Failing To Advance Post-Avdiivka, Russian Reserves Needed Vs Stabilized Ukrainians

The Kremlin and Russia's military leadership believed that once they took Avdiivka, they would begin to roll back Ukrainian defenses, especially as Russian-corrupted US Republicans held up further military aid to Ukraine. 

The Russians were as right about this prediction as they were in 2022 about taking Kyiv in 3 days. Which is to say, the Ukrainian defenses have not only held, but have now forced Russia to commit reserves it had saved for a strategic breakthrough - that never happened. JL  

The Institute For the Study of War reports:

The Russian military is committing tactical reserves to Russian offensive efforts in the Lyman direction, near Bakhmut, and west of Donetsk to prevent Ukrainian forces from further stabilizing the frontline. These reserves were meant to exploit an envisioned Russian breakthrough of Ukrainian defenses, not support offensive operations against stabilizing Ukrainian defenses. These troops would be inadequate to permit the Russian military to collapse Ukrainian defenses. Russian forces have struggled to achieve more than gradual marginal tactical gains in Ukraine since mid-2022, and the introduction of limited reserves does not change Russian prospects for significant gains because Russian forces have not demonstrated the capability to conduct sound mechanized maneuvers to take large swaths of territory rapidlyRussian forces may be currently committing tactical and operational reserves to fighting in eastern Ukraine in an effort to maintain and potentially intensify the tempo of ongoing Russian offensive operations. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 14 that the Russian military command is committing tactical and operational reserves to Russian offensive efforts in the Lyman direction, near Bakhmut, and west and southwest of Donetsk Oblast to prevent Ukrainian forces from further stabilizing the frontline in these areas.[10] Mashovets stated that many of these reserves were meant to exploit an envisioned Russian breakthrough of Ukrainian defenses, not necessarily to support current Russian offensive operations against stabilizing Ukrainian defensive positions.[11] Mashovets stated that Russian forces recently committed additional elements of the 3rd Army Corps (AC) to fighting southwest of Bakhmut; an unspecified reserve regiment of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 10th Tank Regiment (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC) to fighting southwest of Donetsk City; and elements of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA]) to the Lyman direction.[12] Mashovets added that Russian forces still possess appropriate reserves to further intensify offensive operations but that these reserves would likely be inadequate to permit the Russian military to collapse Ukrainian defenses.[13] Russian forces have previously struggled to achieve more than gradual marginal tactical gains in Ukraine since mid-2022, and the introduction of tactical or even limited operational reserves in itself does not change Russian prospects for operationally significant gains because Russian forces have not yet demonstrated the capability to conduct sound mechanized maneuvers to take large swaths of territory rapidly