Why Russian Casualties Are Extreme - And Will Remain So

The Russians are no longer fighting to win on Ukrainian battlefields. They are fighting to hold on until in hopes their "Manchurian candidate" for US President, Donald Trump, wins the US election so that he will then follow Kremlin instructions and cut off aid to Ukraine. 

That is not a sure bet, and possibly not even as important as it once was, given the rallying of NATO and the democratic victories in France and the UK. So Russia will continue to sacrifice its troops until November. And then it will have a decision to make about what to do in Ukraine. JL

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

Russian casualties are reaching extreme levels. In Moscow the signing on bonus has been raised to an extraordinary $22,000. The per capita GDP of Russia was about $12,000. Both the Ukrainians last summer and the Russians  Russians now are being compelled to spread out their area of offensive into a very broad area because they have little hope of a breakthrough.  It may lead to Russia gaining more territory, but it might also lead to higher Russian losses. Its a short term gain strategy—that really does seem to be banking on a Trump victory.

Russian casualties are reaching extreme levels—though the signs are that the Russians will keep fighting the way that has caused the casualties for the coming months.

The sign of just how losses are piling up in Russia are now spreading. In the first case, the Russian state is having to greatly increase the amount it offers to new recruits. In Moscow the signing on bonus has been raised to an extraordinary $22,000 (and this is with a highly inflated ruble value). To try and understand how large that is—in 2021 the per capita GDP of Russia was about $12,000. Moreover, the salary on offer for Russian soldiers means that if they make it through a year they could be paid almost $60,000.

That the Russian state is having to pay such exorbitant financial incentives to get people to join the military is a sign of the casualties they are losing. A further indication of that came from the UK’s senior military officer, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, at this week’s RUSI Land Warfare conference (more on that below). He put Russian casualties at this point at at least 550,000.

Russia's military has now sustained an estimated 550,000 casualties since its invasion of Ukraine, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the UK chief of the defense staff said. "Our assessments are that it will take Putin five years to reconstitute the Russian army to where it was in February 2022," he told the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) land warfare conference. He added it will take another five years "rectify the weaknesses that the war has revealed”, and get Moscow's army back to its February 2022 strength.

Indeed, what we are seeing now will probably mean this figure will grow even more steadily. Last weekend in the update I outlined what Russian and Ukrainian strategies seem to be. The description of Russian strategy, which many people seemed to instinctively understand, was basically to take as much Ukrainian territory as possible before a Trump election—which would allow the Russians time to regroup and rebuild.

Russian strategy is take whatever you can now, no matter how small an area and no matter how much it costs, on the assumption Trump wins, and you get to keep it. You then have four years to basically recover and come again when you are ready.

The idea that the Russians are going to push wherever they can to take territory had some interesting evidence supporting it that came out just a few hours ago. The Institute for the Study of War just released a very interesting report which said that Russia was broadening out its command structure for the areas of its greatest effort. For the last few months, the Russian Central Grouping of Forces has been based in the Avdiivka area, where it has been making its slow and high cost advances through the Ocheretyne bulge and now through Toretsk.

Here is a map of that front.

What the report says is that now the area of greatest offensive Russian action, at least as indicated by command structure, has been increased to an area considerably larger than that indicated by the map.

The exact contours of the expanded area of command is not clear at this point. It seems to be both to the South and North of the present area. In other words, if this report is right, Russia is looking to increase the frontage on which it will be launching its offensive action.

Its a further sign of how this war (and its technology—more on that below) is showing how earlier assumptions of land war dont apply. Only last summer we were hearing how the Ukrainians were wrong not to concentrate their forces for assaults—to try and break through Russian lines. That indeed would be US doctrine (though the US would have total command of the air). However, it simply doesnt apply now. Both the Ukrainians last summer and the Russians now are being compelled to spread out their area of offensive into a very broad area because they have little hope of a breakthrough.

If this broadening of command is right—we will see the Russians attempt to spread out Ukrainian forces with their attempts at micro advances in more places up and down the line. It may lead to Russia gaining more territory, but it might also lead to higher Russian losses. Its a short term gain strategy—that really does seem to be banking on a Trump victory.