Why Russia Fears War Between Iran and Israel Hurts Its Ukraine Strategy

Russia fears a full-blown war between Iran and Israel because such a conflict will limit Iran's ability to continue to supply crucial military aid to Russia in Ukraine. Russia is dependent on Iran now for drones and missiles. A war with Israel would force Iran to divert production from Ukraine to its own battles. Last night, Iran shot 300 drones at Israel while Russia fired very few at Ukraine compared to the past few weeks. This suggests it may already be saving its drone inventory in case of future shortages. 

Even worse for Russia, if Iran and Israel begin a regional war, Iran may demand aid from Russia, which it is not able to supply, weakening its relationship. Iran's attack may now also provide impetus for the US Congress to approve further aid for Israel, Ukraine and Taiwan, which also negatively impacts China's strategic interests. In short, all the parties involved have limited resources and not necessarily aligned interests. JL

Michelle Grise reports in The National Interest:

Russia has found a critical military supplier in Iran, which has provided Moscow with (drones), ballistic missiles, and fighter jets. A closer relationship with Iran improves Russia’s ability to withstand international sanctions. A broader regional conflict between Israel and Iran would limit Iran’s ability to continue as a military supplier to Russia. Tehran may demand more support when Russia has limited capacity to provide (distracted by Ukraine, Russia failed to intervene on behalf of ally Armenia as Azerbaijani military forces overran Nagorno-Karabakh, suggesting Russia lacks the ablility). The Ukraine war has also contributed to Russia’s growing dependence on China. Russia would be especially sensitive to Chinese attempts to encroach on its influence in the Middle East.An Israeli airstrike on an Iranian embassy in Syria last week killed three IRGC-QF generals and four other Iranian military officers. Iran retaliated. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has vowed that Israel would “be punished” and “regret this crime.” Fears are high that this could trigger an escalation of the Israel-Hamas war into a broader regional conflict and potentially even a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel. Although it has been argued that Moscow benefits from chaos in the Middle East—diverting Western attention and resources from Ukraine—it stands to lose a great deal if the Israel-Hamas conflict escalates into a wider war.

Russia has spent the last decade shoring up its influence in the region, often by taking advantage of localized conflicts. This was most evident in Libya, where Russia exploited the country’s civil war to establish a foothold, and in Syria, where Russian intervention saved the Assad regime from imminent demise in 2015. Russia then expanded its footprint in Syria, establishing a permanent presence at military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. After the U.S. withdrawal from Syria in 2019, Russia stepped into the void, helping Syrian government forces regain control of the northeast of the country. The same year, Russia held joint naval exercises with Egypt; the construction of a Russian-built nuclear plant in Egypt earlier this year demonstrated the continued growth of ties between the two countries. 

While Russia capitalized on instability in Syria and Libya to establish itself as a regional security guarantor, it is not positioned to reap similar benefits if the Israel-Hamas war escalates. In part, this reflects Russia’s preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine. Last October, distracted by the war, Russia failed to intervene on behalf of former-ally Armenia as Azerbaijani military forces overran the ethnically Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. This suggests that Russia currently lacks the capacity to act as a stabilizing force in the post-Soviet sphere, let alone the Middle East. 

Other signs suggest that Russia’s influence in the Middle East may be waning. The evolution of the Russia-Iran relationship may hold clues for Russia’s future status in the region. Since the start of the invasion two years ago, Russia has deepened its partnership with Iran, pursuing greater defense and economic cooperation since the invasion of Ukraine two years ago. Russia has found a critical military supplier in Iran, which has provided Moscow with unmanned aerial systems, ballistic missiles, and fighter jets. A closer relationship with Iran has also improved Russia’s ability to withstand international sanctions. 

Moscow’s growing friendship with Tehran may signal that Russian influence in the Middle East remains strong. However, it could also signal the opposite: Russia may realize that its future role in the region will be contingent on the favor of an increasingly capable Iran. For Moscow to achieve its long-term strategic objectives in the Middle East, it must cultivate a close working relationship with Tehran.

The escalation of the current conflict in the Middle East could cause new tensions to surface. A broader regional conflict, particularly if it involves direct conflict between Israel and Iran, would limit Iran’s ability to continue serving as a military supplier to Russia. Tehran may demand more support when Russia has limited capacity to provide it. 

Also worrying for Russia: A broader conflict in the Middle East could give China an opening to serve as a mediator, as it did in negotiating a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023. The Ukraine war has already contributed to Russia’s growing dependence on China. Russia would be especially sensitive to Chinese attempts to encroach on its influence in the Middle East. For now, Russia seems to be following an expected playbook: It has denounced Israel for violating Syria’s sovereignty and deployed more forces to the Syrian-controlled area of the Golan Heights. Whether we see a significant escalation in the coming days and whether Russia will be able to manage the attendant risks remains to be seen.