What Stalemate? Ukraine's Positional Warfare Stymies Russians. Again.
Informed observers might have thought that after the Russians's losses last winter at Bakhmut and this year at Avdiivka, they would have come up with a new strategy. But no.
Despite tongue clicking negativity from some elements of the western press (NY Times, for example), Ukrainian forces in defensive positions in the north are obliterating Russian attacks, while the Ukrainian Marines on the Dnipro River, against overwhelming odds, continue to resist Russian attempts to dislodge them. This is not a winter rest. JL RO 37 reports in Daily Kos:
Fighting has remained fierce. Between December 14 and January 4, the Russians launched a series of seven assaults towards the town of Synkivka, northeast of Kupiansk. Russian attempts to punch through these defenses have not gone well - columns of Russian BMPs rolling straight
into a minefield, getting pinned down by FPV drone attacks before the
remainder are subjected to artillery bombardment—topped off with a
cluster-munition shell raking the dismounted survivors. (And) Russian forces have relentlessly tried to
push Ukraine back from the left bank of the Dnipro River. Despite vastly outnumbering Ukrainian ground forces, Ukrainian drone warfare and artillery have
balanced the odds.
Although the battle lines have not moved more than a kilometer or two in any direction this winter, the fighting has remained fierce. Even in areas with fewer concentrations of Ukrainian and Russian troops, like the fighting in the far northeast around Kupiansk, Russia has been launching repeated smaller-scale assaults.
For example, between Dec. 14, 2023, and Jan. 4, the Russians launched a series of seven assaults towards the town of Synkivka, about 8 kilometers northeast of Kupiansk. Synkivka sits on the main highway approaching Kupiansk from the northeast. The town thus represents a crucial logistical stepping stone for any Russian attempt to recapture the strategically important town of Kupiansk, a key crossing site of the Oskil River.
Accordingly, Ukraine hasreportedly heavily fortified the town, including the laying of dense minefields to protect against potential approach vectors by Russian assault forces. The town is reportedly garrisoned by elements of the14thand30th Mechanized Brigades. Both are veteran units that date back to 2014 or before, although equipped predominantly with aging Soviet-era arms and equipment.
Russian attempts to punch through these defenses have not gone well.
Russia began a series of mechanized attacks running straight through the minefields north of Synkivka, sending columns of various tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles through narrow routes supposedly cleared of mines by Russian combat engineer units.
Despite the repeated failures, the latest video posted by the 30th Mechanized (above) shows yet another column of Russian BMPs rolling straight into a minefield and getting pinned down by FPV drone attacks before the remainder are subjected to artillery bombardment—topped off with a cluster-munition shell raking the dismounted survivors.
Similarly, Russian forces have relentlessly tried to push Ukraine back from its toehold on the left bank of the Dnipro River around Krynky. Despite vastly outnumbering Ukrainian ground forces in the area, Ukrainian advantages in drone warfare and artillery have balanced the odds.
Ukraine’s offensive in Krynky is being conducted by the light infantry brigade of the 35th Marines, supported by numerous artillery, drone, anti-aircraft, and electronic warfare units. However, Ukraine has veryfew armored vehicles on the left bank due to the difficulty of moving armor across the river without a bridge.
So where are Ukraine’s best armored units?
One of Ukraine’s most powerful armored units is the 47th Mechanized Brigade. It spearheaded the Ukrainian advance that liberated Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia portion of the summer counteroffensive, and given that it is equipped withM2 Bradley fighting vehicles and Ukraine’s most advanced Leopard 2A6 tanks, it is arguably the most powerful fighting unit in the Ukrainian Army.
The 47th Brigade is presently deployed north of Avdiivka, and has been instrumental in halting the Russian advance toward Stepove for over two months,
In particular, the Bradleys’ rapid-firing 25mm autocannons have been devastatingly effective at stopping both Russian light armor and massed infantry assaults.
One curious recent development has involved one of the 47th Brigade’s other advanced armored vehicles: its Leopard 2A6 tanks. Despite the fact the 47th Brigade is involved in one of the fiercest areas of combat anywhere in the present Russo-Ukrainian war, the Ukrainian General Staff appears to have stripped the 47th Brigade of itsLeopard 2A6s and replaced them with the ubiquitous T-64BV tank.
The21st Mechanized operates far to the north of Avdiivka, defending Ukrainian positions east of Lyman against a Russian offensive out of Kreminna. The 21st Brigade is sometimes called the “Swedish Brigade” because it received training in Sweden and was equipped with the highly advanced Swedish CV90 infantry fighting vehicle and Strv 122 tank (a Swedish variant of the Leopard 2A5 tank).
The 47th Brigade may have had under a dozen operational Leopard 2A6s remaining. It appears that Ukraine may have chosen to consolidateits remaining Leopard 2A6 and Strv 122 (Leopard 2A5s) as a single battalion attached to the 21st Brigade.
As the 21st Brigade received only 10 Strv 122s and has lostat least a few in combat, the Leopard 2A6s may have been needed badly. As a result, the 47th Brigade appears to now be operating the heavily upgraded Soviet T-64BVs, one of Ukraine’s workhorse Soviet-era tanks.
Extensive upgradesto its fire control systems and night fighting abilities make the T-64BV a dependable and solid if lightly protected tank.The T-64BV has performed admirably, and its night fighting capabilities have proved superior to many older Russian tanks. It is still an unmistakably inferior tank to a Leopard 2A6.
Why would Ukraine choose to remove its best tank from a unit involved in the heaviest and most desperate fighting anywhere in the war?
Instead, the reason may be simple scarcity and need. Unlike in past modern conflicts, tanks used in close-range assault roles in large numberssimply have not been a common part the fighting in Ukraine except during the first few months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Rather than pressing in at close ranges to assault enemy positions, the most common use of tanks has been as heavily protected fire support platforms—staying 2-3 kilometers back from combatwhile firing shells to support infantry attacks.
When both sides’ tanks are standing back 2-3 kilometers, the tanks only rarely venture into each other’s practical firing ranges,making tank-on-tank combat quite a rarity.
To the extent that tanks do venture forward, it is often torescue an embattled and isolated unit. If a Ukrainian infantry fighting vehicle is disabled and its crew and passengers pinned down, it is not an uncommon tactic for a pair of tanks to push forward to help.
Their heavy armor makes such a move more survivable, and its powerful main gun can be extremely threatening to anything short of a Russian main battle tank, forcing other vehicles to pull back. The tanks can lay down smoke and the survivors can hop onto the tops of the tanks tohitch a ride back to friendly lines.
In fulfilling such roles, it may be that the modern tanks are more needed by the 21st Brigade than the 47th.
The 47th Mechanized Brigade’s Bradleys have thepowerful TOW2 anti-tank guided missilesthat can help them take out all but the most modern Russian tanks with equally advanced electronic countermeasures. They can do this on their own, without the need for a tank acting in support.
Comparatively, the21st Brigade’s CV90shave a powerful firing 40mm autocannon that can tear up any Russian armor short of a main battle tank and utterly wreck dismounted infantry units—but it is not powerful enough to penetrate the frontal armor of most Russian main battle tanks.
Given that tank-on-tank combat is relatively rare in the first place, and that the Bradleys can hold their own against older Russian tank units better than CV90s, the 21st Brigade’s need for modern tanks may simply have been greater than the 47th Brigade’s.
Whatever the case may be, the episode also equally shows just how few modern tanks Ukraine has been given, and the struggle for Ukraine to meet the needs of its front-line units, juggling their limited resources.
The news isn’t all bad.
Some of Ukraine’s most elite units that led the summer 2023 counteroffensive appear to be resting, recovering, and incorporating replacement troops. There has been little sign of the powerful 82nd Air Assault Brigade, with its Challenger 2 tanks and American Stryker Fighting Vehicles, whichRybar reports as resting in Western Ukraine. There has been no sign of the 1st Tank Brigade anywhere on the front lines since earlyNovember 2023.
Ukraine has been busy standing upfive new mechanized Brigades(160th, 161st, 162nd, 163rd, and 164th) equipped largely with Soviet equipment. Some of these units are likely to receive the older Leopard 1A5 tanks that should be arriving in the hundreds in 2024.
Any hopes of a major victory may be slim without significant further U.S. and European aid, making reserves critical if Ukraine hopes to continue grinding down Russian combat strength in the continuing war of attrition.
As a Partner and Co-Founder of Predictiv and PredictivAsia, Jon specializes in management performance and organizational effectiveness for both domestic and international clients. He is an editor and author whose works include Invisible Advantage: How Intangilbles are Driving Business Performance. Learn more...
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