Why Russia's Avdiivka Debacle Shows How Ukraine Has Gained the Advantage

The popular adage that Russia has descended from being the second most powerful military in the world to the second most powerful in Ukraine is simplistic, but recent events suggest it may be true. 

Russia's defeat at Avdiivka reveals that - even with advance planning, the commitment of strategic reserves from the southern Zaporizhzhia front, including hundreds of armored vehicles, and an element of surprise - an attempted Russian offensive was stopped by Ukraine within 24 hours of its initial attack. JL

Mark Sumner reports in Daily Kos:

Russia’s efforts seem mainly directed from the south. But the results don’t seem to have varied. The situation is different than it was a year ago. If estimates of Russian deployment are accurate, over half their frontline forces are not in the highly contested south but along the front northeast of Bakhmut. Russia intended to recapture the cities of Lyman and Kupyansk, forcing Ukrainians to retreat across the Oskil River. And they’ve tried. (But) Russia can no longer mount a successful offensive - even with advanced planning, a concentration of forces, and catching Ukraine by surprise.

When Ukraine’s General Staff began logging the number of Russian losses last week, it was at first difficult to credit. It’s usually assumed that Ukrainian estimates of Russian losses are … generous. That’s to be expected. The Ukrainian military is largely compiling reports from the field, and it shouldn’t be surprising that multiple sources might report the same tank taken out, or that a damaged vehicle might be listed as outright destroyed.

But on Oct. 11, Ukraine didn’t report a dozen losses or even two dozen. They reported an astonishing 91 Russian armored combat vehicles destroyed, in addition to 34 tanks. The next day brought another 44 ACVs and 42 tanks. Altogether, over a period of five days, Russian losses were listed at 119 tanks, 233 ACVs, and 4,690 soldiers.

This was not the result of some lightning breakthrough in the south. Or a Ukrainian landing in Crimea, a move that continues to be predicted by sources on Telegram. It’s what happened when Russia decided to try and capture Avdiivka.

Since Ukraine began its counteroffensive over the summer, most reports have involved Russia being on the receiving end of Ukrainian advances. That’s been the case at multiple positions along the southern front and at positions around Bakhmut on the eastern front. In both locations, Russia has engaged in repeated attempts to hang onto territory or reverse Ukraine’s liberation of villages and towns.

Throughout this period, the impression has been that Russia has played a reactionary role, attempting to move forward only in response to Ukrainian successes. But that’s not accurate.

If estimates of Russian deployment are accurate, over half their frontline forces are not in the highly contested south but instead along the front north of Bakhmut. Russia has made multiple declarations that it intended to recapture the cities of Lyman and Kupyansk, forcing Ukrainians to retreat across the Oskil River. And they’ve tried.

Russia drove west from Svatove on multiple occasions, at one point capturing three small villages that Ukraine had liberated several months earlier. But that advance was extremely short-lived. Within a week, Ukraine blunted Russia’s attack, forced a retreat, and returned the front line to where it had been.

There has also been an effort over multiple weeks for Russian forces to move west from Kreminna toward Lyman. The fighting in this area has often been heavy, and early on, it appeared that Russia was having some success. But months later, fighting is still near the little crossroads town of Dibrova. The last time Russia made a measurable advance in the area was in August. They lost it the next day.

In the north, near Kupyansk, Russia seemed to be making significant advances. As late as August, there were reports that Ukraine had evacuated much of the eastern side of the city, and Russia was bragging that they would soon be fighting at the Oskil bridge. But much of what Russia recaptured in the north were small villages which were either ungarrisoned or very lightly defended. Russia is still launching the kind of squad-level assaults around Kupyansk that it has made in so many areas, but the front lines have not moved.

All of that has been part of the background, the noise that moved the numbers here and there, almost unnoticed when compared with the slugfest that has often taken place in the south. But Avdiivka was different.

Avdiivka area

Before Russia’s 2022 invasion, Avdiivka was an industrial suburb of Donetsk, with a population over 31,000. Many of the people there worked at a company that turned coal into “coke” for the production of steel. Since the start of the war, the population has dwindled, and Ukraine has made a deliberate effort to evacuate this frontline city. Still, there are thought to be at least a few thousand civilians still living in Avdiivka.

Soon after the 2022 invasion began, Russian made small advances both north and south of Avdiivka. After a long stalemate, Russia made a significant push in the area last May. That left Avdiivka looking particularly vulnerable. For Russia, the idea of pushing north from Vodiane and south from Krasnohorivka must have seemed like a matter of just applying sufficient force.

Closing a gap barely 7 kilometers wide would allow Russia to not just encircle Avdiivka but also cut off Ukraine’s forces in the area, breach in defensive lines that had held since the beginning of the war, and push the front lines well back from Donetsk. It would also put an end to Ukrainian actions in the area that have kept large numbers of Russian forces pinned down.

According to a Russian military blogger, rather than dashing forward piecemeal, as it has at so many locations, Russia planned the operation at Avdiivka extensively, including two full brigades of troops, an opening artillery bombardment, and air support to be provided by a large number of helicopters. By all accounts—both Russian and Ukrainian—this initial assault met with considerable success, especially around Krasnohorivka. Ukrainian defenders were reportedly caught by surprise, and there was little artillery directed toward advancing Russian forces.

But less than a day into this attack, Russian advances slowed. Some of this was because Ukraine seems to have moved reserves into the area quickly. Another part seems to be that Russia was not prepared for its own success. One day later, those jaw-dropping numbers began to roll in.

Fighting in the area continues. At this point, Russia’s efforts seem mainly directed from the south. But the results don’t seem to have varied in days.What’s clear is that the situation is vastly different than it was a year ago. Ukraine’s advances may have come at a high cost, but Russia can no longer seem to mount an offensive even with advanced planning, a concentration of forces, and the luck ofto catching Ukraine by surprise.