Why Ukraine Attacked the Most Heavily Defended Russian Lines

Alexander the Great and Napoleon both believed that attacking the enemy at his strongest point because to do so - and succeed - meant that the rest of the defenses would then crumble. 

This appears to be at least part of the strategy Ukraine is pursuing, also because they probably have intelligence suggesting the defenses are not as strong has some believe. JL

Kos reports in Daily Kos:

Given other thinner lines across the front, why did Ukraine decide to hit Russia at its most fortified point? The reason for this overwhelming defense is Melitopol—the transportation-logistical hub of the region, and Ukraine’s gateway to Crimea, important strategically to Russia. (Taking) Melitpol would require the retreat of all Russian forces from all of occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast—including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. There just no way to supply Russian positions without Melitopol. Its importance is critical, on so many levels, that it makes sense why Russia would lard up the defenses, and why Ukraine is hitting them head on anyway.

The fog of war is thick. Ukraine has maintained strict operational security (OpSec), while Russia keeps replaying that one failed Ukrainian assault, the one in which they lost a Leopard 2 battle tank and up to 10 M2 Bradleys infantry fighting vehicles. 

New video from the Ukrainian side shows that the Western gear did their job—the crews were saved.

With subpar Soviet gear, infantry ride on the roof of the vehicle, exposed to shrapnel from artillery and mine blasts. Not so with the good stuff we’ve been sending. An American C-17 cargo aircraft can carry three Bradleys at once, and the U.S. has 223 of them. With thousands more in storage and in the process of being phased out from active service, the United States has plenty more to replenish any Ukrainian losses. 

You know what the U.S. can’t send over on C-17s? Trained and experienced Ukrainian soldiers. The gear is doing what it’s supposed to do—protect lives—so they can live to fight another day, ever wiser.  

Losses are certainly to be expected. Heavy losses. This gear wasn’t sent to sit in warehouses and look menacing. It was sent to be used, against a near-peer opponent with the tools to destroy those vehicles. But given other thinner lines across the front, why did Ukraine decide to hit Russia at its most fortified point? 

Ukraine’s current line of advance is into literally the densest network of defensive entrenchments anywhere on the map. 

Red lines are Russian defensive lines

The reason for this overwhelming defensive display is Melitopol—the transportation-logistical hub of the region, and Ukraine’s gateway to Putin’s precious Crimea. Crime is critically important strategically to Russia, because with its port at Sevastopol, Russia can (theoretically) dominate the Black Sea. 

Putin has accomplished one solitary war goal—establishing a “land bridge” from mainland Russia (just east of Mariupol) to Crimea, through Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. That lessens the importance of the Kerch Bridge to keep the peninsula supplied, as it is vulnerable to Ukrainian attack and disruption.

Melitpol would further require the retreat of all Russian forces from all of occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast—including Enerhodar, home of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. There just no way to easily and properly supply Russian positions without Melitopol. Its importance is critical, on so many levels, that it makes sense why Russia would lard up the defenses, and why Ukraine is hitting them head on anyway. 

But before Ukraine can threaten Melitopol, it has to get to Tokmak, itself a key regional logistical hub. Look at how all of the region’s highways radiate out from the city, including the only rail line running through the land bridge. 

Ukrainian forces are moving in the direction of Robotyne. Looking at this map of Russian defensive lines, I count seven layers between the two towns. Ukraine has only gotten through the first line, as far as we know, and that was a reconnaissance screening line. Once Ukraine reaches Tokmak, it’s another 75 kilometers to Melitopol, with Russian defensive lines holding positions on a ridge that runs parallel the entire highway. 

Each red dot is a Russian defensive emplacement

Interestingly, those other side roads aren’t fortified, so once Ukraine reaches Tokmak and bypasses its southern defensive lines (notice how Russia has ringed the entire city), the liberators might have some options to bypass that ridge-line defense. 

Once at Melitopol:

• Russia’s forces in Ukraine are split in half
• Russia can no longer supply Crimea by land, putting pressure on the Kerch Bridge
• Russia surrenders its single war success—its precious land bridge
• Unable to supply its forces, Russia will have to withdraw from all of occupied Zaporizhzhia oblast
• Ukraine will have a free stroll down to the Azov Sea
• From coastal positions, the Kerch Bridge will be around 150 kms away, in range of Storm Shadow cruise missiles (250 kms). Just as importantly, Ukrainian aviation may be able to risk sorties over the Azov Sea to launch heavier guided ordinance against the bridge

Related, Russia just cut water off to Crimea.

With reservoirs topped off in the peninsula, Russia will have water for about a year. The results won’t be immediately felt. But it creates mid-term pressures for Russia to manage. 

With the land bridge and the Kerch Bridge cut off, Russia will face the same challenge in the peninsula that it faced when it occupied the northern part of Kherson oblast—how to supply without reliable sources of transportation. 

Shipping will be vulnerable to Ukrainian anti-ship missiles and drones. Cargo flights will present lumbering targets for F-16s carrying long-range missiles. The situation in the peninsula will become, over time, untenable. It may be enough to force Russia to the peace table. And if not?

Western production of artillery shells is ramping up, both in procuring new sources (Pakistan, South Korea), and in reestablishing manufacturing lines in both Europe and the United States. Russia will be forced to defend as sanctions decimate its manufacturing capacity as its allies, other than Iran, refuse or are unable to step up. 

The U.S. has thousands of M1 Abrams battle tanks and M2 Bradleys in storage, ready to be retrofitted for the long haul, if necessary. What does Russia have? 

Russia has Donald Trump, and the hope that his return to the White House knows the United States out of the war effort and out of NATO entirely. In the end, that hope may be the only thing keeping Russia in the war. 

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Ukraine has claimed dozens of artillery kills per day for the last week or two. The rocket detonates above the GRAD, shredding it with tungsten balls (you can see the spread of the shrapnel in the dirt around the target). Ukraine has been using GMLRS (launched by HIMARS launchers) to take out buildings and supply depots, as it lacked the cruise missiles that NATO forces would use for those purposes. Now, Ukraine is using HIMARS the same way NATO would—to take out artillery and, if Russian sources are to be believed, even trenches.