How Ukraine Is Attacking Extensive Russian Trenches, Bunkers

One way is by targeting Russian logistics behind the lines so the troops manning the trenches do not have sufficient ammunition, food and other necessities. 

The other is by targeting specific areas which appear to be vulnerable or weakly defended, then using heavy armor and specialized equipment to break them quickly before Russian reserves can be brought up to plug the breach. JL 

Daniel Michaels and Ian Lovett report in the Wall Street Journal:

The Russians have constructed an elaborate network of obstacles—including antitank trenches, concrete barriers known as dragon’s teeth and layers of advanced minefields—in Ukraine, where Kyiv is expected to attack. But physical impediments are only as good as the troops manning them. Without resolute, reactive forces, all those trenches, blockades and minefields will slow but not stop trained, well-equipped attackers. (And) targeting logistics—which starves troops of basic supplies, such as ammunition—was one way Ukraine had undercut the Russian manpower advantage.

While Ukrainian soldiers have spent months training to use new Western tanks and equipment for an expected offensive, Russian forces have been building defenses to stop them. 

Satellite images show that the Russians have constructed an elaborate network of obstacles—including antitank trenches, concrete barriers known as dragon’s teeth and layers of advanced minefields—in southern Ukraine, where Kyiv is expected to attack. 

For Ukraine’s long-awaited offensive to be successful, its troops will have to find a way through those lines.

“The jury’s still out,” said North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently, warning against underestimating Russia in the fight. “The Russians have been able to dig in deep defensive lines.”

The fortifications Russia has established are primarily in the southern Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, which analysts believe Ukraine is most likely to target its attacks.  The Russian Ministry of Defense said Monday that its forces repelled Ukrainian attacks the day before along the front line further east, in the Southern Donetsk area. Ukrainian authorities didn’t immediately comment on Moscow’s statement.

U.S. officials said they believe Ukrainian troops can push far enough south to cut the land bridge between Russia and Crimea, which Moscow has occupied since 2014 and used as a staging ground for its invasion last year. 

Still, U.S. officials called Russia’s defenses “significant and challenging.”

 

But physical impediments are only as good as the troops manning them, military strategists say. Without resolute, reactive forces, all those trenches, blockades and minefields will slow but not stop trained, well-equipped attackers.

Last fall, Kyiv routed Russian troops in the northeastern region of Kharkiv. Kyiv’s troops succeeded because the Russians hadn’t erected physical obstacles and their troops were too small in number to counter highly mobile Ukrainian forces.

Since then, Russia has mobilized hundreds of thousands of men. Many are poorly motivated and have only rudimentary preparation, but Moscow is hoping their numbers could prove decisive.

“They may not be the best trained and coordinated troops, but they are there,” said Scott Boston, a senior defense analyst at Rand, a California-based global research organization. 

And while Russia’s infantry may lack extensive training, its engineering forces don’t.

“One place Russian troops are pretty good is field engineering,” said Billy Fabian, a former Pentagon strategist and U.S. Army infantry officer.

The barriers Russia has created include multiple lines of trenches, many cut in zigzag forms, from which defenders can fire on attackers at several angles. They are also designed with backup defenses nearby, to which troops can be trained to fall back and keep fighting. 

 

Gun positions are established well in advance with targets already sighted, so shooters don’t need to bother with calculating firing range, as troops on the move do.

“These allow a less-competent force to do better than it might otherwise and make it harder to break through,” Fabian said.

Ukraine has been striving to confuse and deplete Russian troops, using what strategists call shaping operations. They aim to undermine defenders and make attackers’ difficult task slightly easier.

In recent weeks, a unit of Russian nationals fighting for the Ukrainians has made several incursions into the Russian border region of Belgorod, pressuring Moscow to draw troops away from front-line areas inside Ukraine.

 

Ukraine has also been striking behind Russian lines, using long-range Western weapons to hit fuel depots and command centers. Kyiv used the same strategy last fall, cutting supply lines to Russian troops in the southern city of Kherson. Moscow retreated from the city in November. 

Retired Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, said targeting logistics—which starves troops of basic supplies, such as ammunition—was one way Ukraine had undercut the Russian manpower advantage. 

“Obstacles are only effective if they are covered by fire,” he said.

He said Ukraine wouldn’t need to penetrate the Russian defenses across a broad front, and will likely concentrate its efforts in a few places. 

“They need to achieve deep penetration in two or three areas to isolate Crimea,” Hodges said. “I anticipate they’ll mass overwhelming combat power in a certain area.”

A satellite image from the beginning of this year shows Russian fortifications and dragon’s teeth in Crimea. PHOTO: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/VIA REUTERS

“There will be losses,” he added. “It will be challenging.” 

Ukraine’s forces will likely aim to launch attacks that either kill or frighten away infantry defending trenches. If they can do that, they will use specialized engineering equipment such as armored bulldozers and bridge-layers to cross the gaps.

Bulldozers or sappers can push aside or demolish dragon’s teeth. Minefields are slow to clear, but Ukraine has been given specialized vehicles to address that delicate task.

Defenses such as those Russia has built don’t need heavy staffing everywhere. The multiple lines are built on the principle that the front line of trenches, manned by infantry, should be able to slow an attack long enough for reinforcements to arrive from other locations. 

For Russia, that requires both infantry who will remain to fight and mobile armored brigades that can quickly deploy as reinforcements in sufficient numbers. 

If Ukrainian troops get past the minefields, Russia will race to get tanks and armored troop carriers quickly to the area in large numbers. This could prove challenging for Moscow, which relies heavily on train lines to move its forces and equipment.

 

Whether Moscow has robust reaction forces is one of the big unknowns Kyiv faces. If Russia is agile enough, it may thwart Ukraine’s attackers, or bog them down. A defender’s goal is to compel attackers to repeatedly assault, wearing them down and even forcing them to call up reserves to achieve a breakthrough. 

“People forget that this is what warfare really looks like,” said Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

He compared the situation in Ukraine to the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, when Iraq attacked Iran, Iran counterattacked and the fight descended into a yearslong stalemate of trench warfare.

Iraq established a long front line using three lines of defenses: infantry in trenches, backed by armored units, reinforced by highly mobile Republican Guard units. Baghdad’s infantry did hold long enough for Republican Guard reinforcements to swoop in, and Iran never breached Iraq’s defenses, Cancian said.

“The infantry had to be good enough to hold the line until reinforcements arrived,” Cancian said. “They have to meet a minimum requirement.”