The problem for the Russians is that their jammers only work at very short range as Ukrainian drones are already locked in on their targets. JL
David Axe reports in Forbes:
Russia's RP-377 jammer works against radio-controlled first-person-view drones. But only at very short range. And that helps to explain why Ukrainian drone-pilots have been blowing up Russian vehicles sporting RP-377s. A skilled operator can aim their drone at a vehicle, and count on the drone’s momentum to propel it to a successful strike. The RP-377 draws power from portable batteries rather than from a vehicle’s engine. So when an RP-377 tries to jam multiple frequencies—a power-hungry mode of operation—it sacrifices range. This is the weakness in Russian jamming that Ukrainian drone-operators exploit as they fly their FPVs right through the electromagnetic interference.Russian industry developed the RP-377 jammer to interfere with enemy soldiers’ radio communications. As it happens, the jammer also works against radio-controlled first-person-view drones.
But only at very short range. And that helps to explain why Ukrainian drone-pilots have been blowing up Russian vehicles sporting RP-377s. A skilled operator can aim their drone at a vehicle, and count on the drone’s momentum to propel it to a successful strike even as its radio control link drops out in the final few seconds of its flight.
It seems Ukrainian operators have had to figure this out on their own, however. According to Ukrainian drone expert Serhii Beskrestnov, the Ukrainian defense ministry hasn’t helped.
“Was it studied by military and non-military organizations?” Beskrestnov wrote in a recent social-media post about the RP-377. “I have no doubt. Has anyone from scientific centers tested it on FPVs of different types and ranges? Not sure.”
“Has anyone told the combat UAV pilots of the armed forces of Ukraine about their capabilities to protect equipment, and their vulnerabilities?” Beskrestnov added. “Undoubtedly, nobody.”
RP-377s have showed up on more and more Russian vehicles. But while Russian jamming is a growing problem for Ukraine’s drones, just as Ukrainian jamming is a growing problem for Russia’s drones, the RP-377s don’t appear to be the biggest contributor to this increasingly hostile electromagnetic environment.
Videos abound of Ukrainian drone-operators blowing up Russian vehicles wearing RP-377s in the jammers’ distinctive backpacks. In at least one case, a Ukrainian drone-operator struck an RP-377-equipped BMP fighting vehicle ... on its RP-377.
It’s not that the RP-377 is a bad jammer. “I saw the spectrograms,” Beskrestnov wrote. “The interference is very high quality.”
But the Russians’ jammers probably are tuned to broadcast signal-blocking noise over a wide band of different frequencies in order to cover all the different frequencies Ukrainian drone-operators might use.
“The price for this is a small range of protection,” Beskrestnov explained. The RP-377 usually is a backpack system: it draws power from portable batteries rather than from a vehicle’s engine. So when an RP-377 tries to jam multiple frequencies—a power-hungry mode of operation—it sacrifices range.
Yes, a Ukrainian FPV might go blind as it barrels toward its target. But it goes blind when it’s already on course for a crippling hit. The RP-377 works, but it doesn’t work far enough. How far, exactly? Maybe just tens of yards.
This apparently is the weakness in Russian jamming that Ukrainian drone-operators seem to be exploiting as they fly their FPVs right through the electromagnetic interference. It’s to their credit that they figured out the vulnerability in time to take advantage of it.
The Ukrainians’ advantage probably won’t last forever. The Kremlin is installing more and more purpose-built, vehicle-mounted Volnorez jammers that reportedly work out to a distance of half a mile.
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