Why Maneuver Warfare (Finally) Worked So Well In Ukraine's Kursk Offensive

Through much of the past past two and a half years, there has been concern that 'the modern threat environment' dominated by drones and electronic warfare have rendered the tank and other heavy armor obsolete. 

But Ukraine's Kursk offensive appears to have quieted that argument. The reality, though, is that recent NATO maneuver warfare doctrine needed to received an upgrade, which Ukraine has now provided. The primary innovation, especially for a country that does not enjoy much traditional air capability, let alone superiority, was Ukraine's use of modern technologies in combination with technologically advanced forward reconnaissance  in order to identify and then overcome Russian defenses. Adaptive tactics based on real time information from sensing technologies based on large, mobile platforms like tanks may provide a model for rejuvenating the maneuver concept and are apparently already being tested in training by NATO forces. JL

Kris Osborn reports in Sofrep:

Heavy armored vehicles were instrumental in the success of Ukraine’s Kursk offensive by using forward reconnaissance units to identify weak points in the Russian perimeter. The effective employment of ISR, networked command and control enabled mechanized units to blast through Russian defenses. Upgraded tank platforms using modern technologies including sensing, longer-range weapons and adaptive tactics were effective in a modern threat environment. Maneuvering tanks were able to to find weaker, more penetrable parts of Russia’s defenses. This enabled Ukrainian armored units to use surprise and attack areas less fortified by barbed wire, attack drone swarms, anti-armor weapons and mines. Ukraine “conducted small raids to probe for Russian vulnerabilities and then exploited them with mechanized forces.

Attack drone swarms, mobile anti-armor weapons and hit and run ambush-style attacks have all simply decimated Russia’s tank force, a development that continues to inspire international attention to the utility and potential combat vulnerability of heavy armor and mechanized maneuver. Countless media reports continue to emphasize the vulnerability of tanks, something which has in part helped generate new concepts of operation. The US Marine Corps Force Design 2030, which specifically cites lessons learned from the Ukraine war, calls for a massive reduction in the service’s force of tanks. The Corps subsequently decided to divest its force of tanks in favor of a lighter, faster, and more expeditionary lethal force using an increased number of drones and anti-armor weapons for high-speed multi-domain attacks. However, the circumstances are quite different for the Army, which has consistently upgraded its fleet of Abrams tanks and made tactical adjustments to ensure their continued relevance. There do appear to be many key variables that many of the reports about tank destruction in Ukraine appear to miss to a certain extent.

There appear to be many reasons why the tank is here to stay, particularly if upgraded. Modern applications of what could be identified as traditional Combined Arms Maneuver using heavier platforms such as tanks continues to show great combat effectiveness, particularly when paired with reconnaissance and targeting units, advanced ISR and a new generation of networking and command and control technology.  Mechanized assault, something aligned with the Army Wide Area Maneuver concept of operation, not only continues to occupy a key place in modern warfare but will arguably take on even more tactical relevance in coming years as emerging technologies in the areas of unmanned systems, AI-enabled computing, sensor image fidelity, target-data transmission contribute to more survivable attack formations and the successful application of longer-range precision weaponry.  Army Research Laboratory scientists, for example, talked to Warrior a few years ago about breakthrough progress with AI-empowered technology able to autonomously land a drone on a moving tank using advanced sensing and machine learning.

What this amounts to is that emerging technologies and tactics continue to make the tank more effective and indispensable in modern land war. Recently, tanks and heavier armored vehicles were instrumental in generating the initial success of Ukraine’s Kursk offensive by using forward reconnaissance units likely in position to identify weak points in the Russian perimeter. The effective employment of ISR and networked command and control likely enabled mechanized units to blast and maneuver through Russian defenses. In this respect, massively upgraded traditional tank platforms can use modern technologies, upgraded sensing and longer-range weapons to adapt tactics and remain extremely effective in a modern threat environment.

Throughout much of the region along the border areas of operating Russian troops, there continue to be extremely lethal layered defenses, mines, barbed wire and ditches making it difficult for tanks to break through or even operate. This is especially true given the widespread use of attack drones and anti-armor weapons which have had a devastating impact upon heavy armor in the Ukraine-Russia war. However, when combined with advanced reconnaissance, networking and improved command and control, tanks seem to have proven to be uniquely valuable in Ukraine’s Kursk offensive.  An essay in the BBC cited sources indicating that Britain’s Challenger 2 tank was successfully employed during the Kursk offensive, and it appears maneuvering tanks were likely able to use ISR to find weaker, more penetrable parts of Russia’s defenses. This enabled Ukrainian armored units to use an element of surprise and attack areas less fortified by barbed wire, attack drone swarms, anti-armor weapons and mines. What this demonstrates is that the firepower and pure mechanized attack “force” of a modern upgraded main battle tank, can perform critical, unique, much needed functions if used properly in a modern threat environment.

 

This effective employment of mechanized maneuver formations by the Ukrainians was well articulated in a recent essay from West Point’s Modern War Institute which identified Ukraine’s successful effort to “bring maneuver back.” The essay, written by US Army writing fellow Major. Robert G. Rose, is called “The Kursk Offensive: How Ukraine’s Operational-Level Guerrilla Warfare is Brining Maneuver Back.”    

Ukraine “conducted small raids to probe for Russian vulnerabilities with the 80th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades and then exploited them with mechanized forces. Ukraine has once again shown that maneuver requires identifying a vulnerability and exploiting it with a speed that prevents the enemy from addressing that vulnerability,” (Robert G. Rose, US Army, is a Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James M. Dubik writing fellow and serves as the commander for Alpine Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade)

Accordingly, the Modern War Institute essay seems to suggest that, when utilized in tandem with advanced ISR and adjusted tactics, maneuver warfare using tanks can arguably be more effective than ever. Stand-off ISR, coupled with small, mobile, forward-operating reconnaissance teams, can enable tactical tank maneuvers to achieve a measurable combat effect, as evidenced by Ukraine’s offensive.