Why Prigozhin's And Putin's Loss Is Ukraine's Gain

For political rather than military reasons, the Wagner Group is being dismantled, its battle-hardened veterans dispersed among regular Russian army units, exiled or prosecuted.  

This will further reduce the Russian military's effectiveness as a fighting force and may lead to more internecine conflict within that army. There is nothing but lost opportunity to Russia's Ukraine gambit in this. Ukraine's challenge is how to most effectively take advantage of its enemy's self-inflicted disarray. JL

Elliott Ackerman reports in The Atlantic:

Over the course of a single weekend, Prigozhin and Putin have done what the Ukrainian military and its NATO allies have failed to achieve in 18 months of war: removed Russia’s single most effective fighting force from the battlefield. Although many Wagner fighters may now be folded into the regular Russian military, their power will be diluted. The strain Ukrainians placed on Prigozhin’s forces in Bakhmut, Kherson, and other places contributed to this rebellion, and is again placing the Ukrainians in the driver’s seat of the war. Putin’s troubles in Ukraine are a cautionary tale for autocrats the world over. This latest chapter highlights the existential threat from within that hired armies pose.

When Wagner Group paramilitaries marched into Rostov-on-Don on Saturday, many residents responded by offering food and water. In one video, a young woman offers a soldier masked in a balaclava and wielding an assault rifle a packet of crackers. When asked why, she answers, “It’s a humane thing. They look tired.”

Those soldiers must be tired, and now their future is even more uncertain. The ones who participated in Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed coup will escape prosecution because of their “heroic deeds on the front,” according to the Kremlin, while those Wagner paramilitaries who didn’t participate will be offered Russian Defence Ministry contracts. Although Prigozhin was able to negotiate a safe exit from Russia (at least for now), an early casualty of this coup seems to be the Wagner Group itself; Vladimir Putin is unlikely to keep it intact.

Over the course of a single weekend, Prigozhin and Putin have jointly done what the Ukrainian military and its NATO allies have failed to achieve in 18 months of war: They’ve removed Russia’s single most effective fighting force from the battlefield. Wagner Group fighters have, since 2014, combatted a long line of adversaries including the Ukrainian armed forces, the Free Syrian Army, the Libyan army, and even elements of the U.S. armed forces. Although many of those Wagner Group fighters may now be folded into the regular Russian military, their power will be forever diluted.

Wagner’s potency was derived both from its experience as a fighting organization and from its status as a private entity, one that has operated apart from the state. The grief of a mother mourning the death of her mercenary son doesn’t resonate politically the same as the grief of a mother mourning the death of her conscripted son. One is an employee in a private enterprise; the other is the responsibility of the nation. Outsourcing dirty wars to mercenaries is a practice as old as war itself. If it checks political costs at home in the short term, it increases long-term political risk. When loyalty to a commander eclipses loyalty to the side for which the soldiers are fighting, the result is a mercenary army that marches on its capital—as Putin has just seen.

Up to this point, Putin’s pathway to victory in Ukraine has relied on a strategy of attrition, both of Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield and of the political will of Ukraine’s allies. The most effective tool Putin had for the former has now ceased to exist. When it comes to the latter, before this weekend, Putin seemed to have a chance at sustaining his war in Ukraine longer than the West could sustain its interest; this was a strategy he pursued effectively in Syria.

 

But the loss of the Wagner Group necessitates that Putin rely wholly on the Russian military. This reduces his ability to insulate the Russian population from the costs of war, diminishing the political space for such an approach. Authoritarians aren’t the only heads of state fixated on the costs of war. We’ve all heard the term boots on the ground. It’s a fixation among American leaders in times of war. The Pentagon even bestowed an acronym on this concept: BOG, pronounced “bog,” as if it correlates with getting “bogged down” in a war. American presidents have long relied on special-operations forces, CIA paramilitary forces, and mercenary forces like Blackwater to reduce the U.S. military’s footprint in countries where we’ve been at war. But the stakes are different for democratically elected leaders. Unlike in authoritarian nations, the cost of a lost war for a president is likely a lost election, not the loss of his life.

We live in an age of rising authoritarianism. Those authoritarians have little respect for international order, and wish to redraw maps. This has made Ukraine a global, not a regional, concern. The greatest current authoritarian regime is China, and the ease or difficulty that Russia faces in Ukraine today informs the decisions that President Xi Jinping might make tomorrow in Taiwan. The biggest threat to any authoritarian is one from within. An autocrat considers his decision to wage war alongside his appreciation for whether that war will consolidate or weaken his power. Putin’s troubles in Ukraine are already a cautionary tale for autocrats the world over. This latest chapter highlights the existential threat from within that hired armies pose. Strategists in Beijing, Tehran, and elsewhere will likely be redrafting aspects of their war plans.

But there’s still an actual war going on in Ukraine, and it isn’t over because Putin is facing a political crisis. Ukraine is in the middle of a summer offensive. It’s still early, but gains in that offensive have thus far proved underwhelming. Even if Ukraine hasn’t yet retaken meaningful swaths of territory, it’s taken back something every bit as important: the strategic initiative. The strain Ukrainians placed on Prigozhin’s forces in Bakhmut, Kherson, and a host of other places contributed to this rebellion, and this rebellion is again placing the Ukrainians in the driver’s seat of the war.

Prigozhin ostensibly turned against Putin and marched on Moscow because of the insufficient support of the Russian military. In the opening hours of the coup, he said, “Those who destroyed our lads, who destroyed the lives of many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers, will be punished.” The coup attempt we’ve just witnessed was a profound punishment for Putin and Russia. In this regard, Prigozhin was successful. The question we should all be asking now is how to capitalize on Prigozhin’s success.