The US Has Handed Ukraine A Negotiation Advantage

By offering the ceasefire, which Ukraine avidly agreed to, the US - whether intentionally or not - has turned up the pressure on Putin. 

First, because it has led to the immediate resumption of military aid and intelligence sharing, whose cut-off created an advantage for Russia in Kursk oblast. But secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, it forces Putin to choose between wiping Ukraine off the map - or staying on Trump's good side. Expect Russia to reject - politely - the ceasefire as currently structured, but also expect Ukraine to continue to play the Kremlin dilemma to its advantage. JL 

Fred Kaplan reports in Slate:

Tuesday’s meeting in Jeddah, between his top officials and their Ukrainian counterparts, ended with the Americans handing Kyiv a clear advantage—militarily and diplomatically—and putting Moscow in a tight, awkward spot. Whatever the Russians decide, Ukraine will enjoy an immediate resumption of U.S. military and intelligence assistance. If Putin rejects the ceasefire offer, Secretary of State Rubio added, “then we’ll unfortunately know what the impediment is to peace.” Putin’s foreign policy rests largely on staying cozy with Trump and splitting the U.S.–European alliance. If Putin says nyet, Trump might even turn against Putin.

Maybe President Trump isn’t clamoring to push Ukraine under the bus after all.

Tuesday’s meeting in Jeddah, between his top officials and their Ukrainian counterparts, ended with the Americans handing Kyiv a clear advantage—militarily and diplomatically—and putting Moscow in a tight, awkward spot.

According to a joint statement released after several hours of talks, the two countries agreed to a 30-day ceasefire in the Russia–Ukraine war, hopefully to be extended for a longer span, segueing into negotiations toward a permanent peace. The ceasefire deal—which also contains details about a long-term settlement that have not been publicly disclosed—will soon be presented to the Russian government for its acceptance or rejection. Meanwhile, whatever the Russians decide, Ukraine will enjoy an immediate resumption of U.S. military and intelligence assistance, which Trump had suspended after his disastrous Oval Office meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky on Feb. 28.

 

Trump’s suspension of weapons deliveries—and especially his halting of intelligence on Russia’s movements—had started to damage Ukrainian troops’ strength and morale at a time when both sides are facing shortfalls and exhaustion. Even before the Oval Office meeting, when U.S. and Russian officials met to discuss an end to the war without inviting any Ukrainians to the talk, it seemed as if Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin were about to impose a peace on Kyiv—and that Trump had capitulated to Russia’s position.

Zelensky had pushed for the meeting in Jeddah to repair the damage done by the Oval Office disaster and, more broadly, to restore good relations with Washington, which are necessary not only for Ukraine’s war effort but also for his country’s stability—and possibly survival—after the fighting is over.

 

Whatever happens next, from Zelensky’s standpoint, the Jeddah meeting was an unqualified success.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin must be displeased—and more than a bit surprised. He has opposed a ceasefire unless it is preceded by a settlement of the war’s “root causes.” By his definition of those causes, he has insisted on the removal of Zelensky’s regime (which he sees as illegitimate), the “demilitarization” and “neutralization” of Ukraine (meaning its disarmament and a pledge never to join NATO), and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from much of Eastern Europe (which is to say, the reversal of the West’s Cold War victory).

In recent weeks, Trump has expressed sympathy for Putin’s views, saying that Ukraine started the war and remains the main obstacle to peace.

At the very least, the results of the Jeddah meeting put that proposition to a test. “The ball is in Russia’s court,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio said coming out of the meeting. If Putin rejects the ceasefire offer, he added, “then we’ll unfortunately know what the impediment is to peace.”

If Putin says nyet, even Trump might get the picture. He might even turn against Putin—whom he has openly admired for many years—for dissing his high-profile plan to end the war. He told reporters on Wednesday that Russia would face “devastating” penalties, mainly financial in nature, if it rejected the deal. He didn’t elaborate, nor is it clear what these penalties might be, given that the U.S. has already piled sanctions on Russia and that trade between the two nations is too scanty for tariffs to matter. Nonetheless, Putin’s foreign policy rests largely on staying cozy with Trump and thereby splitting the U.S.–European alliance; he may take the vehemence of Trump’s remarks as a warning that this partnership might be in danger.

 

Of course, Putin could accept the ceasefire, then refuse to abide by it. We have all seen, most recently in the Middle East, how difficult it is to sustain even a 30-day ceasefire, especially when one or both sides would rather keep fighting. It is unclear, at least from the U.S.–Ukrainian joint statement, how the ceasefire—whether for 30 days or an extended span—would be monitored and enforced. Some European countries, notably Britain and France, have offered to deploy peacekeeper troops on Ukrainian soil. Putin has rejected that idea out of hand. If actual peace talks get underway, he may have to change his position—or risk being seen, by the rest of the world and even by Trump, as the bad guy.

Even if a ceasefire happens, that wouldn’t necessarily mean the outbreak of peace. Nobody believes that a final deal would give back all the territory that Ukraine has lost to Russia since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 or even since the wider invasion of 2022. Zelensky doesn’t concede the point, but has said that he can’t stop fighting without some form of security guarantees, if not formally from NATO, then in some manner from select Western countries, including the U.S.—in order to deter or prevent Russia from reinvading months or years down the road.

Trump has said that the minerals treaty—which he and Zelensky were about to sign until the Oval Office blowup and which they now seem set to try signing again in a do-over—would be a more-than-ample substitute for a security guarantee. The Russian army, he argues, wouldn’t dare threaten Ukrainian soil once American miners and engineers are present, exploring and excavating its minerals (whose revenues the U.S. would then share). There may be something to this, but it’s doubtful that Western companies would send their workers to Ukraine without U.S. security guarantees—especially since half of Ukraine’s mineral wealth is buried on land that Russian troops currently occupy.

 

But those are issues for the future. In the meantime, National Security Advisor Michael Waltz—who represented the U.S. in Jeddah, along with Rubio and Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff—is carrying the ceasefire proposal, including details not yet publicized, to Moscow.

Trump also said he will personally talk with Putin soon. During that phone call, Putin will probably repeat his rambling lecture that distorts and falsifies the history and geopolitics of Russia and Ukraine—a lecture that Trump has accepted in the past. Trump very much wants to believe the tall tale, just as he wants to restore good ties between Washington and Moscow—but whether he continues to do so may depend, this time, on Putin’s actions as well as his words. If true, that in itself marks a major change in the relationship.