Could Russia's Defensive Lines In Ukraine Be More Fragile Than Originally Thought?

As speculation rages about whether Ukraine's counteroffensive has begun - - especially in light of the NovaKhokova Dam breach, which has flooded some Russian defenses south of Kherson - there is also interest in whether Russia is even capable of defending most of its new trench lines. 

The hope is that Russia has fewer troops than predicted due to its obsession with Bakhmut and that this has created serious vulnerabilities elsewhere along the line. JL 

The Economist reports:

American and (NATO) officials advising Ukraine say Russia’s defensive lines could be more fragile than thought. A fast, violent assault is the best way to minimise casualties and deny Russian forces the opportunity to reinforce breakthrough. Ukraine (was) too cautious during last year’s offensive in Kherson province, allowing thousands of Russian forces to escape with their equipment. Ukraine’s main effort is still to come. (It) will have to find the best places to break Russian lines along a narrow segment of the front to force Russia to defend a number of areas at once, stretching its units thin. Russia cannot defend the entire length of the front. Ukraine is still probing, looking for vulnerabilities - or creating them - before committing its strongest units.

For months a guessing game has played out in military circles worldwide: where and when would Ukraine conduct its counter-offensive? Most expected it to come through Zaporizhia province, in the south of the country, perhaps directed at the city of Melitopol, with the aim of cutting the “land bridge” seized by Russian troops at the start of the war that connects occupied Crimea with Russia itself. Western officials had expected the offensive to begin two weeks ago, and some were getting impatient.

On June 4th—two days before the anniversary of D-Day, the start of the liberation of Europe from the Nazis—Ukrainian forces launched what Russia’s defence ministry called a “large-scale” assault on five axes in the south-east of Donetsk province, in eastern Ukraine. Some of them may indeed threaten the land bridge; others were further to the north. Western officials tell The Economist that this does in fact mark the start of the offensive, with attacks also under way on other parts of the front. Yet the cream of Ukraine’s forces has not yet appeared on the battlefield.

 

One Ukrainian attack took place around Velyka Novosilka, a minor settlement south-west of Donetsk city. Alexander Khodakovsky, commander of a Russian militia in Donetsk, said that Ukraine had followed up that attack by pretending to pull its forces back and then striking later at Novodonetske, around 12km to the south-east. The Ukrainians had conducted a successful assault with a limited strike force of just ten armoured vehicles, he said, adding that they had also disrupted Russian communications. Russia’s defence ministry said that Ukraine had thrown its 23rd and 31st mechanised brigades, including two tank battalions, at the front.

There have been advances elsewhere, too. Ukrainian forces are understood to have regained territory in the western and northern suburbs of Bakhmut, a town in Donetsk that has been the locus of fighting for much of the past year. Other reports suggested that there was further fighting in the direction of Soledar, just north of Bakhmut. Russia claimed that the ground assaults had been repulsed, inflicting heavy losses on Ukraine.

In fact Ukrainian troops were in Novodonetske by the morning of June 5th, says a Ukrainian source. “News from the…front line is becoming more alarming by the hour,” wrote one popular Russian Telegram channel. A Western official with knowledge of the situation says that Ukraine advanced in the area by up to five or six kilometres. But while Russia’s defence ministry was mounting its media campaign—hailing the role of General Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s top commander, in the defensive operation—Ukraine’s government has maintained a policy of information lockdown.

American and European military officials advising Ukraine say that Russia’s defensive lines could be more fragile than thought, and that a fast, violent assault is the best way to minimise casualties on the Ukrainian side and deny Russian forces the opportunity to reinforce the site of any breakthrough. They suspect that Ukraine has been too cautious in the past, notably during last year’s offensive in Kherson province, where its troops, despite the eventual liberation of Kherson city, allowed thousands of Russian forces to escape with their equipment.

If Ukraine does intend to reinforce its attacks in Donetsk, it would suggest a slightly more easterly axis of advance than many had supposed. Velyka Novosilka lies around 120km north of Berdyansk, a key port on the Sea of Azov, and part of the land bridge between Russia and Crimea. A southward thrust in Donetsk could also threaten Mariupol, the port city captured and razed by Russia last year. Russian defences are slightly thinner in Donetsk than in Zaporizhia. Many of Russia’s diminished reserves, particularly those from the VDV airborne forces, have also been dragged north to Bakhmut in recent days, probably opening up gaps elsewhere on the front. Ongoing cross-border raids by Ukraine-backed militia into Russia’s Belgorod region, opening up hundreds of kilometres of additional frontlines, have also proved a useful distraction.

 

However, Ukraine’s main effort is probably still to come. With the total length of the front around 900km and 12 offensive brigades at its disposal, Ukraine cannot afford to spread itself too thin. It will have to find the best places to break Russian lines along a narrow segment of the front. The task, some Western advisers say, is to force Russia to defend a number of areas at once, stretching its units thin. Russia cannot defend the entire length of the front equally. At this stage Ukraine is still probing Russian forces, looking for vulnerabilities—or creating them—before committing its strongest units.

Images on social media appeared to show an American-supplied MaxxPro armoured vehicle abandoned near Neskuchne, immediately south-west of Velyka Novosilka. But although the 23rd and 31st brigades have benefited from Western equipment, they are not among the nine Western-supplied and trained brigades that Ukraine has built up over the last six months for the purposes of spearheading an offensive. Those units are equipped with Western tanks and engineering equipment to break through the multi-layered trenches, minefields and fortifications that stretch across Ukraine’s south and east. When they appear in force, there will be no room for ambiguity over whether or not the offensive has started in earnest.