapid—both began and ended in a single morning, with forces advancing 6-7 kilometers. Ukraine couldn’t hold Berdin but successfully captured Fanaseevka and Cherkasskaya Konopelka.

At the Pokrovsk salient in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine deployed only fast vehicles and APCs where no stationary fortifications or dense minefields existed. These groups broke through to Kotlyno and Pischane, disembarking in ruined houses to storm Russian positions. Similar counterattacks likely occurred at Uspenivka, Shevchenko, and Lysivka with Dachenske.

Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast on the Deep State’s map

The Belgorod border breakthrough followed the same pattern—Ukraine left heavy equipment at fortified lines. Despite vehicles lost to mines and drones, infantry advanced through breaches using cars and ATVs to capture Demidovka and Popovka while continuing to engage.

Equipment losses didn’t halt the offensive. As Matveev notes, “No offensive can occur without losses. However, it’s far more advantageous to lose equipment than personnel, even when equipment is in short supply.”

Small victories, not war winners

Will Ukraine’s new tactics win the war?

“No. These operations succeed only with clear, achievable local objectives—capturing a village 5 kilometers from the front. That’s it,” the analyst says.

When attackers try to seize too much ground, everything collapses—supplies fail, equipment is lost, and the enemy, now aware, counterattacks. The hunter becomes the hunted.

Yet these small mechanized group tactics could form the foundation for larger breakthroughs. This happened in Kursk Oblast in August 2024, when small groups with engineering equipment and armored vehicles breached the border and, meeting minimal resistance, allowed main forces to advance.

This highlights surprise’s crucial role—it is harder to achieve with large reserves. A small group of 20 vehicles can assemble quietly without triggering a major alarm. Russian commanders don’t immediately divert resources to counter what seems like a minor threat, especially when drones quickly knock out some vehicles.

 

So, Russian forces fall into the trap of underestimation. Even days after the Popovka breakthrough in Belgorod, Ukrainian forces encountered only border guards—poorly armed and equipped compared to regular army units.

Currently, Ukraine deploys these mechanized groups for targeted counterattacks that disrupt Russian offensive momentum, for diversions, and to expand control zones.

“On crucial front sections, quality equipment and training gives Ukrainians a unique opportunity: though outnumbered, they locally seize initiative, attack, dictate battle terms, and control key areas,” Matveev explains.

If Ukrainian generals attempted traditional large-scale offensives, they would likely just waste their forces.