What continues to be evident in Russian initiatives is a lack of recognition that the Ukrainians are looking at the battlefield options the Russians have and then designing tactics for thwarting them with as much damage and as many casualties as possible. Why, after almost five years, the Kremlin refuses to recognize this, will be the stuff of great history some day. At present, it is the stuff of great Ukrainian intelligence, planning and performance. JL
David Axe reports in Trench Art and Clement Molin reports in X:
David Axe reports in Trench Art and Clement Molin reports in X:
Two Russian combined arms armies spent months planning a powerful mechanized assault toward Kramatorsk. The attack failed on July 22nd. Ukrainian air assault brigade spoiled the attack in a complex operation beginning in April. Despite having been in the area for eight months, Russian forces had been unable to consolidate their positions; rivers complicated logistics, and it was impossible to concentrate large numbers of troops. The Ukrainians were able to advance stealthily behind enemy lines, reaching the Mokri Yali River. Counterattacking through gaps in Russian defenses 60 miles southwest of Kramatorsk, the paratroopers pinned down half of the 90th Division’s forces. So when the division attack in July, it attacked weakly. Ukrainian drones made quick work of the advancing T-72B3A tanks and other vehicles. This operation is taking place because the Russian army is unable to bring reinforcements to the front as anti-tank ditches prevent any Russian mechanized attempt at relief.























