A Blog by Jonathan Low

 

Dec 17, 2023

Ukraine's Cross-Dnipro Attack Inflicts Heavy Losses On Redeployed Russian Forces

Independent assessments of Ukraine's cross-Dnipro strategy indicate that it is achieving its objectives of both forcing the Russians to redeploy elite troops to the sector - and to then inflict significant casualties on those redeployed forces. 

News reports by consistently negative New York Times journalists that cherry-pick interviews with frightened soldiers fail to reflect the objective reality which is that Ukraine has taken a risk entailing expected sacrifices in order to achieve a strategic goal which is being accomplished. JL 

Institute for the Study of War reports:

Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Dnipro River draw Russian forces to the area and inflict heavy losses upon them. The effort has been successful as the Russians have transferred Airborne (VDV) forces from western Zaporizhia to the east bank. Ukrainian forces may be inflicting significant losses on Russian forces. The degradation of defending Russian forces on the east bank facilitates wider operational objectives of pushing Russian forces out of artillery range of the west bank. Ukrainian soldiers who described difficult conditions across the Dnipro are to be expected for an economy of force operation and may continue until Ukrainian operations set conditions for a more secure Ukrainian bridgehead

Ukrainian forces continue operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast amid reported difficult conditions in the area as part of an apparent effort to set conditions for future Ukrainian operations and the resettlement of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. The New York Times published a series of interviews with Ukrainian military personnel operating on the east bank and along the Dnipro River on December 16, wherein the commander of a Ukrainian regiment stated that Ukrainian drone strikes have heavily suppressed Russian long-range artillery on the east bank in recent months.[1] Ukrainian officials previously stated that Ukrainian forces established several bridgeheads on the east bank as part of an operation that aims to push Russian forces out of artillery range of west bank Kherson Oblast.[2] The reported suppression of long-range Russian artillery may allow Ukrainian forces to operate more freely in near rear areas in west bank Kherson Oblast, which may partially explain intensified Russian glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian targets on the west bank.[3] The much more abundant 152mm tube artillery systems that Russian forces widely operate in Ukraine have an approximate range of 25km, although Russian forces are unlikely to deploy these systems to immediate frontline areas due to the threat of Ukrainian counterbattery fire.

The withdrawal of tube artillery beyond 25km from the west bank and the suppression of long-range Russian artillery would remove consistent threats to populated areas on the west bank and allow the many Ukrainians who fled the Russian occupation of west bank Kherson Oblast to return more safely. The reduction of Russian artillery fire on the west bank would also allow Ukrainian forces to operate more freely along ground lines of communication (GLOCs), deploy more critical counterbattery and air defense systems within the vicinity of the Dnipro River, and more securely launch operations across the Dnipro River. A bridgehead is meant to provide security for crossing forces to continue operations, and the withdrawal of Russian artillery further from the Dnipro River would establish a safer position from which to conduct future operations if the Ukrainian high command so chose.[4]

The Ukrainian commander also reportedly stated that Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Dnipro River currently aim to draw Russian forces to the area and inflict heavy losses upon them.[5] The Ukrainian commander reportedly added that the effort to draw Russian forces to the area has been successful as the Russian command transferred unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) elements from western Zaporizhia Oblast to east bank Kherson Oblast.[6] Russian officials have acknowledged that elements of the 7th VDV Division are operating in Kherson Oblast, and it is possible that limited elements of the 7th VDV division operating near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast (the 247th VDV Regiment, the 108th VDV Regiment, and the 56th VDV Regiment) have redeployed to defend on the east bank, although ISW has observed elements of those units still committed to defending and counterattacking in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[7] Ukrainian military officials previously reported that Ukrainian operations on the east bank between October 17 and November 17 killed 1,126 Russian personnel and wounded 2,217, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be inflicting significant losses on Russian forces in the area.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin similarly described Russian defensive operations on the east bank as an intentional attempt to lure and attrit Ukrainian forces, however, and ISW cannot currently assess if there is an asymmetrical attrition gradient in this sector of the front. The degradation of defending Russian forces on east bank Kherson Oblast may be an immediate operational objective, but one that can facilitate the wider stated operational objective of pushing Russian forces out of artillery range of west bank Kherson Oblast.   

The New York Times also published interviews with Ukrainian soldiers who have fought on the east bank who described difficult conditions in operating across the Dnipro River and in establishing positions on the east bank.[9] These difficulties are to be expected for what is an economy of force operation with limited positions on a riverbank and may continue until Ukrainian operations set conditions for a more secure Ukrainian bridgehead if the Ukrainian high command chooses to seek to establish one. The expressed Ukrainian objective to push Russian artillery away from the Dnipro River would partially address some of the difficult conditions that Ukrainian personnel described if fully achieved.

1 comments:

Jim's Alaska Blog said...

Krynki is not the only Bridgehead on the east bank. Recent evidence indicates the AFU control the northern part of Bilohrudove too. The ISW also stated that the AFU control Velykyi Potemkin island, which may put the southern part of Bilohrudove into contention too.

Let's keep an eye on the Kinburn Spit before the end of winter too :)

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