Russian Forces Ordered To Expel Ukraine From Kursk But Don't Have Capability

The Kremlin has ordered Russian forces in the country's southwest to expel Ukrainian units from Kursk oblast by mid-October, though some reports say the date is actually October 7, Putin's birthday.

Knowledgeable observers believe that timetable is not achievable given the Russian military's degraded capabilities. Recent Russian attacks indicate shortages of men and equipment in the sector. Even if the Russians were to shut down their Pokrovsk assault - also considered unlikely given the reputational investment in that effort - they have not demonstrated the ability to carry out such an offensive against prepared, dug in and well supplied Ukrainian forces. JL

The Institute for the Study of War reports:

The Kremlin has tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time. Russian forces have begun counterattacks within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast but have not started large-scale combat operations that would indicate a concerted counteroffensive aimed at expelling Ukrainian forces. Sustained Russian counteroffensive operations within Kursk Oblast will require Russian forces to redeploy additional elements from Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have prepared positions within the salient that will pose challenges to any Russian counteroffensive. A Russian counteroffensive would generate operational requirements that would impact Russia's already degraded capability to funnel more manpower and materiel into the drive on Pokrovsk.

Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October — significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time. Ukrainian newswire RBC-Ukraine reported on September 19 that unspecified sources stated that Russian forces have concentrated 37,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast and that Russian authorities have instructed these forces to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October.[9] RBC-Ukraine's sources stated that the Kremlin wanted to concentrate a grouping of forces in Kursk Oblast that had a five-to-one manpower advantage over Ukrainian forces before launching a counteroffensive operation but did not establish such a grouping before launching a "counteroffensive" on September 10.[10] Russian forces have begun counterattacks within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast but have not yet started large-scale combat operations that would indicate a concerted counteroffensive operation aimed at completely expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.[11] Sustained Russian counteroffensive operations within Kursk Oblast will require Russian forces to redeploy additional elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and/or commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine.[12] Ukrainian forces have not established control of all areas throughout the entire salient in Kursk Oblast, but Ukrainian forces most certainly have prepared positions within some areas of the salient that will pose challenges to any concerted Russian counteroffensive effort.[13]

RBC-Ukraine's sources stated that Russian authorities have also tasked Russian forces with creating a "buffer zone" on the territory of "border oblasts bordering Russia" by October 30 — presumably an order to advance into Ukrainian territory along the international border to push Ukrainian fire elements further back from Russian territory.[14] Russian forces aimed to create a "buffer zone" in northern Kharkiv Oblast when they launched their offensive operation in the area on May 10, but have since only advanced roughly 10 kilometers in depth at most in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[15] The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast reportedly spoiled planned Russian offensive operations outside of northern Kharkiv Oblast in the international border area that likely aimed to expand the area of combat operations across a broader front in northeastern Ukraine and further fix and stretch Ukrainian forces along a longer front.[16] A Russian counteroffensive operation to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast followed immediately by a subsequent incursion into Ukrainian border oblasts reminiscent of Russia's offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast would be a massive operational effort that would require a substantial allocation of manpower and materiel. The Russian military command has demonstrated a desire to shield the priority Russian offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction from the operational pressures caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast, but a Russian counteroffensive followed immediately by an offensive operation along the international border would most certainly generate operational requirements that would impact Russia's already degraded capability to funnel more manpower and materiel into the drive on Pokrovsk.[17]