The Understanding That Russia Is Weaker Than Realized Is Gaining Traction

A spate of recent articles in mainstream western media reveals that Russia's military and economic weakness is finally becoming more widely understood and acknowledged. 

The Kremlin's chronic failure to achieve its goals in Ukraine never seemed sufficient to further this knowledge, but the collapse of its client state in Syria - and Russia's evident inability to do anything about it - has finally driven home the realization that Russia's weakness is systemic - and possibly irreversible. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

For much of 2024 the focus in reporting and analysis has been squarely on Russian strength and Ukrainian weakness. (But) events internationally (particularly in Syria) and the fact that Russia is suffering huge losses for small gains in Ukraine is leading to understanding Russia’s true vulnerability. Russia is now losing men and equipment at rates that it cannot replace with new production or soldiers. It has almost all of its military fighting Ukraine and has nothing to spare, not even to defend its own borders. Fighting Ukraine is all it can do. And even with massive Iranian and North Korean aid (and some Chinese), they are struggling.

For much of 2024 the focus in the reporting and analysis has been squarely on Russian strength and Ukrainian weakness. We’ve been hearing regularly that a Ukrainian collapse was right around the corner and that the Russian steamroller was relentlessly squashing the life out of Ukraine. Such stories are still occurring—thats for sure (see last story).

Of course readers of this substack have been hearing for years that Russian strength is being greatly over-estimated. Thankfully, events internationally (particularly with Syria) and the fact that Russia is suffering huge losses for small gains in Ukraine is also leading to some people understanding Russia’s true vulnerability. There was a really interesting piece to that effect by Fareed Zakaria in the Washington Post.

I can safely report that Russia is probably not weaker than many readers of this substack realize—but certainly Russia is much weaker than people who rely on mainstream reporting would have been led to think. The whole article is worth a read, if you can access it—and Zakaria goes a great deal into the production problems that Russia is facing, particularly in the face of such high losses. Here are three key paragraphs.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia now resembles the Soviet Union in the 1970s. While it is still assertive and interventionist abroad, its economy at home is increasingly weak and distorted by its conversion into a wartime operation. But just as the external expansionism and internal mobilization could not mask Soviet decay forever, so today Putin’s bravado should not scare us. Think about it: If Russia were winning in Ukraine, would Putin threaten to use nuclear weapons?

Two scholars, Marc DeVore and Alexander Mertens, note in Foreign Policy that “Russia is losing around 320 tank and artillery cannon barrels a month and producing only 20.” Citing open sources, they note that Russia has lost almost 5,000 infantry fighting vehicles since its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian defense contractors can make only around 200 a year. Its labor shortages are acute in virtually every sector, something even Putin has acknowledged.

In the military, the starkest sign is that the Russian army has had to invite North Korea to send in troops to help it out. Noel Foster of the Naval War College wrote that Moscow’s desperation can be seen in the rising salaries and bonuses it has to offer to recruits: “As of July 2024, recruits from Moscow received a $21,000 enlistment bonus and wages amounting in total to just under $60,000 in their first year of service, effectively earning more per month than privates enlisting in the US Army at the same time.” (Keep in mind that average Russian income is less than one-fifth that of America’s.)

What Zakaria is arguing is not new—but it is so important that it be understood publicly. Russia is now losing men and equipment at rates that it cannot replace with new production or soldiers (without wrecking its economy). It literally has almost all of its military fighting Ukraine—and has nothing to spare; not for Syria (which was strategically important) not even to defend its own borders. Fighting Ukraine is all it can do.

And still, even with massive Iranian and North Korean aid (and some significant Chinese), they are struggling. Im going to go into this in more detail in an end of the year analysis—but instead of showing that Russia cant be beaten, 2024 shows it very much can. However that needs to be both understood and acted upon. Its good, therefore, to see such arguments being made.

Also, its nice to see a plug for the article by Mark Devore and Alexander Mertens (which was aided by Oleksiy Zagorodnyuk) in Foreign Policy. It really deserves a read if you have time. It provides evidence showing how Russia should have major equipment shortages by the end of 2025. Definitely worth a read if you can.

The Financial Times and Pokrovsk—the same article every month.

Just ending on an example of how not everyone is stressing Russian weakness. The Financial Times yesterday published a piece saying Ukraine was in terrible shape around Pokrovsk, had made fundamental mistakes, and the city could very well fall. All very depressing.

If you had a sense of deja vu in reading this piece—you should not be surprised. The Financial Times has basically written the same article for almost half a year now. I will give a few examples.

In early August, Ukraine’s defenses around Pokrovsk were cracking, according to the FT, as Russia was very close to seizing the supposedly vital logistics hub.

Over the past week, the Russian army advanced within 15km of the garrison city of Pokrovsk and the outskirts of nearby Toretsk, according to military analysts, reviews of combat footage and interviews with Ukrainian soldiers and senior officials. It also captured part of the neighbouring town of Niu-York and is still pressing ahead.

Pokrovsk is a major logistical hub for Ukraine’s military that has become a linchpin for its defence of the rest of Donetsk region, while Toretsk and Niu-York have been bulwarks against Russian forces since 2014.

The Russians are just 5km from the main T0504 highway, bombarding it with artillery and drones, and threatening to cut it off.

The culprit, as always, was Ukrainian inefficiency and failure. In late August, the FT wrote a piece saying the impending fall of Pokrovsk was down to Zelensky. Now, the Russians were only 8kms away because of Zelensky’s incompetence.

Russian forces are closing in on the strategically important city of Pokrovsk taking several nearby towns this week and forcing undermanned Ukrainian units to retreat from prepared defensive positions.

Pokrovsk is one of two key rail and road junctions in the Donetsk region and its loss would threaten the entire region’s logistics for Ukraine’s military, according to Frontelligence Insight, a Ukrainian analytical group.

Satellite imagery analysed by open-source investigators at the Finland-based Black Bird Group shows Russian forces now just 8km from Pokrovsk. In response, local authorities have ordered the evacuation of residents in the area.

Oleksandr Kovalenko, a military analyst at the Kyiv-based Information Resistance group, called the situation on the eastern edge of Pokrovsk “a complete defensive failure”.

And yet, Ukrainian incompetence did not seem to be enough to have the city fall. So in September, the Financial Times pivoted and said it was Russian overwhelming strength that was about to lead to the capture of Pokrovsk. Russian advances were now down to sheer Russian might and their brilliant adaptability.

With a combined pre-war population of 100,000, Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad are vital for Ukraine’s defence of the eastern front. If they fall, it would endanger the larger cities of Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk and Slovyansk and significantly boost Russia’s strategic position in the region, Ukrainian commanders warned.

Capturing these two hubs would also hurt Ukrainian morale, which had just received a boost from the Kursk incursion, said commanders and soldiers.

Russia’s main strategy has remained the same since the start of its full-scale invasion in 2022: overpowering Ukrainian forces with sheer might and resource advantages, Phoenix and commanders from four other Ukrainian brigades told the Financial Times this month. They all complained their soldiers were sometimes outnumbered at a ratio of 1:8 and that for every shell fired, Russians were firing 10 or more.

But the Russian forces had also adapted, the commanders said, learning from earlier mistakes and avoiding large assaults with tanks and armoured vehicles. Their new tactics have led to recent successes in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, forcing Ukrainian troops to retreat and bringing Moscow closer to its goal of controlling the entire area.

And yet, no matter what the Financial Times has written about Ukrainian incompetence, Russian might and adaptability, and its vital strategic importance, the Ukrainians still control Pokrovsk. Russian advances have actually been very small before the first story quoted and the last. The Russians have advanced maybe 10 kilometres closer to Pokrovsk since that first story was written—and at huge cost. Will the Russians take it? Possibly. But the drumbeat focus on Russian strength and Ukrainian failure tells a very one-sided version of the Pokrovsk story.

One of the reasons the change in narrative is so important.