After 3 Months, the Avdiivka Assault Continues To Be A Disaster For Russia

Three months after Russian forces launched their offensive against Ukrainian defenders at Avdiivka, the Russians have lost thousands of men, hundreds of armored vehicles, trucks and weapons in what has become a literal graveyard of bodies and destroyed equipment - and have gained far less than the Ukrainians won in their summer counteroffensive. 

If this continues - which it promises to as the Russians keep attacking in the same way at the same places - the Ukrainians will be in a better position to resume their offensive while the Russians will be even more depleted - and with nothing to show for it. JL 

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

It has now been 3 months since the most recent offensive by the Russians to take Avdiivka started. This has been a disastrous campaign for Russia. The Russians continue to assault the same area, have often used the same attack routes and done the predictable things. Russian losses in men and materiel continue to be extreme. The Ukrainians have extracted a massive toll on the Russians for a ruined shell of no strategic value for these losses. What the war over the last few months shows is that the Ukrainian military remains far more efficient and flexible than the Russians.

it has now been 3 months since the most recent offensive by the Russians to take Avdiivka started. They’ve been trying to take Avdiivka for alot longer than that—as it was just over the border from where the fighting started in February 2022. However in early October 2023, after building up what was considered quite a large force, the Russians started a major effort to seize the town. Usually 12 October 2024 is seen as the date that the offensive started.1 By 15 October Putin was mentioning that the town was being attacked—a sure sign that he was investing some real hopes that it would fall.2 British intelligence said at the time that it looked like the largest Russian troop concentration in since January 2023—in other words—they really wanted to take the town.3

 

Losses, however, have been very high. Already by the end of October, the US was saying that the Russians had lost 125 armored vehicles and extremely heavy casualties (many shot by the Russians themselves as they retreated). The Russians, however, have continued to assault, at times reverting back to the human wave assaults that they employed against Bakhmut. There have been some pretty horrific pictures of groups of Russian casualties closely packed having perished in what looks to be the same basic operation.4

In December, two months after the offensive started, US intelligence figures were released to CNN, and they showed continuing massive losses. The figures given were minimums, and US intelligence has generally been cautious when it comes to claiming Russian losses.

“Since launching its offensive in October, we assess that the Russian military has suffered more than 13,000 casualties along the Avdiivka-Novopavlivka axis and over 220 combat vehicle losses-the equivalent of 6 maneuver battalions in equipment alone,…”5

Now, here we are more than 3 months after the offensive started, and the Russian gains have been small (note, I started putting this together on the evening of October 12—but probably wont finish it and release it until October 13). I’ve used the maps by @AndrewPerpetua, which are excellent, to show where the battle lines are now and where they were at the start of October.6 Helpfully, these maps have a distance measurement (see top left hand corner) so you can see the ground gained—or barely gained to be more accurate.

For most of the line, indeed, there has been almost no change over 3 months, and where there has been some Russian advances (on the bulges to the north and south of the town) these advances have been a kilometer or two. Its worth noting that President Zelensky in one of his most recent addresses, mentioned some successful operations of Ukrainian troops around Avdiivka.7

What’s fascinating is how this battle is being portrayed and what has happened. Lets start with the reality.

This has been a disastrous campaign for Russia so far. The Russians have continued to assault the same area, which the Ukrainians obviously know like the back of their hand. The Russians have often used the same attack routes and done the predictable things—its hardly a shock for the Ukrainians to see the Russians press at the flanks. Russian losses in men and materiel continue to be extreme—and they keep coming.

Ukraine’s issue in this campaign seems to be a continuing supply of ammunition. With the suspension of US aid (shameful) from what I’ve heard, ammunition stocks at the front lines are becoming very stretched for the Ukrainians, and they are having to ration fire pretty substantially.

If supplies become so stretched that Ukraine has to abandon the town it will still have been a campaign that the Ukrainians were smart to fight as they have to this point. They have extracted a massive toll on the Russians for, what Im told, has been a significantly lower Ukrainian loss. The Russians would have gained a ruined shell of no strategic value for these losses. This is the kind of active defense campaign that Ukraine will want to fight for the next few months, maybe most of 2024. Extracting heavy losses, keeping their own down, and buying time.

Reporting Over Avdiivka—Compared to Ukrainian Counteroffensive

Now the reporting. The Russian campaign against Avdiivka can been portrayed as a relentless Russian effort which will soon bring success, while the Ukrainian counteroffensive of approximately the same length is now almost universally called a failure. The New York Times published a particularly strange piece, which claims that Russian attacks at Avdiivka and other places in the East shows that they are in the ascendant.8 The evidence is almost entirely anecdotal and comes from talking with (admittedly exhausted) Ukrainian soldiers. There is not a single evidentiary statement from Russian sources.

Ukrainians fighting near Avdiivka—picture from NYT story in question: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/13/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war.html

Btw, this is a huge problem with the war reporting. Western reporters are given huge latitude to talk to Ukrainian soldiers after combat, soldiers who are exhausted and almost certainly traumatized—and they relay their experiences honestly. Nothing similar ever happens with the Russians—so we are usually left with some statement about the Russians being relentless, making their soldiers seem like emotionless automatons. Take this comparison from the story:

Here is a part that comes from actual interactions with Ukrainian soldiers (all quotes in italics come from the same piece—will only note the first quote).

For now, Ukraine is in a perilous position. The problems afflicting its military have been exacerbated since the summer. Ukrainian soldiers are exhausted by long stretches of combat and shorter rest periods. The ranks, thinned by mounting casualties, are only being partly replenished, often with older and poorly trained recruits.

One Ukrainian soldier, part of a brigade tasked with holding the line southwest of Avdiivka, pointed to a video he took during training recently. The instructors, trying to stifle their laughs, were forced to hold up the man, who was in his mid-50s, just so he could fire his rifle. The man was crippled from alcoholism, said the soldier, insisting on anonymity to candidly describe a private training episode.9

Now the part about the Russians. There are no interviews, anecdotes, etc, just broad statements that make the Russian war machine seem powerful and relentless—as opposed to the very inefficient and wasteful institution that it is.

Outside Avdiivka, where Russian forces are concentrating much of their forces in the east, the rumble of artillery on one recent afternoon was almost nonstop. It was a soundtrack not heard since the war’s earlier months, when Russian paramilitary forces assaulted Bakhmut, eventually capturing it.

The soldiers defending Avdiivka’s flank said that some days, Russian formations had assaulted in nine separate waves, hoping for Ukrainian trenches to fold. It is a tactic replicated across the front by Moscow’s infantry, with little sign of stopping despite a high attrition rate common for a force attacking dug-in positions.

Its really baffling. The Russians have had massive losses, havent taken Avdiivka, yet the thrust of the reporting narrative is that they are having success—and are relentlessly on the march. The Ukrainian counteroffensive, which secured more territory than the Russians will take even if they seize Avdiivka, is however seem as a great failure—such as in this story. This is how the counteroffensive is portrayed near the start of the piece.

Ukraine’s military prospects are looking bleak. Western military aid is no longer assured at the same levels as years past. Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive in the south, where Jaeger was wounded days after it began, is over, having failed to meet any of its objectives.

So, what do we have. The Ukrainians started their counteroffensive, suffered losses, adjusted to that to keep losses down, and made modest territorial advances but certainly did not achieve what they wanted. The Russians have suffered much higher losses assaulting a much smaller area for the same amount of time—and this is shown as a sign that they are on the ascendant.

Actually, what the war over the last few months shows is that the Ukrainian military remains far more efficient and flexible—though that is not the story you will read in contrasting Avdiivka versus the Counteroffensive.

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The US Congress Getting to Crunch Time

The debate over US aid for Ukraine is reaching crunch time—and we should know soon if there will be a deal. There are a huge number of issues (which have much of the same political balancing act going on). There is the border fight, the aid for Ukraine and Israel fight, and the possible government shutdown fight. For those who dont follow US politics closely, the US government will (once again) run out of funds if Congress does not authorize spending very soon.

The spending fight gives what I would say is an important indicator of whether aid to Ukraine will be approved—because it will show whether Speaker Johnson will be willing ultimately to pass legislation that depends on Democrat votes as well as Republican—instead of working only with a small GOP majority.

The Republicans in the House remain as fractured as they have been. The extremists of the Freedom Caucus (poorly named) temporarily thwarted Johnson’s proposed budget deal, when more than a dozen of them voted against the procedure Johnson was going to use to get it through.10 Basically Johnson needs total unanimity from the GOP House members if he is going to get something through the House on party lines—and that unanimity ain’t there.

The upshot, is that if he wants the bill passed, the easiest way would be to work out a deal so that enough Democrats (who dont want the shutdown) join with the majority of the Republicans to pass it. This is what happened in November.11 Now, some moderate Democrats have just said that they would vote to keep Johnson as speaker if the Freedom Caucus made a move to oust him.12 If something like this does happen now, and Johnson decides on working with Dems to keep the government functioning and protect his position as speaker—that is a very good sign for aid to Ukraine. If, otoh, he opts to try and appease the Freedom Caucus—I think we can say not only is a government shutdown coming—its no new aid for Ukraine.

The majority for aid, keeping the government open, etc, is there. Its up to the Speaker, ultimately, to go down that road.