Russian Submarine Commander Who Defected From Ukraine Killed By Bomb

Russian Naval Captain Robert Shageev, who had commanded Ukraine's only submarine in 2014 but defected when the Russians seized Crimea that year, was killed by a bomb placed near his home in Sebastopol earlier today. 

Ukraine neither forgives nor forgets. JL

The Kyiv Post reports:

Russian Naval Captain Robert Shageev was killed earlier today when an explosive device detonated near a residential area in Russian-occupied Sevastopol. He was a Captain1st rank in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Shageev previously served in the Ukrainian Navy and commanded the Zaporizhzhia – Ukraine’s only submarine at the time. He defected to Russia after Moscow occupied and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014. Shageev later served in Russia’s Black Sea Fleet as deputy commander of its 4th Separate Submarine Brigade. Ukraine charged him with treason and desertion over his decision to join the Russian military. Shageev continued serving Russia during its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. He had commanded the Stary Oskol, a Russian submarine capable of carrying Kalibr cruise missiles.

Ground Robots Purchases By Ukraine Troops Up 680% Over Last Year

Ground drones have become so popular with frontline Ukrainian combat units that orders of various types placed with the state platform that loosely resembles Amazon - ranging in capability from logistics support to attack weapons - are up 680% this year over last year. 

There are now 280 suppliers making hundreds of variations. JL

Jake Epstein reports in Business Insider:

Ukrainian troops are rushing to a digital weapons marketplace to buy record numbers of ground robots, reflecting the surging popularity of these combat machines on the battlefield. The Ukrainian state innovation platform, said the military has ordered more than 3,000 ground robots from its digital marketplace, including 640 units in July alone. That represents a 680% increase over 2025's monthly average. Ukraine launched the Brave1 Market in April 2025, granting soldiers access to an Amazon-style website to buy military technology, such as drones, robots, and electronic warfare systems. In October 2025, ground drones became eligible for purchase with "ePoints," which Ukrainian troops collect for verified kills of Russian soldiers or military hardware. There are now 280 firms that make hundreds of different ground drones.

As US, NATO Troops Train Against Ukrainians, Kyiv's Teams Never Lose

For more than a year, US and other NATO forces have been participating in training exercises in which they are pitted against Ukrainian units who apply what they have learned in their war against the Russian invasion of their country. The outcomes have been one-sided: in favor of the Ukrainians.

In one such exercise in Germany, a 10 man Ukrainian drone team wiped out a US armored brigade. In fact, the Ukrainians dispatched the Americans so quickly that the US unit had to recreated as a 'new' unit or the exercises would have ended too early. The British, Swedish and Estonians have had similar experiences against the Ukrainians. The lesson is that NATO now has much to learn from Ukraine about how to fight a modern war. JL

Alastair MacDonald and colleagues report in the Wall Street Journal:

US Army troops faced off against Ukrainian drone operators at a military exercise in Germany earlier this year. It didn’t go well for the Americans. British, Estonian and Swedish exercises have also resulted in easy Ukrainian triumphs. The Ukrainian drone operators eliminated a U.S. armored brigade in one exercise. The US troops sent heavy armored vehicles that threw up dust and were easy for Ukrainian recon drones to spot. Those drones were followed by drones dropping explosives and FPV drones. The Ukrainians were 'destroying' US equipment so quickly that the US units had to be sent back in as new units to keep the exercise going.

Compressing the Kill Chain: Ukraine Gives Satellite Intel To Frontline Troops

What Ukraine has learned the hardest way possible - through the deaths of its soldiers - is that the more timely and accurate intelligence it can get to frontline troops, the more likely they are to win - and survive.

Which is why, contrary almost all previous military doctrine in any fighting force, they are providing satellite intel directly to combat troops in the kill zone. Their position is that compressing the kill chain is a tactical accelerator. Or, more graphically, he who moves fastest is most likely to live to write the after-action report. JL

Wes O'Donnell reports in Medium:

Ukraine warfighting runs on compression, not Bureaucracy: Compress the kill chain, compress the sensor-to-shooter timeline, and compress the gap between spotting a Russian vehicle and converting it into a smoking grid square. The side that sees first, decides first, and shoots first usually gets to write the after-action report. Ukrainian units identify targets, execute strikes, and immediately re-task satellites for battle damage assessment. This is a process that typically unfolds over hours that became a continuous loop for the Ukrainians. Moving intelligence directly to frontline units reduces reliance on jammable drones. Satellites don’t fly into electronic warfare, run out of battery mid-mission, or require an operator close enough to get targeted. Rapid retasking after a strike is where this begins to look less like imagery support and more like a tactical kill-chain accelerator.

Amid Media Blackout, Ukraine Liberated 745 KM, 26 Villages On Oleksandrivka Front

There have been noticeably fewer articles this year about the actions and achievements of Ukrainian forces in specific sectors. This, it turns out, was not for lack of interest, but to preserve operational security so that the Russians could not easily discern Ukraine's plans. 

That reporting veil is now being lifted, partially, with the news that on the Oleksandrivka front, Ukrainian forces have liberated 745 square kilometers encompassing 26 villages since the winter. That offensive is ongoing and, although details are sparse, reveals much about Ukraine's success in the ground war. JL

Valentyna Romanenko reports in Ukraine Pravda:

The Oleksandrivka offensive has been under way since 29 January and is continuing. During the offensive, Ukrainian forces regained control of more than 745 sq km of territory and 26 settlements – 12 in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, 10 in Donetsk Oblast and four in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukrainian troops also searched for and destroyed Russian forces that had infiltrated into rear areas across more than 300 sq km. Ukrainian Air Assault Forces took control of the settlements of Tolstoi, Novokhatske, Hrushivske, Zirka, Zelenyi Hai, Piddubne, Myrne, Tsehelne, Pryvillia, Zlahoda, Krasnohirske, Pryvilne, Novohryhorivka, Stepove, Kalynivske, Berezove, Novomykolaivka, Voskresenka, Oleksandrohrad, Yalta, Rybne, Maliivka, Sichneve, Ternove, Novoheorhiivka and Zaporizke.

Kremlin Claims Capture of Non-Existent Ukrainian Village

If you're the Russian Defense Ministry, the thinking must be that claiming the capture of a non-existent village is arguably better than not claiming capture of a non-existent village. JL

New Voice of Ukraine reports:

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed its forces captured the non-existent village of Shcherbakovka in Ukraine's Kharkiv Oblast on August 12. The village was officially abolished in 1997 after depopulation left the settlement completely empty. As of 2026, the community no longer physically or legally exists within Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense, General Staff and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov have also repeatedly asserted control over areas that remain securely under Ukrainian control.

Russia Firing Missiles Faster Than It Can Produce Them Signals Supply Constraint

Russia is firing a lot of missiles at civilian targets in Ukraine this summer, far more than it has before. Some appear to believe this is a sign of Putin's intransigence and evidence of his ability to continue to fighting. That Ukraine has run short on air defense weapons (as has the rest of the world, including the US) so is less able to hit the missiles which are more powerful than drones, is certainly part of the reason.

But a more informed review of the data suggests this is, in fact, a signal of supply constraint: that the missiles are being fired both because they are all he has left from his once vast and diverse arsenal. And given how little impact they are having on the ground or on Ukrainian morale suggests that the missile attacks are simply continuing the war with what inventory is on hand. The data reveal that Russia is firing them faster than it can produce them, which may also mean that this is a violent strategy to try to force some sort of conclusion before one is forced on Russia. JL 

Vikas reports in The Geopolitical Economist:

Over the past month, data have confirmed Russia is spending its missile stockpile faster than it can replenish it. Russia is paying more men, more missiles, and more Zircon hypersonics for less ground than at any comparable point since the full-scale invasion began. In attrition warfare, the side that runs out of something critical first does not necessarily collapse immediately. It degrades. It substitutes. It absorbs. But the degradation is real, the substitutes are inferior, and the absorption has a ceiling. What the July data from Ukraine tells us is that Russia reached a milestone: it began consuming missiles faster than it produces them. Russia is not firing everything at once. It is trading across categories, using more ballistics, fewer drones, and shifting the mix as stockpiles allow. That trade-off is a symptom of constraint, not abundance.