China's President Xi announced plans to visit his fellow dictator Putin, even as Russia's forces have begun to falter - again - in their attempt to defeat Ukraine. Xi would undoubtedly like Putin to win because that would help advance his own designs on Asia. And he would be happy to provide more military aid to Russia but for two related problems: Russia is far weaker and incompetent than he or his minions imagined so they dont want to waste good weaponry on poor troops. That instinct is bolstered by the realization that united western allies have made it absolutely clear that they will trash the Chinese economy if he attempts to help Putin too obviously. So a flight to Moscow for a handshake and a smile is a lot cheaper than trainloads of tanks and artillery shells followed by an export ban from his biggest markets in the US and Europe. JL
Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:
In the last week the most important battlefield development is that Russian incremental advances around Bakhmut and other towns seemed to shrink, (revealing) a lessening in Russia’s offensive capabilities. The Russians took a huge gamble in throwing so much at Bakhmut because they are not a great power. The losses they suffered were not sustainable, and last week they had to ramp down operations as (they) reached the unsustainable point. This is to Ukraine’s advantage. It gives the Ukrainians time to rest and resupply their forces. China would like to aid Putin. (But) the Chinese remain unsure what the Russians are capable of, and don’t want to pay the price for supplying military support for Russia.Ive written so much about Bakhmut in particular over the last few weeks that I dont want to endlessly rehash that question in this update. However its worth pointing out that in the last week the most important battlefield development is that the Russian incremental advances around Bakhmut and other small towns have actually seemed to shrink. Indeed there seems to be a a general lessening in Russia’s offensive capabilities across much of the line.
Interesting comments by @DefenceHQ which supports the same analysis with @TheStudyofWar came up with yesterday. Russian ability to continue offensive operations seem to be waning for the moment.Latest Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine - 17 March 2023. Find out more about Defence Intelligence's use of language: https://t.co/y5daPr1dkT 🇺🇦 #StandWithUkraine 🇺🇦 https://t.co/IEAW3R5oPqMinistry of Defence 🇬🇧 @DefenceHQThis is an important development—because so much of the arguments being put forward by those who were claiming that the Ukrainians needed to pull out of Bakhmut for instance seemed to be based on an assumption that Russia could simply keep up its offensive pace. As if the Russians were immune from losses because of a special Russian way of war.
This was always going to be a reach, and I fear it reveals that the analytical group that drastically overrated Russian capabilities before 24 Feb 2022 still cant fully grasp what the Russian military is capable of—or more clearly not capable of. That has been amplified by a general belief of the supposedly huge (and mostly non existent) military reserves that Russian can tap. Actually, the Russians took a huge gamble in throwing so much at Bakhmut precisely because they are not a great power. The losses they suffered were not sustainable in the long-term, and last week it seemed that they had to ramp down operations as their losses reached the unsustainable point.
Russia is sustaining "1200, 1300 even 1500" casualties a day in its current offensive, mostly in Bakhmut. Killed to wounded ratio is one to three - senior Nato official, speaking on condition of anonymity.This is to Ukraine’s advantage right now. It gives the Ukrainians time to rest and resupply their forces in Bakhmut. The Russians might restart offensive operations soon (indeed the Ukrainians want the Russians to attack—better to attrit them further), but if they do, it might mean even more losses for the Russians. This was is horrible, but the more the Russians use their resources in these very wasteful offensives over political-minded non-strategic targets like Bakhmut, the better it is for Ukraine.
The big Chinese announcement this week was that President/Dictator Xi would soon be visiting Putin in Russia. On the surface this was one of the most important signs recently that the Chinese government remains committed to its ‘forever’ friendship with Russia.
China says its leader Xi Jinping will visit Russia next week and meet President Vladimir Putin, Xi's first visit since Russia invaded UkraineHowever once this was announced it was quickly followed up with the news that the Chinese leader would call President Zelensky after his visit to Russia.
Xi Jinping's call with @ZelenskyyUa, as reported by @KeithZhai in @WSJ, is a must-do pillar in 🇨🇳 framing of Xi's visit to Moscow. Make no mistake: the trip will be about deepening ties to 🇷🇺 that benefit Beijing, not about any real peace brokering. 1/ wsj.com/articles/china…This need to make it clear that Ukraine would not be ignored shows the real bind China has gotten itself into with this war (imho). That was also shown in the interesting trickle of news that is coming out about Chinese military aid to Russia. There are signs of some very limited aid being supplied to Russia. China is trying to quietly slip in dual-use goods and smaller items (rifles, body armor) but not provide the major aid Russia needs.
China isn’t selling a large amount of weapons to Moscow specifically to aid its war effort, but data reveals that China is supplying Russian companies with “dual-use” equipment that could also be used on the battlefield in Ukraine. #DragonBear #geopoliticsWhat does it show? Two things I would say. The first is that China (at least President Xi) would very much like to aid Putin and very much would like Putin to win. The triumph of dictatorship is something very important to the Chinese regime, whereas a Russia that becomes more pro-European and integrated into the west would be a strategic nightmare for them. However the second thing it shows is that the Chinese remain really unsure what the Russians are capable of, and therefore really don’t want to pay the price they would have to pay for supplying large amounts of military support for Russia. The Chinese cant be impressed with the Russian military performance so far, and at the same time its been made clear to them that the European and US response to any large-scale aid to China.
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-diplomat-josep-borrel-china-russia-ukraine-war/
So lets see how the Putin visit/Zelensky phone-call dynamic plays out. However, on the surface, Chinese policy towards the Ukraine war for now remains stuck between a Rock (wanting Putin to win) and a Hard Place (having to pay a real price if they aid Putin).
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