Why Russia's Winter Offensive Appears To Be Petering Out

Maps reveal that Russian forces continue to attack all along the front line - and have nothing to show for it. Many Ukrainian defensive positions were originally built in 2014. And bombardment levels have decreased markedly from two months ago.

While the Russians maintain they are degrading Ukrainian troop and equipment, the opposite appears to be more likely, given the astounding Russian casualty rates. The big question is how the Russians will perform when Ukraine goes on the offensive. JL 

Mark Sumner reports in Daily Kos:

For the last two months it’s been Russia making its big winter push and Ukraine on the defensive, and … nothing much has really changed. Yesterday, once again, the Ukrainian General Staff reported the Ukrainian military repelled more than 100 attempted Russian advances in a single day. Bakhmut (is) stable. On both north and south, Ukraine seems to be holding Russian forces from gaining access to the remaining roads into the city, and even pressing Russian troops back in some areas. (Other towns envy) the tourist dollars Vuhledar will enjoy when this is over and everyone goes there to see the Museum of Russian Pigheadedness.

If most of this week had been a story of declining Russian operations—so much so that the question of whether Russia’s offensive had already culminated was seriously being asked—that seemed to change yesterday. Once again, the Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian military repelled more than 100 attempted Russian advances in a single day. With those attacks happening up and down the long front, this seemed a good time to do something the update has been missing — review the maps.

Some of the areas, such as that surrounding Kupyansk, haven’t been looked at in some weeks. Others, such as that just south of Zaporizhzhia, have been missing in action for months. So consider this a snow day when it comes to any sort of meta-analysis or search for broader context. 

We’re going to look at maps.

The first portion of the map to discuss is the part we’re not going to be looking at. We’re not look at the border between Ukraine and Belarus, since there continues to be no sign of anything happening there. Remember when just a few weeks ago there were all these declarations that Russia was sending troops into Belarus for another push on Kyiv? That included this fun January 19 story from Newsweek, that claimed Russia was “using railway tank cars to secretly transport troops to Belarus.”

The idea was silly then, and it looks sillier two months later. Anyway, there’s still no action along the border. Ukrainian officials note that: “The Russian Federation continues to maintain a military presence on the territory of the Republic of Belarus, but without the formation of offensive groups.” They also note that Belarus is doing some “terrain altering.” That is, they’re digging trenches on their side of the border, because they’re more worried about Ukraine coming in that Russia going out.

Kupyansk Area. Open image in another tab for a closer view.

Even more than the area around Bakhmut, a comparison of this map to the last time we were at this end of the line gives the impression that Russia has gained a lot of ground. After all, Ukraine recently held nominal control of almost every area in the “disputed” portion of this map, as well as some villages now back in the red. But the truth is most of these towns were never garrisoned with any significant force. Ukrainian troops passed through. Medical teams checked up on residents in some areas. But most of the action in this area was focused on clearing the P07 highway to the southeast. Ukraine still seems to have control over that highway in this area. You could just about draw the lines of dispute anywhere north of that highway. With the exception of fighting close to Dvorichna, which has been tough, it doesn’t appear that Russia has devoted a lot of effort in this area. There’s been a lot of claims that it was about to retake Kupyansk, but there doesn’t seem to be any threat of that happening soon.

Ukraine actually noted 13 seperate attemps

Svatove Area. Open image in another tab for a larger view.

This is another one that can look disappointing when compared to the last view. However, for the last two months it’s been Russia making its big winter push and Ukraine on the defensive, and … nothing much has really changed. The biggest difference in the map here is that a larger area has been put into the disputed category based on reported Russian assaults. So little has really changed in this area that Novoselivske and Kuzemivka appear to be still divided along the same rail line where forces were facing off in October.

Ukraine pushed up to that intersection west of Svatove during their push in the late fall. Russia put at lot of that area along the highway back into dispute with their winter offensive. But not much really changed hands. Be prepared to see that same kind of thing when we move south. 

Kreminna Area. Open image in another tab for a larger view.

Kreminna was supposed to be the heart of Russia’s efforts to turn things around in the north, but mostly what they’ve done is spin their tires, and treads, fighting General Mud. I’ve ceded those areas along the highway north of the city back to Russian control, mostly because they haven’t shown up in the list of recent repulsed assaults, and the area of dispute has been shifted west, but there’s not a lot of evidence of movement.

On the south, Ukraine remains in the forested areas adjacent to the city, in spite of multiple aborted efforts to flush them out. I’ve put Dibrova in Ukrainian control here, but it likely should be noted as disputed as well, as it appears that Ukrainian forces are actually based just west of Dibrova proper. At the south end of the map, Russia has made almost daily runs at Bilohorivka — likely out of wanting to claim they held every major settlement in Luhansk. It hasn’t worked. 

Ukraine reports that Russian forces are still actively trying to break through here, and just as at Svatove it’s disappointing to see some of those small towns around Kreminna back in the yellow or red after they appeared to be stepping stones to Ukraine taking the city. But again, Ukraine has been on the defensive here. That Russia hasn’t really been able to move them away from Kreminna, even though Ukrainian forces were not in any sort of prepared defensive position, is kind of extraordinary.

Bakhmut Area. Open image in another tab for a larger view.

I’ve expanded the usual area around Bakhmut both to give something of a larger overview of the area and to keep the scale similar to that of the other maps. Usually, when looking at Bakhmut, the area under consideration is really quite small.

In this larger view, it’s easy to see that the real Russian advance in the area is related to the occupation of Soledar and subsequent movement along the highway north of Bakhmut. That advance is powered by the same thing that brought Russian forces ot Bakhmut in the first place: logistics. So long as Russian can hold the M03, and the smaller highways that feed into it, they have their route laid out for their genuine strategic goal up the road at Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.

But what’s happening at Bakhmut itself seems to be a kind of odd stability. The little explosion icons mark areas of conflict in this area over the last day. On both north and south, Ukraine seems to be holding Russian forces from gaining access to the remaining roads into the city, and even pressing Russian troops back in some areas. Wagner Group forces are reportedly still picking their way through buildings in northern Bakhmut, but that effort is moving slowly.

It’s been a week since Russia moved close to cutting off Ukraine’s access, and what seemed like a deathwatch last weekend seems indefinitely delayed now. 

Donetsk Area. Open image in another tab for a larger view.

The amazing thing about this area is that, in spite of multiple Russian assaults each and every day of the invasion, very little ever seems to change. In areas, Ukrainian troops are still sitting in the defensive works thrown up in 2014.

In general, Russia is throwing a lot of shells across this line, and continuing the same kind of small, disconnected attacks that have characterized its offensive in many areas. 

Velyka Area. Open image in another tab for a larger view.

Really, this is a “not many towns big enough to be called towns” area. I’ve added it mostly because Vuhledar is in this area, and Vuhledar is now famous. Other villages along this line are likely wishing that Russia would run a few fruitless assaults their way so that they can get in on the tourist dollars Vohledar will enjoy when this is over and everyone goes there to see the Museum of Russian Pigheadedness. 

In addition to running their forces up that road right through Vuhledar, Russia has tried going a little bit to the west and a little bit to the right. This week alone, they’ve tried both. Both failed. Again.

If you compare this map to previous maps I made of this area, it looks as if Ukraine has made several advances. That’s not so much the case as it is that I was noting down villages that Russia claimed to have captured, and now that I’ve taken more time to look it turns out, shockingly, that Russian sources lied.

Hulyiapole Area. Open image in another tab for a larger view.

As with the previous map, the apparent shift of the line south when compared to previous maps is largely just a better understanding and review of recent reported assaults. 

There hasn’t been a lot of action on this part of the line in recent weeks, but what could be a significant event happened hear on Wednesday. That’s when a small Ukrainian armored force drove down that road toward Polohy, before being turned back by a combination of artillery and portable anti-tank weapons. Ukraine lost four M113s in the process, along with what looks to be at least a dozen troops.

That event seems to mark the kind of “reconnaissance in force” that has seen both sides waste so many men in this war. However, this place and this time seem odd for Ukraine to be making such a low-key assault. The force sent wasn’t large enough to capture Polohy, though it did get almost to the town before being turned away. It ends up looking like a way to test the waters and determine how good a job Russia has done of mining their roads (spoiler alert: they haven’t). But if that was the purpose, it was an expensive test.

Orikhiv Area. Open image in another tab for a large view.

This area directly south of Zaporizhzhia has been exceptionally stable, with the estuary at Kamyansk pretty much marking the boundary for months now. Things haven’t been silent. There have been a lot of small scale assaults and a lot of slight drifts of that control line. Many of the small villages along that line have been absolutely pummeled by shelling. But considering the forces both sides reportedly have—at Zaporizhzhia on the Ukrainian side and down at Melitopol for the Russians—the level of activity has been remarkably low. 

Pretty much every analyst seems to believe that this area will be a focus for the Next Big Offensive. It would certainly be understandable for Ukraine to direct its forces this way to break through to Melitopol and Mariupol. Russia probably finds it a bit embarrassing to claim it owns Zaporizhzhia without being able to put one man in Zaporizhzhia. This area could end up being the real test of which side has spent the winter rebuilding and preparing for spring, and which has spent it exhausting all available resources.

The names of towns in this area are unfamiliar at the moment. Don’t expect it to stay that way.