The Bloodsoaked Math Of Ukraine's Optimizing Russian Depletion At Avdiivka
Since Russia has again decided to expend significant resources in pursuit of a largely unachievable goal, as it did at Bakhmut last year, Ukraine has again decided that helping them eliminate those resources is a strategically useful objective. JL
Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:
The Ukrainians have decided to use Avdiivka to attrit the Russians even more. Zaluzhnyi is associating himself with the decision to fight at Avdiivka. He both believes its worth the sacrifice (it certainly
seems to be extracting a terrible toll on the Russians) and that that
this campaign will keep going— it will probably be the focus of
Russian offensive operations this winter (attacks will be heavily
infantry based, so the weather wont make too much difference and he
wants the Ukrainian people (and the world) to understand that.
There were a number of very important developments this week that marked down how the war is progressing and what is important in the coming months. Three in particular stood out (at least to me). The first is some reporting on Russian missile stocks and production (which has important portends for a winter campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure). The second was the continuing Ukrainian campaign against Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet (which is anything but a stalemate), and finally General Zaluzhnyi made some interesting and specific comments about the fighting around Avdiivka.
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A Russian Missile campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure—one is being prepared for, but its results will probably not depend on missiles.
Im sure you remember last winter the Russians made a major attempt to shut down Ukraine’s energy system with a distance bombardment which involved a large amount of their different missile systems. During the winter of 2022-2023 Russia fired more than 1200 missiles and drones on Ukrainian power generations, and the Ukrainians estimate that they destroyed almost 40% of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.1Fortunately for Ukraine, the Russians didn’t have enough ordnance to run a truly effective campaign. They could not continually bombard targets, and Russian attacks had to take significant pauses which allowed the Ukrainians time to repair and bolster their defenses. As such it was in the end a significant Ukrainian defensive victory—but it showed the Russians what they might have accomplished had they gone about it more systematically.
A Ukrainian energy infrastructure target burning after a Russian attack: October 2022. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-63357393
It seems like such a campaign is now starting up again. Ukrainian sources stated this week that recently the Russians have launched 60 different attacks on Ukraine’e “energy infrastructure.2Its so far a slower buildup than last year (the mass attacks started in October, but one assumes Russian attacks will only pick up. They might be waiting for colder weather or waiting to build up even greater stockpiles—there are a number of different possibilities so speculating is pointless (they might indeed even have decided to develop an entirely different target mix).
Now this week, we had some hard data released by Ukraine about Russia’s missile stockpile at present, and it brings up the classic good news/bad news analysis—and I will give you both.
The Good News:The best news, if Ukraine’s estimates are correct, is that Russian missile production is basically tracking Russian usage. What that means is that, if Ukrainian intelligence estimates are correct, that Russian longer-range missile inventories at this stage of the year are about the same as last year. Ukrainian strategic intelligence (initials HUR) even released some hard figures.
“As of the latest estimates, Russia possesses approximately 870 high-precision missiles with operational-strategic and strategic potential, capable of striking targets at distances exceeding 350 kilometres, Major General Vadim Skibitsky, a representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine (HUR),said in an interview with "RBK-Ukraine".
The breakdown of missile types in Russian arsenals, as provided by Skibitsky, is as follows:
165 Kalibr missiles
160 units of X-101, X-555, and X-55 missiles with warheads
290 Iskander-M and Iskander-K missiles
80 Dagger missiles
150 X-22/X-32 missiles
Notably, Skibitsky highlighted that these figures are consistent with last year's missile inventory, suggesting that Russia can continue missile production and maintain a sufficient stockpile.”3
Now this is hardly a sign of Russian success—indeed, its a sign (if missiles were all that mattered) that Ukraine would be in better shape this year than last. On the Russian side, to have production simply pacing usage (not allowing for the growth of stockpiles for larger campaigns) is a sign of struggle. Normally 20 months into a war, production of war material should be ramping up enormously.
So if Russia cant increase stockpiles, that means that (relying just on missiles) the campaign that they could wage this year would be no more threatening than last year—indeed it would be far less threatening. This is because Ukrainian air defense is much stronger and more experienced than last year. If Ukraine’s partners have been maddeningly slow (imho) in providing Ukraine the ability to do long-range strike, they have at least been quite supportive in giving Ukraine the ability to defend itself from such strikes. You might say this is the best example of the German aid conundrum. Germany still refuses to give Ukraine Taurus missiles (which Ukraine desperately needs) but it has been very generous with air defense for Ukraine at the same time.
German made IRIS air defense system of the kind supplied to Ukraine: https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-germany-iris-t-air-defense-system/32657769.html
At the same time, Ukraine should have had a summer to prepare its energy system, train its air defenses and prepare contingencies (the scale of the Russian attacks last year seemed to take some people by surprise.
So really, Ukraine, if the Russian campaign will be based mostly on the same number of missiles as last year, should be in a very strong position to fight it off.
The Less Good News. Of course, there is a fly in the ointment this year—and it will be a fascinating test of modern air power. If Russia has approximately the same number of missiles, it should have a much larger stockpile of cheaper drones than it did 2022-2023. One of the ironies of the failed great power vision of Russia, is that actually Iran, not a great power supposedly, has been a massive support for the Russian war effort—so that the supposedly great power owes the Iranians a massive debt. Perhaps the most important thing the Iranians have done is supply Russia with massive number of Shahed drones—as well as the expertise so that Russia can build their own (in other words the technology transfer has been to the great power, not from it).
Remains of a Russian Shahed used to attack Ukraine. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/russia-using-domestically-produced-iranian-developed-attack
Russia has very large production targets for their home grown Shaheds. Western Intelligence has even pinpointed one very large industrial facility hundreds of miles from Moscow in Tartarstan, which seems to be a major assembly plant for the Russian variant (called Geran)
What we do know is that the Russians plan on mass producing the Shahed by the summer of 2025 (they have a production target of approx 6000 by then)—but we dont know how many they will have on hand for this winter’s campaigns.4And that number is the real wild card.
If the Russians had thousands of Shaheds to go with their missile stocks, that would open up the possibility of a different kind of winter campaign. Shaheds are effective and cheap, and even as decoys (they often seem to force the Ukrainians to use more expensive anti-air systems to shoot them down)—they have great value. So the winter campaign might very well hinge on the number and usage of a Iranian weapon.
All I will say is pay attention to the next few weeks. If Russian attacks on energy infrastructure continue to pick up—and we start seeing large numbers of Shaheds, it will show whatmightbe different this winter. If we don’t see masses of Shaheds, then improved Ukrainian air defense should be able to cope well with what’s coming missile wise.
Ukraine Continues to Pummel Crimea and Drive the Black Sea Fleet Away
The stale stalemate/not stalemate debate continues. Those favoring stalemate talk about the land war and the armies on the front-lines. Those who believe Ukraine still has initiative, often talk about the air-sea war, in particularly over Crimea and the Black Sea. This week the non-stalemate crowd had something to point to—another well planned Ukrainian attack on Crimea—in this case the Russian naval base at Kerch, which was housing one of the newest warships in the Russian fleet, the missile carrierAskold.5
The Askold after being hit last weekend: https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/ukraines_attack_on_askold_highlights_an_important_detail_about_russian_air_defense_of_crimea-8489.html
There was even some remarkable footage which captured the moments when theAskoldwas hit. You can see them here if you want.
To understand the interrelatedness of the air sea war, theAksoldcarries Kalibr missiles, one of the mainstays of the Russian campaign against Ukrainian power generation. At the same time—it shows the power of giving Ukraine more long-range strike. It seems the Ukrainian attack was done with UK/French supplied Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles. Personally, its hard to see this vessel being repaired and functional for a very long time—if at all.
Once again it reveals three things.
Thefirstis that Ukraine can do and has done remarkable things with long-range strike and their own ingenuity. They continue to keep the initiative in the Black Sea naval war without warships. I talked about that two months ago in some detail in 2 posts.
The Ukrainians are continuing this campaign with great effect. They are slowly and methodically driving the Russian fleet more and more into the far eastern Black Sea. They have shown the ability to hit Sevastopol and Kerch and to be able to sink or seriously damaged a range of Russian warships of the most advanced and important types—using primarily longer range missile systems (some supplied by Allies, some developed internally). They are also maintaining the advantage in the maritime drone war. Just last night they claimed to have sunk two smaller Russian landing craft in Crimea using their own maritime drones.6Once again, there was remarkable footage of these attacks.
This is an extraordinary success that holds out the possibility of a Ukrainian victory in Crimea (more on that in point three).
Thesecondthing it reveals is that Ukraine still does not possess enough long-range strike (ATACMS, Taurus) etc. I wont lecture any more on this but to say that Ukraine clearly has to carefully ration the use of its long-range strike—and it takes long pauses between operations to make sure it has a high percentage chance of hitting high value targets. It does not have the capability to come back week after week and try and make these naval bases non-functional. That is doesnt is a tragedy and a sign why we have aided Ukraine so poorly at times (and lengthened the war).
Thethirdpoint is very simple. Russian control of Crimea is extremely vulnerable—were Ukraine armed properly. Crimea is actually a supply headache for Russia—it has the Kerch bridge and a few naval ports. With strike, Ukraine could take all of these out—making it impossible for Russia to bring in supply from anywhere but directly through occupied Ukraine in the North. This would place a major burden on Russian logistics. Russia is desperate to hold Crimea, Ukraine has a remarkable opportunity to damage Russian control there—but we are not aiding Ukraine enough to do this. Its simple and so stupid.
Zaluzhnyi and Russian Losses
General Zaluzhnyi released an unusually specific message about Russian losses in the fighting around Avdiivka lately. If he’s right, they are extreme: 100 tanks, 250 APCs, 7 aircraft and 10000 soldiers in the past month.
Two things stand out in this and are worthy of comment. First, Zaluzhnyi is associating himself with the decision to fight at Avdiivka. So one assumes he both believes its worth the sacrifice (it certainly seems to be extracting a terrible toll on the Russians) and that he wants the Ukrainian people (and the world) to understand that.
Secondly, it seems that he believes that this campaign will keep going—indeed it will probably be the focus of Russian offensive operations this winter (attacks will be heavily infantry based, so the weather wont make too much difference—unless its a very bad winter). There are even reports that the Russians are massing many more troops (40,000) to make another major effort to take the town.7
So the Ukrainians have decided to try and use Avdiivka to attrit the Russians even more. Two weeks ago I said this looked to be the case—and it now seems to be confirmed. It will be a hellish winter there—with Ukraine trying to keep their casualties down while extracting a terrible toll on the Russians. If Zaluzhnyi’s claims are right—they are certainly doing the latter.
So that’s it—another rather long update (the message says its too long to fit in one email). Apologies. I’m also thinking of doing more and more of these on Saturday—as it means Sunday is not quite so stressful. I hope that is alright everyone—and that you have a great rest of the weekend.
As a Partner and Co-Founder of Predictiv and PredictivAsia, Jon specializes in management performance and organizational effectiveness for both domestic and international clients. He is an editor and author whose works include Invisible Advantage: How Intangilbles are Driving Business Performance. Learn more...
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