How Ukraine Is Challenging the Desert Storm Mindset

Even in the age of  missiles, jets and tanks, military commentators still seem affected by paintings of Britain's Scots Greys - with sabers waving - charging Napoleon's massed infantry at Waterloo. 

It's latter day equivalent was the allies 'left hook' in Desert Storm, with tanks churning sand through the desert as the Iraqis threw down their arms and ran away. This image was reinforced by last fall's Ukrainian assaults in Kharkiv and Kherson, where they caught the Russians unawares. But that was then. The reality now is that drones have made the such massed attacks suicidal, rendering the Desert Storm mindset obsolete. And it is often forgotten that the allies bombarded Iraq for 43 days before actually attacking, whereas Ukraine hardly has an air force. Since it is said that generals always fight the last war, it may take awhile for all the cobwebs to be swept away, but the fact remains that Ukraine is doing what it can with what it has - and is winning. JL 

Phillips O'Brien reports in his substack:

The last 9 months have shown that even though infantry has appeared in large numbers, the tank has not been able to lead an armored breakthrough exploitation. Indeed, the opposite is the case—the tank has become more of a support weapon to aid infantry led assaults. Unless Russia (or any power) can exercise air superiority over the area of battle, its too easy to slow armored advances by destroying the vehicles. The Desert Storm campaign air phase lasted 43 days. Its one of the reasons the Russian initial invasion failed, even though the Ukrainians were actually not terribly well armed. However the mindset of the fast armored advance still remained in people’s minds.

The big story this week might be that the reporting, once again, has turned in its inevitable cycle. The boom-bust cycle of understanding this was has now turned back to stalemate and quagmire.

Ukrainian UAV operator: https://x.com/GeneralStaffUA/status/1707803995891179701?s=20

Stalemate?

At the start of the week The New York Times published an entirely accurate map showing how little the front line has moved over the last 9 months.

Blue Ukrainian Advances, Red Russian advances, since the start of 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/28/world/europe/russia-ukraine-war-map-front-line.html

What do we make of this. Can you call it a stalemate? In a very narrow sense yes. It shows very clearly that both sides are having great difficulty making forward advances with ground troops. This is as much a technological imperative as anything else—and one of the problems people have is that they have probably internalized the pre-war analysis of what this war (and war in general) looks like. Basically, the vision of war that was given was of a fast moving combined arms, fast, deep air/armor advance. The stress was on devastation, fast movement and Russia overwhelming Ukraine in relatively short order. Just one example, here was Michael Kofman’s and Jeffrey Edmond’s description of what the war would most likely look like, released just as Russian forces were about to cross the border on February 24.

The opening air campaign would probably be short. Unlike Western militaries, which concentrate firepower in their air forces, Russia puts bulk of its firepower in its ground forces, so it would quickly proceed to a ground campaign. It would start by using helicopters to drop troops into Ukraine. Russia might also strategically drop paratroopers and airlift troops and armored vehicles behind the frontline to seize or other infrastructure. The main effort of Russia’s ground campaign would be to create a pincer movement from the north that encircled Kyiv and enveloped the bulk of Ukraine’s ground forces in the eastern part of the country. Russian formations would then cut off Ukrainian supply lines and fragment the Ukrainian military into isolated pockets surrounded by Russian troops. Drones and combat helicopters would offer Russian ground forces reconnaissance and cover.

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So, there would be a short, sharp Russian air campaign, then the Russian grounds forces would get to work quickly enveloping Ukrainian forces in the east, and fragmenting them into small groups. The speed of this operation was going to be breathtaking, considering how short the air campaign was to be. Looking back at the US Desert Storm campaign, the air phase lasted for much longer than people sometimes remember, a whole 43 days.

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 Now after an extremely short air campaign, the Russians were going to overrun Ukrainian forces in a much shorter time period. Though Kofman and Edmonds dont an exact time period, in another interview giving not long before, Kofman claimed the Russians could overrun the whole Ukrainian army in weeks.

Russia’s military superiority would enable it to overrun Ukraine’s army in weeks by launching assaults on multiple fronts—including from Belarus and the Black Sea, according to CNA’s (Michael) Kofman.

They’re defending the eastern flank of the largest country in Europe and what do they have? They could very easily be cut off and isolated in the eastern part of Ukraine, which is why they may find themselves fighting an organized retreat if faced with a multipronged attack,” Kofman said.”

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Now this view was obviously deeply flawed, but I would argue that one of the reasons it was, its because it completely missed vulnerability of armored vehicles. Unless Russia (or any other power) can exercise air superiority over the area of battle, its simply too easy to slow armored advances by destroying the vehicles. Its one of the reasons the Russian initial invasion failed, even though the Ukrainians were actually not terribly well armed.

However the mindset of the fast armored advance still remained in people’s minds. One of the most comment arguments coming from those who talked about how fast the Russians would be before February 24, was that the real problem with the initial armored advance was that they did not have enough infantry defending the vehicles. If this was rectified, and logistics improved, so the argument went, the tank would regain its great advantage as an offensive juggernaut.

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Well, the last 9 months have shown that to be untrue. Even though infantry has appeared in large numbers, the tank has not been able to lead an armored breakthrough exploitation. Indeed, the opposite is the case—the tank has become more of a support weapon to aid infantry led assaults. The well-known head of Ukrainian counter-intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, stated this clearly a few weeks ago.

Ukraine’s counter-offensive will be predominantly infantry-based in the fall, the head of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate or HUR, Kyrylo Budanov, said at the Annual meeting of the Yalta European Strategy, which was held in Kyiv on Sept. 8-9….

In any case, the effectiveness of all types of armored vehicles has decreased due to the large number of portable anti-tank systems and kamikaze drones, Budanov said.

“Therefore, our offensive is mainly conducted on foot. It was the same last autumn in Bakhmut; we used minimal armored vehicle support,” he said.

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Indeed, things seem to be getting worse for armored vehicles. There was an article published in the Wall Street Journal (disclaimer, Im quoted in it) which discussed how the Ukrainians are seeing UAVs becoming a growing threat to armor.

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 Basically, UAVs are making it exceedingly difficul to protect tanks once they are identified, which mean massing them for an offensive. Here is a screenshot of some of the text.

What does this mean? It certainly means that unless one of the sides can gain a clear advantage in airpower—and that includes UAVs, then armored led advances will be almost impossible. The only way to advance otherwise is if the defensive forces facing the armored columns are so weak, they cant put up much resistance (see the Ukrainian liberation of Kharkiv last year).

If that was all there was to war, a ground campaign against an enemy, than indeed we would be in a stalemate until one or the other sides weakened the other so much that an advance would be possible. That would be a big ask.

However, that is not everything. In March in the Atlantic, I made a plea to give Ukraine more ranged weapons of the kind to allow attacks throughout occupied Crimea to devastate Russian logistics , command and control, sea power and air power (or at least anti-air power). This was precisely because it was depressing to see that what we were doing was arming Ukraine for a direct armored assault on Russian lines, which was the hardest task to do. Here in an excerpt.

“…the manner in which the West is supporting Ukraine’s war effort is deeply frustrating. Though NATO countries have a variety of systems that can target Russian forces deep behind their lines, recent aid has been overwhelmingly geared toward preparing Ukraine to make direct assaults against the Russian army. The most widely discussed forms of equipment—such as Leopard 2 tanks, Bradley armored personnel carriers, and even Archer long-range artillery—are not the kinds of systems that can disrupt or degrade Russian forces far behind the front lines.

In short Ukraine is being made to fight the war the hard way and not the smart way.”

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Unfortunately, for what seems to be misguided fears of Russian escalation, the US administration did not do that. Instead what they gave the Ukrainians was support aimed for a battlefield engagement, and even their one escalation (cluster munitions) were battlefield weapons.

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Not Stalemate'

The real problem with this has become apparent over the last few months/weeks. While the Ukrainians have made some advances with their infantry led assaults, their greatest strategic successes have come with ranged weapons. If the US did not give such systems, the Europeans eventually stepped up. First the UK provided storm shadow cruise missiles and then the French provided their version (basically identical) called the Scalp.

Though because these were supplied by European states, there was not than many on offer. Maybe about 300-350 (its not easy to get exact figure). However even with that small number, the Ukrainians have been able to do some very effective strategic attacks (more on than midweek). They have attacked bridges and depots in Crimea, and most spectacularly the Black Sea Fleet. Most prominently, they have destroyed two major warships in drydock and in a very well coordinated command/control attack, hit the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in daylight.

Russian warships damaged/destroyed in drydock. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/satellite-images-show-damage-russian-naval-vessels-struck-ukraine-attack-2023-09-14/

Black Sea Fleet headquarters ‘damaged’ after Ukrainian missile attack. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/09/22/missile-strike-hits-russias-black-sea-fleet-hq-a82538

The great dilemma facing Ukraine is that they have so few ranged systems of this type, they need to be very careful how they use them. If the US had stepped up with alot more ranged systems in the Spring (ATACMS and JASSMS for instance) Ukraine could have undertaken a systematic logistics and command and control campaign (and an even more devastating campaign against Russian air and sea assets) before trying the ground advances. It would have given the Ukrainians are far better chance of success.

Only now is that being grasped by the administration (hopefully) with the story that ATACMS are coming. If its too late to speed up the counteroffensive this summer, it is something that must be provided going forward. For the larger strategic war is not a stalemate. Ukraine has shown the ability to do great damage to Russians behind the lines (which is almost always what wins battles anyway). People need to move beyond the deeply flawed view of what this war would be like from before Feb 24, 2022 and understand what this war is.

Ukraine needs to largest number of effective ranged systems that we can give it. They also need them now. In other words, basing aid for Ukraine on supporting armored led assaults on defended positions is not working, basing it on ranged systems to degrade Russian resources—is working.

Observations from Helsinki Security Forum

Do you want the good news or the bad news? Ive spent the last 4 days speaking and attending panels at security conferences in Riga and now Helsinki. When it comes to Ukraine, there is good news and bad news. The good news is that European states, particularly those in the north and central (not taken over by populists) are if anything even more committed to Ukrainian victory. This also includes the UK and France. There is an understanding that if Putin is given significant amounts of Ukrainian territory, its basically destroying the European order. Assuming that the US remains sane and continues backing Ukraine, I think the trajectory of support for Ukraine will remain strong and even increase.

The bad news—simple. Well there is widespread acknowledgement that Trump getting elected in 2024 could lead to the US cutting all aid to Ukraine, and the Europeans view that as a catastrophe—there does seem to be no real planning to deal with such a contingency. They know it will be a disaster, but its almost too large for European states to comprehend at this point. This, in my mind, is catastrophic, but its hard to see anything being done, as every day passing makes sensible preparation more difficult. In other words, European support for Ukraine seems very much based on making sure Biden gets re-elected. That’s not very comforting, considering the race for the presidency will be a two horse contest.