Definition of Insanity: Russians Trying Same Failed Tank Attack 7 Times

There are repeated reports that the Russians have learned from their earlier mistakes. 

But given this behavior, it is not apparent what, exactly, they may have learned. JL 

David Axe reports in Forbes:

When your mechanized assault across a minefield and through a drone and artillery kill-zone toward a dug-in enemy force fails with heavy losses, what do you do next? If you’re the 25th and 138th Mechanized Brigades of Russian army, you just repeat the failed assault ... several more times into a mined kill-zone near Synkivka. The Ukrainian 14th and 30th Mechanized Brigades destroyed each column in turn, apparently reseeding the mines and resetting their defenses between attacks. The outcomes almost always are the same: Russians attack, get wrecked by the combination of mines, drones, artillery and close cannon fire, then retreat. A few days later, they try again

When your mechanized assault across a minefield and through a drone and artillery kill-zone toward a dug-in enemy force fails with heavy losses, what do you do next?

If you’re the Ukrainian army, you reconsider your tactics and try again a different way—as happened when a 47th Mechanized Brigade assault group got trapped in a Russian minefield south of Mala Tokmachka in June, then pivoted to flanking infantry assaults.

If you’re the Russian army, you just repeat the failed assault ... several more times. At least, that was the approach of the 25th and 138th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade around Synkivka in northeastern Ukraine last month.

The Russians repeatedly sent mixed columns of tanks, BMP fighting vehicles and infantry into a mined kill-zone straddling the intersection of forest paths a half-mile north of Synkivka. The Ukrainian 14th and 30th Mechanized Brigades destroyed each column in turn, apparently reseeding the mines and resetting their defenses between attacks.

There’s visual evidence of at least seven failed Russian assaults through the same kill-zone between Dec. 14 and Dec. 28. The last might have been the most catastrophic for the Russian brigades.

In the daytime attack, a pair of tanks led a pair of BMPs each stuffed with infantry. The Russians had to thread past the wrecked vehicles and craters from previous botched assaults, so they knew what was waiting for them as they emerged from the forest.

While a drone from the Ukrainian 30th Brigade watched, the lead Russian tank either struck a mine or ate an anti-tank missile—and exploded. The survivors from the three-person crew bailed out directly into Ukrainian cannon fire, apparently from a dug-in BMP.

The three intact Russian vehicles quickly bunched up behind the burning tank, at which point the Ukrainians did the smart thing—and struck the last vehicle in the column, a BMP, with explosive first-person-view drones.

The infantry riding in the Russian BMPs bailed out and made for the adjacent treeline. The undamaged tank and BMP both tried to maneuver out of the kill-zone—and both struck mines. Adding insult to injury, the Ukrainians lobbed a cluster shell at the burning wreckage and scattered infantry.

It’s unclear how many Russians died—and whether any escaped. On Jan. 1, the 30th Brigade captured some Russian infantry just south of the Dec. 28 skirmish.

As the winter deepens along the 600-mile front line of Russia’s 23-month wider war on Ukraine and Russia launches its traditional early-winter attacks, clashes like that around Synkivka are becoming more frequent.

The outcomes almost always are the same: Russians attack, get wrecked by the combination of mines, drones, artillery and close cannon fire, then retreat. A few days later, they try again, get wrecked again and retreat again.

The only sectors where the Russians are advancing are the sectors where they’ve concentrated tens of thousands of troops and thousands of vehicles—Avdiivka and Bakhmut, to name two—and where Russian commanders are willing to take thousands of casualties and lose hundreds of vehicles in order to advance a mile or two.