Ukraine Has Exposed the Russian Military As "Deeply Flawed, Ponderous, Weak"
Day Six of Ukraine's Kursk offensive finds Ukrainian forces advancing further into Russia with little evident coordinated Russian response despite the Kremlin's pubic pronouncement that Putin is managing "the situation."
No matter what happens from here on, Ukraine has exposed the Russian military as deeply flawed despite two plus years of lessons learned and that even NATO's retired weapons systems given to Ukraine are superior to Russia's. JL
Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:
What the Ukrainians have shown is that the Russian military remains deeply flawed and ponderous, and that much of Russia’s small successes in the Donbas have been due to Russia is free to fight with a huge asymmetrical advantage (not having to defend their own border). The Ukrainians seem to be integrating EW with UAVs and faster moving mobile forces. Russians have been complaining that they cant penetrate Ukrainian EW and at the same time the Ukrainians are cutting them off from their C2. Ukraine also attacked Russian airfields from which glide bombs drive their micro-advance strategy in the Donbas. They obliterate an area which is why they can only advance a tiny amount at a time.
This weekend update will focus at first on developments in the Kursk Offensive, then go into the Ukrainian ranged campaign against Russian airfields (why they seem to be targeting what they are) and then finally discuss the improving situation for Ukraine in US politics—particularly the selection of Tim Walz as Kamala Harris’s VP.
The Kursk Offensive Continues
The Russian oblast of Kursk is now partially occupied by Ukraine.
Since the podcast was recorded and I sent out my overview of the offensive to subscribers, the offensive has continued and Ukraine has been steadily increasing its area of control. To give you only the most conservative map projections, this was yesterday’s update from Deep State.
Andrew’s is slightly more ambitious in the ground taken, but that is not a surprise as Deep State is notorious in waiting to show Ukrainian advances. Many other maps, for instance, are showing deeper penetration than Perpetua’s.
His map shows a penetration of almost 15 miles at the most extreme point (the furthest extension in the blue) with Ukrainian forces showing up even further out (the yellow).
In other words, the Ukrainians are not retreating back into Ukraine. They are pushing on deeper into Russia. There is a huge amount of speculation as to their ultimate aim—and what is impressive is that the Ukrainian government and military is leaking nothing on the matter. They have been impressively tight-lipped both in the organizational and now the launching phase of the operation.
So publicly no one really knows what the aim is. I asked the former Ukrainian Defense Minister, Andriy Zagorodnyuk what he thought the Ukrainian intention was—and while he (rightly) made no comment on the ultimate territorial or time expectations for the offensive, he gave a number of important military/geopolitical explanations that might be underlying the offensive. The 5 reasons he mentioned are (people who received my subscriber update already have these).
“1) To divert Russian forces from other fronts, particularly near Kharkiv
2) To demonstrate to the Russians that they have an unprotected border and are incapable of defending themselves to dissuade further cross-border attacks into Ukraine
3) To demonstrate to the world that the Russian army, even with half a million soldiers in Ukraine, remains weaker than they understand
4) To test new tactics in combined arms operations for greater use later in the war
5) To take the initiative away from the Russians and damage their morale.”
What the Ukrainians have shown is that the Russian military remains deeply flawed and ponderous, and moreover that much of Russia’s small successes in the Donbas this year have been down to the fact that Russia has been freed to fight with a huge asymmetrical advantage (not having to defend their own border). The fact that the Russians have not had many troops on their border seems to be a direct result of US pressure on Ukraine not to launch attacks into Russia itself (a phase of the war that is now well and truly over). However up until now this has handed a huge amount of the initiative to Russia. They could choose when and where to attack Ukraine from Russia (See the Kharkiv Offensive in May), and didn’t have to use many troops defending their own border (an amazing thing in war). Ukraine, on the other hand, has been forced to attack only in Ukraine itself—where the Russians could plan and dig in—creating strong defensive lines.
In the discussion of the war, this is something I’ve been banging on about for years—but people mostly chose to overlook its strategic effects. Its been massive and greatly inflated Russian power. The Ukrainians have just exposed it for the stupid and retrograde policy that it was.
Beyond exploding this little strategic bomb, the Ukrainians, as Andriy said, also seem to be working on new tactics for combined arms offensives. Now this is interesting—and I wont say much because all of this is based on batches of unsubstantiated reports. However, the Ukrainians seem to have been integrating EW with UAVs and faster moving mobile forces very well. Russians have been complaining that they cant penetrate Ukrainian EW and at the same time the Ukrainians are cutting them off from their C2.
There will be much more on this in the future.
So we are left with the question of what will happen—and of course the answer is only Kyiv knows. What seems to be happening, though, is that the Russians are moving (very slowly) to try and send forces to the area. So far Im hearing that this has not been a great success. The Ukrainians were clearly ready for the appearance of Russian reinforcements, and devastated this military column as it moved to counterattack.
The Russians were clearly not ready for this operation, and are not responding with the speed that they should. That is giving the Ukrainians time to decide what they want. Do they want to press in further? Do they want to start fortifying a salient in Russia itself, which will cost the Russians a great deal to try and retake. Or do they want to start an incursion somewhere else on the border, basically trying to tie the Russians in knots.
Both of these bases are located at important distances. They are far enough away that aircraft flying from them are safe from Ukrainian anti-air and the bases are just outside ATACMS range (probably). In other words, the Russians would have thought them relatively safe.
On the other hand, the bases are close enough that the Russians could use them to launch one of their most effective weapons system—the large glide bombs that they are using to pound Ukrainian position. These glide bombs pack a huge punch, and while they are not terribly accurate—they don’t have to be. Their explosive power is so great that even if they don’t hit a target exactly they can obliterate such a large area that they will probably damage anything nearby. The Russians have used glide bombs extensively as part of their micro-advance strategy in the Donbas. They basically try to obliterate an area in advance of their lines—force the Ukrainians out and advance into it. It helps explain why they can only advance a tiny amount at a time. I mentioned this strategy at the end of last weekend’s update.
What is heartening is that Ukraine seems to have the mass of UAVs to hit two of these bases in succession. It also shows their priorities and intelligence. They are trying to limit Russian attacking possibilities—which is always the best way to fight.
US politics looking better and better
Well, considering how things looked a month ago for Ukraine within the context of US politics—things are much better (though of course, much still needs to happen). A month ago Trump had a consistent and significant lead in the polls—and there was even talk of a Trumpian landslide over President Biden. To make things even more ominous for Ukraine, Trump selected JD Vance as his VP running mate. Vance has been as hostile to Ukraine as any member of the Senate, and at times has basically repeated Kremlin talking points word for word. It was another sign that a Trump administration would be very bad news for Ukraine. I put this piece together on Vance and Ukraine then.
Then things started turning. Biden dropping out of the race and being replaced by Harris as the presumptive Democratic nominee provided a huge boost to the Democrats, energized parts of the electorate that were either dormant or even considering voting for Trump. She first caught up in the national polls with Trump, and then in the swing states. Indeed, she now seems to have a small lead in both.
This is obviously a good thing for Ukraine, as Harris would probably follow the Biden Administration’s policy towards Ukraine. Intriguingly, and even more hearteningly, her VP selection, Tim Walz, has been openly pro-Ukraine for years. He has regularly and publicly stated his support for the Ukrainian cause, and the Ukrainian ambassador to the US, Oksana Markarova, has called Walz a “reliable friend” of the country. Here are some of her quotes on Walz.
"Governor Walz is definitely one of the leaders of such support and a reliable friend of our country".
The ambassador added that Minnesota is one of the states where the governor's active support helps Ukraine to conduct its advocacy campaign.
Tim Walz meeting with Ambassador Markarova in February 2024. https://www.minnpost.com/dc-memo/2024/02/d-c-memo-walz-takes-on-the-gop-on-ivf-helps-out-on-ukraine/
Early in 2024, when Ukraine was cut off from US aid by Republican obstructionism in Congress, Walz was a strong public campaigner for Ukraine. He even used quite striking language about Ukraine winning the war—and “driving out” the Russians from all of Ukraine.
So more and more is it looking likely that the Harris-Walz has a chance of winning—its seems that at worse they will continue the Biden policy and might even be more supportive of Ukraine. Considering where things were—this is a good thing.
As a Partner and Co-Founder of Predictiv and PredictivAsia, Jon specializes in management performance and organizational effectiveness for both domestic and international clients. He is an editor and author whose works include Invisible Advantage: How Intangilbles are Driving Business Performance. Learn more...
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