Why "Sudden, Erratic" Tariffs Sank the Dollar Rather Than Raising It As Expected

One of the administration's economic goals was to have tariffs raise the value of the dollar, on the theory that fewer imports would narrow the trade deficit which would drive up the dollar. 

But the opposite has occurred as the dollar has dropped versus other currencies even as the equity markets have cratered. The reason is that the combination of erratic and retribution-driven financial policies have reduced faith in American economic and innovation potential. Business prefers to invest when it has relative certainty, not volatility and unpredictability. JL

Jon Sindreu reports in the Wall Street Journal:

On Thursday and Friday, stocks tumbled following Trump’s unveiling of punishing tariffs. What was unexpected is that the U.S. dollar tumbled. The WSJ Dollar Index, based on a basket of currencies, has lost 5.9% this year and is below where it was on election day. Dollar strength is largely due to investments that track growth in economic productivity driven by Silicon Valley profits turning the U.S. into a massive exporter of tech goods and services. (But) U.S. growth becomes tainted by protectionism and China's AI challenge. Focusing too much on trade deficits overlooks the competitiveness and profitability of American products play in determining the dollar’s value. The sudden, erratic tariffs dampen investment, (causing) faith in the U.S.’s long-term economic potential to fade.

While President Trump has always claimed to want a weaker dollar, the consensus among investors was that his policies would strengthen it. Turns out he was right, but perhaps in the worst way.

On Thursday, stocks tumbled in the U.S., Europe and Asia following Trump’s unveiling of a raft of punishing “Liberation Day” tariffs. What was more unexpected is that the U.S. dollar tumbled against most major currencies. The WSJ Dollar Index, an indicator based on a basket of currencies, has now lost more than 5.9% this year and is below where it was on Nov. 5, before its postelection rally.

This is making Wall Street analysts look pretty bad: Most were telling investors, even up to the very moment in which tariffs were announced Wednesday, that protectionist policies would push up the currency. The idea was that fewer purchases of overseas goods would narrow the trade deficit and mechanically reduce U.S. demand for foreign exchange. Also, U.S. growth is outpacing the eurozone’s, which has historically been dollar-positive. 

Instead, speculators have swung to betting heavily against the greenback, Commodity Futures Trading Commission derivatives data show Germany is growing​faster

 

The sudden unwind can’t truly be about tariffs increasing the risk of recession. The dollar usually strengthens during busts as well as booms because investors seek refuge in it—creating the famous “dollar smile.”

Why did the market get it wrong? Perhaps the greenback is at such expensive inflation-adjusted levels that it was primed to fall. Or, as some investors argue, U.S. economic aggression against allies is eroding the dollar’s “global reserve” status.

The latter would be a win for the administration. In 2024, Trump’s chief economic adviser, Stephen Miran, stressed the need to tackle the trade deficit by penalizing foreign central banks and treasurers for parking assets in the U.S. This is in line with the view that haven demand overvalues the dollar and places an “exorbitant burden” upon the American economy.

It lacks empirical support, though, since higher official foreign purchases tend to coincide with a weaker dollar. Global dollar reserves have flatlined since 2018 as the dollar rose 16%, per International Monetary Fund figures.

A better answer, which is less flattering for Trump, is that faith in the U.S.’s long-term economic potential is fading.

 

Currency traders can be short-term chasers of bond-yield differentials. Over five-year periods, however, the difference in return-on-equity between U.S. and European stocks has shown a 70% correlation to dollar-euro moves since 2001.

This suggests a good chunk of dollar strength is due to investments that track relative growth in economic productivity—largely driven by Silicon Valley raking in huge profits and turning the U.S. into a massive exporter of technology goods and, especially, services. 

Markets might now be anticipating another structural shift. A rearmament push is fueling hopes of an economic revival in Europe, just as the U.S. growth story becomes tainted by protectionism and Chinese artificial-intelligence challengers. Of course, China’s rise itself underscores that the textbook case for free trade is flawed, and that the U.S. government should arguably also try to promote key industries. Offshoring to cut costs has often harmed workers, created fragile supply chains and made firms less eager to innovate. Troubled industrial giants such as Intel and Boeing can attest to that.

The problem is that Trump’s tariffs have been sudden and erratic. Wednesday’s list of reciprocal tariffs on each trading partner are a case in point, since they aren’t based on any calculation that makes economic sense. Such policies are probably denting corporate investment rather than inducing companies to relocate production through a targeted and phased-in approach. More than Asia’s development miracles, these policies resemble Latin America’s flawed experiments with “import substitution.”

 

Yes, there could be benefits to General Motors and Ford reshoring assembly jobs from Mexico. But doing the same with all auto parts—including low-value components such as textiles and wiring harnesses—would just make the U.S. car industry very inefficient. This comes atop likely retaliation by other countries and the 100% tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles inherited from the Biden era.

U.S. carmakers excel in the truck and SUV segments, where American consumers are particularly discerning. But they struggle to produce cars under $25,000, even before tariffs. Tesla, too, is a luxury brand.

 

If the U.S. market becomes isolated, foreign firms such as Toyota and Hyundai, which dominate budget models, may innovate less in their U.S. plants than abroad.

This is what happened to Brazil and Argentina, because their attempts to build a homegrown auto industry shielded companies from outside competition between the 1950s and 1980s. And it stands in contrast to how Japan, South Korea and China created world-class automakers by combining protectionism with the discipline of foreign markets.

Focusing too much on trade deficits overlooks the fact that the competitiveness and profitability of American tradable products have played a key role in determining the dollar’s value. Right now, they are coming into question.