How Ukraine Can Achieve Conventional Warfare Victory With Enough Drones

Much of Ukraine's battlefield success to date can be attributed to its creative use of drone warfare against an enemy superior in size and resources. 

Drones have made it possible for Ukraine to hold its own even as European countries build up capacity - and as the US battles Russian corruption of some of its politicians. With greater range, accuracy - and lethality - drones can be expected to help degrade Russian capabilities going forward. JL 

Peter Olandt reports in Daily Kos:

The challenge of the Ukrainian battlefield is that the attacking infantry is observed by a small drone from kilometers away which calls in artillery fire (or drones). We have evidence that Ukraine can locally control electronic warfare to limit Russian drones. One tactic is targeting enemy drone operators and transmitters, destroying them.  Russian drone operators are less willing to go near the front now. So the drone problem may be solvable using old military concepts. Maneuver warfare can result in a smaller force defeating a larger one as the smaller force avoids the main mass of the enemy while striking at critical points causing the collapse of the large force. Ukraine can accomplish this.

Despite the battle lines having mostly frozen in 2023, a conventional military victory of ejecting Russia from all Ukrainian land (2013 borders) is still technically feasible.  Drones have made offensive warfare far more difficult through both spotting and direct attacks by drones.  Combined with trenches and minefields, any force on either side mobilizing and moving in large groups quickly becomes focused on by the enemy.  This extreme difficulty with offensive action has kept the war in an attritional stage for the past year.  But with the right supplies and preparation, it is possible for Ukraine to break out of attritional warfare and resume maneuver warfare.

While attritional warfare can be effective, it has the drawback of taking significantly more time than maneuver warfare.  For those not sure of the difference between the two, attritional warfare is generally world war 1 style trench warfare slogging it out for years over the same few miles of territory until one side exhausts a critical component of their military.  This can be ammunition, food, backing of the people, having enough people and so forth.  Frequently the enemy’s economy has to be driven into the ground to the point where they can no longer produce war goods quickly enough to keep the country fighting.

On the flip side, one of the classic victories for Maneuver warfare is the fall of France in 1940.  The German army anticipated the French and British armies going north into Belgium and the Netherlands and countered with an armored thrust through the Ardenne Forest cutting off the supply lines from France.  In addition, the French were unable to keep up with the quick movements of the German forces (for a variety of reasons) and eventually collapsed due to their inability to contain the German breakthrough.  Had Germany instead just bashed itself against the Maginot Line repeatedly the French may never have fallen.

In Ukraine we have seen both styles.  Russia’s initial invasion was a maneuver warfare attempt of trying to get to Kyiv quickly and decapitate the government by bypassing Ukrainian strongpoints.  Thankfully this attempt failed and the conflict shifted to attritional warfare.  That is until the Russians became perilously thin around Kharkiv and Ukraine took advantage by making a surprise maneuver warfare attack achieving great advances in days.  Unfortunately they could not sustain this drive and the lines reformed.  The Russians have since done a better job of “crypto mobilization” and have kept their manpower levels high enough to prevent a repeat of this.

Kherson was an example of an attritional warfare win.  While the collapse happened quickly, it happened because Russia could not send enough supplies and people over the river quickly enough to the point where Russia withdrew (after the US election) knowing it could not hold out indefinitely on that side of the river.  The land ended up being taken quickly once the withdrawal, but this was not due to maneuver warfare tactics but localized attrition.

Instead of being able to follow up with more attacks right away, Ukraine took 6-8 months to regroup and prepare for a summer 2023 offensive.  Had they had the equipment and forces available in late 2022 they probably would have kept on going instead of waiting.  Why this wait was necessary is unclear but in my own opinion likely tied to slow NATO response in sending offensive equipment in sufficient quantities.  Unfortunately it gave time for Russia to both entrench with insanely large minefields but to also improve it’s drone warfare.  And so when Ukraine attacked in the summer of 2023, Russia was prepared and prevented any quick breakthroughs.

Maneuver warfare is generally desired because it can bring a conflict to a quick victory as we saw in France in 1940 (obviously other parties were still fighting but France was out of it).  It’s great for morale (if you’re winning) as the lines on the map move quickly.  It can be far less costly in lives and equipment.  And it doesn’t drive the national economy into oblivion.  In Ukraine’s case, with Russian genocide of Ukrainians in occupied territories there is a desire to end that suffering as quickly as possible as well.  Maneuver warfare, if managed by a brilliant force top to bottom, can also result in a smaller force defeating a larger one as the smaller force avoids the main mass of the enemy while striking at critical points causing the collapse of the large force.  Again, something we all wanted for Ukraine.

So how does Ukraine get back to maneuver warfare?  We have heard reports of and seen some limited evidence that Ukraine can temporarily and locally control the electronic warfare element of the conflict and ground or limit Russian drones.  This has apparently happened around Adiivka at times.  How Ukraine has achieved this is unknown, but certainly plausible in the short term.  One of the tactics we do know about is the targeting of enemy drone operators.  Drones are all about maintaining signal and one of the ways to do that is by sending out a strong signal with a stronger transmitter.  Ukraine has been finding at least some of these transmitters and destroying them (and the drone operator with them).  Ukraine has been successful enough we saw a report saying Russian drone operators were less willing to go near the front now.  So the drone problem may be solvable and it may be solvable using old military concepts.

Most people get the concept of Superior Firepower pretty easily.  If they have a 100 rifles and we have 50 rifles and 50 artillery guns (with ammo) then we have the superior firepower.  Different militaries come at the concept of obtaining superior firepower in different ways, but in the end it frequently comes down to similar means.  Infantry is supposed to go take hill whatever.  As they approach they begin to identify different enemy threats.  They start being shot at by machine gun fire, they see enemy infantry, they see a tank, etc…. Sometimes the infantry is equipped well enough to take on the threat on their own.  Frequently however, they need to call for support and bring in superior fire.  Most commonly, it is local mortars or artillery.  Nowadays, it may be calling for drone support (or having a drone unit with them).  The US Army usually sends a call over to the Air Force to obliterate whatever is in the way.

The challenge of the Ukrainian battlefield is that frequently the attacking infantry is observed by a small drone from kilometers away which calls in enemy artillery fire (or drones).  The infantry never sees the spotter drone and so all they can do is radio in that they are under attack by artillery or drone.  In World War 2, spotting was done by a person and a radio.  If the spotter could see the infantry, the infantry could frequently have a chance at seeing the spotter (or taking some educated guesses) and call in their own artillery.  At the very least they could call in smoke, obscuring their location and movements and they hopefully get out of sight or get close enough to kill the spotter or make them run.  In the current environment, some drones can see through smoke or simply reposition easily to a new spot to get a better angle on the target not obscured by smoke.  With night vision and thermal sensors, nighttime is not the help it used to be.

In order to defeat the Russian defense of minefields, artillery and drones, the Ukrainians will need to engage in a modern version of the Superior Firepower doctrine to effect a breakthrough.  It would need to run as follows:

Pick the breakthrough point; somewhere with decent roads (or roads nearby) or firm enough ground to support supply.  Engage on a wide front around the point to activate Russian artillery and drone assets.  As these come on, Ukraine needs to identify the artillery or drone operator location and eliminate it before they scoot.  Wash, rinse, repeat over the target section of front until the drones and artillery is effectively suppressed.  

Then the infantry can move forward clearing mines with Bradleys providing suppression of enemy infantry and a chance to take out enemy tanks as well.  Ukraine could do a blanket jam of all electronic transmissions in the area to down all drones.  The Bradleys and Ukrainian infantry are superior to the Russians (on average) and without the Russian fire support helping the enemy, the Ukrainians can move forward.  Ukraine should run some old fashion land telephone line (or fiberoptic if we wanted to stay modern) to keep their own communications open during the jamming period.  This would continue to allow their own artillery  to support them.

As the initial breakthrough is achieved fresh infantry is brought forward to widen and deepen the breakthrough until they reach a breakout into the Russian backfield.  The breakout units would need mobile EW equipment to prevent Russian drones from targeting them once through the lines.  HIMARS would need to be tasked with supporting these units with on call fire.  Without air support, continuing the breakout would be dependent upon how quickly supplies can be brought through the new gap to feed artillery units following the lead units.

A challenge of the lead units would be keeping in contact with headquarters in an environment where jamming from both sides will be heavy.  The Ukrainians would need to give a lot of thought to the solution because obtaining a breakthrough will be expensive so they need to make the breakout count for all its worth.

I make this sound easy, but it’s not.  There are reasons neither side has done this in the past year.  But on the Ukrainian side they are solvable.  Ukraine has pretty much retreated into a defensive posture since September or October in part because the summer offense wasn’t going as planned, but also due to uncertainty with US support.  Ukraine can’t gamble on a big offense using considerable amount of ammunition if the US isn’t behind them.

For the next offensive, Ukraine will need to stockpile considerable amounts of ammunition, EW gear, and other material in order to achieve local fire supremacy against the Russians.  Not just superior firepower, but fire supremacy.  They need to have the resources to obliterate not just known Russian targets, but the extra ammunition to take chances on suspected Russian locations.  They need to overwhelm the Russians with preemptive shelling of supply roads.  Drone mining of Russian supply roads (but not the ones the Ukrainians hope to shortly use).  Wave after wave of drones such that even if only 10% get through, it’s enough to eliminate all targets.  

The collective Allied nations have the economic ability to support such an endeavor if they have the willpower to do so.  I am writing this article precisely to counter the conventional wisdom that nothing effective can be done against the Russian positions.  That is a false narrative.  It is true nothing can be done on a shoestring budget which is what we have been giving Ukraine (compared to the need, by some measures we’ve been giving a lot, it’s just that the need is so much greater).  IF we supply Ukraine with sufficient force they can accomplish this.

Don’t believe me?  How come no one expects Russia to win against the combine NATO forces?  Oh, because NATO still has a lot more supplies we’re not giving Ukraine.  Ukraine could field a million person army if they had the equipment.  2 million if needed.  Operation Desert Storm has just under 1 million allied personnel involved (3/4s being Americans).  If we really wanted Ukraine to win we’d provide them with the resources to make an army that large possible.  If they needed more soldiers, we could help financially support a larger foreign legion contingent.  France and Britain have experience with that.  Russia is doing that on their side.

But it all begins with understanding that Ukraine can win this if they have sufficient materials.  Would it look like Desert Storm?  Of course not.  It would need to fit the current dynamics.  But it is certainly possible.  We took back Kuwait, an autocratic country, because we felt it was in our country’s interest to not let other countries be as aggressive as Iraq was, and to not endanger global oil supplies.  Ukraine is a democracy fighting against the largest destabilizing force in the world and has large amounts of natural resources (much untapped) along with considerable grain production.  It is in our interest, morally and economically, to see this resolved as fast as possible and comprehensively as possible.

Ukraine can do this.  We need to give them not sufficient tools to maybe get it done, but overwhelming tools to make it happen.  And we need to not repeat the false narrative that nothing can break Russian lines.