The Reason Modern Manoeuver War Requires Destroying Long Range Logistics
Ukraine knows what it needs to win and it is hitting Russian logistics with what it has. But it needs more if it is to stop an enemy who has no red lines and recognizes no international authority other than raw military power. JL
Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:
We have a chance to end the European security question for
decades by having Ukraine win and getting the country into NATO and the
EU. If this opportunity is not grasped, it will be a failure of historic
proportions.
(But) if Ukraine (is) to win the logistics war, continuing destruction of enemy warehouses, disruption of
supply chains and an increasing trucking distance for ammunition and
other logistics assets, Ukraine needs to adopt
missiles with an increased range. Modern maneuver warfare is about trying to
protect the vulnerable tank to give it a chance to advance. The
real heavy lifting occurs before the tank goes into action.
the most important/interesting story this week is that we have a long document written by General Zaluzhnyi (and is staff) about modern war and how to best aid Ukraine to help it win. This is of course if the USA actually wants Ukraine to win, as opposed to give up territory in a deal with Putin.
General Valerii Zaluzhnyi: https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3781585-zaluzhny-war-with-russia-moving-to-a-new-stage.html
Zaluzhnyi’s View of War
The Problem
If you have the time you can read this nine-page report which has Zaluzhnyi down as the lead author and is linked fromThe Economist, as part of an interview that he gave to them.1
Phillips’s Newsletter is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.
Its a meditation of how the ground war between Ukraine and Russia has evolved over the past year. He discusses how the war has moved from one of movement in 2022 to a “positional” contest in 2023. By positional he means that the front lines between the two sides are not moving a great deal—which Im sure is hardly something that comes as a surprise to people who have been following events. Indeed, the paper even makes reference to the “positional” nature of the “trench” warfare of 1914-1918, to discuss the challenge that Ukraine is now facing.
Ukrainian Soldier in a Trench System: 2023
British Soldiers in a Trench (World War I)
Of course Zaluzhnyi does not want to stay locked in this form of positional war, where only incremental advances are possible. Indeed the whole purpose of the paper is to discuss what is needed to end this phase of war, and transition back to a form of “maneuver” warfare, which would allow the Ukrainians to move forward and liberate larger chunks of their territory by making holes in the Russian defensive lines and being able exploit these holds.
So in a nutshell, Positional warfare is what we have (slow-moving, static lines, infantry based advances) and Zaluzhnyi wants to find a way to get to Maneuver warfare (fast-moving with breakthroughs that are vehicle based.
Now one of the problem with the whole way that people have addressed this paper is that they assumed Maneuver warfare was going to happen (when indeed it was always extremely difficult). However the pre-February 24, 2022 discussion of what the Russians were capable of, concerned how fast moving and overwhelming the Russian form of maneuver warfare would be. The well-known analyst Michael Kofman, who believed that the Russians had overwhelming military power and would be able to defeat Ukraine conventionally in a matter of “weeks”. He even tweeted out this map of a possible Russian invasion at the start of the war—and he had the Russians streaking across Ukraine. The Russians were to surround Ukrainian forces in the Donbas, seize Odessa, envelop Kyiv and might only stop after overrunning about 70% of the country.
Map Released on Twitter: @KofmanMichael
In other words, the war was seen widely as one that would be a maneuver war, and I think people got this idea ingrained in their minds.
Of course some of us were arguing that this idea was deeply flawed, because it not only drastically overstated Russian military capabilities, it failed to address the technological changes of the previous decades, changes that made vehicles such as tanks ever more vulnerable to a range of systems (hand-helds, mines, etc). And actually, this vehicle vulnerability has gotten worse over the previous 20 months, with the growth of the use of anti-vehicle UAVs.
Russian Tank exploding after Ukrainian UAV strike: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/04/28/russian-brigades-keep-sending-tanks-into-the-same-drone-kill-zone-near-donetsk/
So basically people had an idea of maneuver warfare that was never really possible as vehicles were vulnerable and are no more so, and you cant have a fast maneuver breakthrough without vehicles. So this brings us to the solution part of Zaluzhny’s paper.
Its all well and good to say you want to transition from positional war to maneuver warfare, however you have to come up with a way to do that. Most of Zaluzhnyi’s paper surrounds that issue, and he lays out a number of important steps that must be undertaken to allow this transition to occur for Ukraine. Easily the most important of these is to try and gain some form of air superiority for the Ukrainians.
Its facinating how much of Zaluzhnyi’s paper surrounds this. As he says right at the start, air supremacy is the key element in NATO modern warfare understanding.
Modern art of war involves gaining air superiority to successfully conduct large-scale ground operations. This is reflected both in the doctrines of NATO armed forces and in the governing documents of the armed forces of the russian federation.2
This highlights one of the fundamental problems with the way the Ukrainian counteroffensive was viewed this summer. People had visions of Ukraine breaking through Russian lines and streaking forward like a US/NATO planned advance—whenat no timedid Ukraine have the necessary preconditions for a NATO maneuver-warfare form of operation. Those who criticized Ukraine for not following NATO style combined operations tactics were basically criticizing a lion for not being able to fly. It was always a profoundly lazy and self-serving criticism—which I addressed a few months ago.
Now Zaluzhnyi’s solution to this problem is fascinating—in that it is overwhelmingly UAV based. Maybe if we had supplied Ukraine with a large number of F-16s earlier, he could propose something else, but as of now, he imagines trying to overwhelm Russian air defenses with UAVs. Apologies for the large quote, but its worth giving you this one in detail. Its also worth noting that Zaluzhnyi is talking only of gaining air “superiority”—which would be the temporary control of the air in a focussed area of operations (its not air supremacy). In other words its air control in a space and time limited fashion.
As for gaining air superiority:
simultaneous en-masse use of cheap unmanned aerial target simulators and attack UAVs in a single combat formation in order to overload the enemy's air defence system, mislead the enemy about the number of real targets in the raid and expose elements of the enemy's air defence system;
hunting down enemy UAVs with the help of our own hunter drones with trap nets on board in order to directly eliminate a destructive threat of materiel and personnel on the battlefield by kamikaze drones;
use of radiation simulators of the medium-range anti-aircraft missile system to target illumination stations in close proximity to the contact line in order to reduce the effectiveness of the use of glide guided bombs against our troops when assuming offensive (due to the fact that carrier aircraft will launch guided bombs from the maximum possible ranges) and reduce the manned aviation intensity due to the pilots' refusal to conduct sorties;
blinding of thermal imaging reconnaissance equipment and UAVs targeting with stroboscopes at night in order to complicate (prevent) strikes on the positions of troops (pieces of weapons and equipment) at night using UAVs equipped with thermal imaging equipment; en-masse use of electronic warfare assets (small and portable jamming transmitters, anti-drone guns, etc.) along the contact line of the parties to counter enemy UAVs in order to increase the ground forces protection from enemy UAVs.
Its fascinating to see the Ukrainians try and reimagine air warfare without aircraft. Zaluzhnyi is calling for overloading and destruction of Russian anti-air and UAV capabilities and the neutralizing of Russian air attack methods (glide bombs). This would both protect Ukrainian forces and allow Ukrainian attack with their own UAVs to have a chance for success.
Of course gaining air superiority in and of itself is not the only thing needed—its the most important, crucial first step, but Ukraine needs to be able to do more to make the transition to maneuver warfare. The steps that are enunciated by Zaluzhnyi are about degrading Russian forces and capabilities while building up Ukraine’s.
His next point is about the need to strengthen Ukrainian counter-battery capabilities (the ability to quickly identify, target and destroy Russian artillery once the latter reveals itself by firing). I have to say that this builds on a notion of what this war is, which is so different than it was expected to be. Before the full-scale invasion in many ways analysts were expecting a fixed-wing aircraft--tank dominated war. Actually, what we have now seen this summer is an artillery-UAV war. What Zaluzhnyi is saying is that if one side can take control of this artillery-UAV war, it will change the dynamic on the battlefield. If you want to read more, I discussed this concept back on July 2, if you want to read more.
One final thing that Zaluzhnyi believes will play a crucial role in Ukraine having the ability to take control of the UAV-artillery war, will be improved Electronic Warfare capabilities. This ‘invisible’ war, involves both sides trying to disrupt or even take control of enemy equipment by messing with its electronic signalling/communications. Both sides are putting real effort into this now, but no side seems to be able to dominate. Again, what Zaluzhnyi is saying is that if Ukraine is going to have a rapid advance somewhere, it will need to have a form of electronic superiority similar to air superiority. At the moments of advance, Ukraine has to have the ability to operate its equipment free of Russian electronic countermeasures and at the same time Ukraine needs to be able to use EW to keep things such as Russian UAVs operating.
So—what do we have to set the stage for maneuver warfare—it is:
Gain air supremacy
Achieve counter-battery dominance
These two steps will allow Ukraine to control the UAV-artillery war. However as a key part of this Ukraine must:
Strengthen its EW capabilities to thwart Russia in this area.
Now these are not the only things Zaluzhnyi mentions. He also talks about the crucial importance of Ukraine improving its command and control, its logisitics, and the building up of its reserves. These are the crucial behind the lines improvements that will allow the maneuver warfare to proceed if Ukraine can establish the battlefield preconditions above.
Now—what does Zaluzhnyi not mention in his piece. Well for the tank-boys in the audience its a pretty depressing read. I see no mention of tank, armor, MBT or AFV. Zaluzhnyi doesnt say they are unimportant, he just ignores them. In other words, he is basically admitting that modern maneuver warfare is about trying to do everything possible to protect the very vulnerable tank to give it a chance to advance. The real heavy lifting occurs before the tank goes into action.
Do we want Ukraine to Win?
Zaluzhnyi is actually asking this question without actually asking it—and to be honest, I dont know if many of Ukraine’s partners know the answer to it. As Zaluzhnyi points out a number of times, politely, Ukraine has been deprived of crucial ranged weaponry so far in the war. First he points out that the Russians have adapted by regularly moving equipment and supplies out of the range of Ukrainian capabilities. He mentions how both Russians started firing their artillery from maximum range and keep their aircraft well outside of the range of Ukrainian anti-air. Indeed he mentions range considerations far more than tanks, etc.
Then he says, not surprisingly, that if Ukraine wants to win the logistics war against Russian supplies, it must increased its range capabilities (though I dont know if this is a sign of resignation or not) he also says that this is preferably from homegrown developments than from Ukraine’s partners.
To continue the effective destruction of enemy warehouses, disruption of supply chains and an increasing trucking distance for ammunition and other logistics assets, the Armed Forces of Ukraine need to adopt missiles with an increased range, preferably of their own production.
Its in many ways the crucial question that needs to be answered honestly now. Do we want Ukraine to win the war and liberate all its territory? or Do we want Ukraine to be forced to accept a deal which hands over parts of the country to Putin? The rhetoric of western leaders is the former, though to be frank the policy looks more and more like the latter. We armed Ukraine this year specifically not to give it range, air superiority, etc. We forced it to launch direct assaults on defended Russian lines. Zaluzhnyi is saying that cannot continue. Either Ukraine is armed properly to win a modern war, or the technological imperatives will necessitate the continuation of this attritional war we have seen.
Western leaders must therefore answer that question now, and act accordingly.
You know my view—not arming Ukraine to win the war will be a catastrophe and will interject long-term instability into Europe. We have a chance to basically end the European security question for decades by having Ukraine win and getting the country into NATO and the EU. If this opportunity is not grasped, it will be a failure of historic proportions.
Even so, some will push hard to make this historic failure a reality. I wrote this paragraph in my weekend update #49 on 8 October—and its depressingly becoming true. Its about how we were soon going to see this summer’s fighting described.
Overall the view will be from the analysts who have been second guessing Ukraine that Ukraine had a great opportunity in the counteroffensive, but blew it because of their own mistakes and major Russian military improvements. The Ukrainians started the counteroffensive in a slip-shod way in early June, by launching the major effort without probing and stumbling into a well-prepared Russian kill zone. At that point the Ukrainians made too hasty a decision to abandon NATO combined arms tactics, and instead moved to the slow, attritional war that we have seen. This was a disaster, and now the war is favoring Russia, who is gearing up its war industries and will be gaining the upper hand in the coming months. Ultimately you will hear the analysts say that while they support Ukraine, the war is basically a stalemate that concessions should now be made for Russia to have a peace deal.
This is now the growing narrative, and it will get worse. Many of those who built up the Russian army before Feb 24, seem determined to push the Russian strength narrative and the Ukraine cant win idea. Its both wrong-headed in how it views war (the counteroffensive did not fail because Ukraine failed—it has reached this state because of the technologies involved), and because it fails to address the great question.
Ukraine can win the war. The question is simple. Do we want to aid Ukraine to do so?
As a Partner and Co-Founder of Predictiv and PredictivAsia, Jon specializes in management performance and organizational effectiveness for both domestic and international clients. He is an editor and author whose works include Invisible Advantage: How Intangilbles are Driving Business Performance. Learn more...
0 comments:
Post a Comment