Russia's Kursk Attack Stalls As Ukraine Inflicts 50% Armor, Troop Losses

The breathless western reporting of a 'major' Russian offensive to retake Kursk oblast turns out to have been - prepare yourself for the shock... - an exaggeration. 

The Russians launched a battalion-sized assault which, a day later, had been repelled with 50% losses of armor and troop strength. The Ukrainian positions have held and because of both ammunition and manpower shortages, the Russians are not expected to make much headway. JL

Stefan Korshak reports in the Kyiv Post:

The Russian army tried to reduce the Ukrainian incursion at one of its most extended points. This was a battalion-sized attack, 50 armored vehicles and several hundred men, which is not a major offensive across the entire northern front. By Friday evening it was clear the Ukrainian main line had held. There have been counterattacks, but there for sure were heavy Russian casualties. Ukrainian drones were taking out lots of Russian armored vehicles, plus Ukrainian artillery catching Russians moving in the open. The Russian maximum advance appears to have been a couple of kilometers. The Russians are still attacking, both objectives, but the scale and pace of those attacks has dropped off

This week saw the Russians launch one big push on the left/western face of the Ukrainian salient in the Kursk Region, and possibly, a pair of secondary pushes. The battle is over whether the Ukrainians can sever Russian supply to territory even further to the west.

If the Ukrainians were able to advance about 5-8 km from the part of Russia they hold, the Russians to the west would be isolated because the Russian supplies must cross the bridges over the Seym River. The Ukrainians can and have hit the bridges.

But it’s not like the Russians have quit. So, from the Russian side, if the Russians hold the Ukrainians and then push them back, about 5-8 km in the opposite direction, then a Russian offensive attacking on the left/western face of the Ukrainian salient could be cut off at the base, because supply to Russian forces making those attacks would be strong.

 

Since that’s possibly – ahem confusing to read, I’ve drawn a rare map with some red arrows to illustrate this. I took the latest map from DeepState, who it is safe to say are pro-Ukrainian but try hard to deliver accurate information, for a fix on who owns what ground in southwest Russia right now.

As you can see, there is a dark gray area that’s probably fully controlled by the Ukrainians, and a gray area that is just that, it’s not clear who is in control. You should not take it as gospel since it’s clear the lines are fluid and moving. But DeepState is fairly diligent and what they published this morning checks out with how most others are reading the situation, so it’s reasonable to take a screen shot of their latest situation map.

 

On that map, I’ve drawn a goose-egg in orange to highlight the area where Russian MIGHT be cut off, and currently their supply has to be iffy. Again, this is because they have the Ukrainians on three sides and an unfordable river on the fourth side, in the north.

I’ve also highlighted a slice of territory to the east of that potential isolation zone, which the Russians control. It’s narrow and threatened. If the Ukrainians control it, the Russians are cut off. However, if the Russians control this slice of territory, then the Russian army will have a clean, well-supplied way to attack the Ukrainian incursion.

 

That’s why that particular piece of Russian soil is what soldiers call “operationally important” and the scene of fighting right now. I’ve marked it in yellow.

This Russian attack went down the route of the big red arrow. As you can see, there really was nothing clever here, the Russian army is obviously trying to reduce the Ukrainian incursion at one of its most extended points and at the same time get access to the base of the Ukrainian salient. It has been Russian operational doctrine in Ukraine, since about mid-2023, to deal with Ukrainian strongpoints if possible by cutting off supply to them first. This is exactly what is going on here

The Russian push out of Korenovo towards Sudzha seems very clearly to have overwhelmed forward Ukrainian positions and, as of Thursday night, it wasn’t clear whether the Ukrainians could contain it.

 

Reports were of “dozens” of Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers “breaking through” Ukrainian lines and motoring off into the rear, Ukrainian artillery gunners and drone operators being forced to fight like infantry. Meanwhile the rah rah Russia channels were all proud and happy that the Russian marines, or maybe it was airborne paratroopers, had overwhelmed Ukrainian defenses and Mother Russia’s holy soil was soon to be liberated.

Here’s a Friday morning write-up for reference.

By Friday afternoon, however, the situation seemed to be a good deal less catastrophic. By evening it was pretty clear the Ukrainian main line had held. There may or may not have been counterattacks, but there for sure were heavy Russian casualties.

The “how” likewise was nothing new: Ukrainian drones were taking out lots of Russian armored vehicles mostly, plus Ukrainian artillery catching Russians moving in the open. The Russian maximum advance appears to have been a couple of kilometers.

People started remembering that at bottom this was by scale a battalion-sized attack, so maybe 50 armored vehicles and several hundred men, which is a lot different than a major offensive across say the entire northern front. I’ve inset a map of the region next to the tactical map.

 

However, there were zero reports of actual ground regained by the Ukrainians, so, from the Russian point of view if casualties aren’t a factor, this was a successful attack. And as everyone in this war knows, if the Russians do it once and it works, you can bet they’ll try it again. The implication is that given force ratios Ukraine getting kicked out of Russia is only a matter of time.

The qualifier is, Russian supplies of trained troops and good equipment aren’t bottomless. The Russians clearly committed capable troops, albeit almost certainly only shells of actual full-strength formations to the assault. Yes, they gained ground but how many trained soldiers and small unit leaders did they burn through to gain the ground? We have aleady seen that the Russian army can run out of competent units far more quickly then it does untrained soldiers.

I’m seeing a similar dynamic in the eastern Porkovsk/Kurahove sector where, you may recall, pretty capable Russian units scored gains. The situation there is that, yes, the Russians are still attacking, both objectives, but the scale and pace of those attacks has dropped off from a couple weeks ago. Meanwhile, Ukrainian claims backed by lots of drone video of heavy Russian losses has gone up.

Is this the fall-out from the Russian ammo bases the Ukrainians hammered during September, or maybe Russia’s Donbass offensive has run through most of its trained, combat-capable units committed to that sector and until they train up and deploy more, they can only maintain moderate pressure on the ground? That would be my guess, because that’s what we’ve seen in the past.