Russia Is (Finally) Moving Most Troops In Ukraine To Defensive Positions

The majority of reports from Ukraine over the past three days indicate that Russian troops are belatedly moving into defensive postures in anticipation of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. 

The looming question is whether this is too little too late, or not. JL 

Daily Kos reports:

Wagner’s persistence within Bakhmut is incongruent with the overall slow-down in the pace of Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine as conventional Russian forces appear to be largely shifting focus to prepare to receive the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Aside from very limited and localized attacks in the Kreminna area and near Donetsk City, Russian forces have largely ceased offensive operations throughout the theater, signifying a transition to the defensive. It would be an operationally sound decision for the Russian MoD to begin stockpiling ammunition and supplies in order to prepare for Ukrainian counteroffensive actions, and Prigozhin’s desperate statements indicate that the Russian MoD is likely doing so.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on May 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[21] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Raion Military Administration Head Roman Vlasenko reported ongoing fighting near the Kreminna forest area and Bilohorivka.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 4 that Russian forces conducted positional battles near Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna) and the Zhuravka gully (18km west of Kreminna).[23] Footage published on May 4 purportedly shows elements of the 88th Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps) operating in the Siversk (17km southwest of Kreminna) direction.[24]

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Wagner’s continued persistence within Bakhmut is incongruent with the overall slow-down in the pace of Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine as conventional Russian forces appear to be largely shifting focus to prepare to receive the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive.[2] Aside from very limited and localized attacks in the Kreminna area and near Donetsk City, Russian forces have largely ceased offensive operations throughout the theater, likely signifying a transition to the defensive.[3] It would be an operationally sound decision for the Russian MoD to begin withholding and stockpiling ammunition and supplies in order to prepare for any Ukrainian counteroffensive actions, and Prigozhin’s desperate statements indicate that the Russian MoD is likely doing so. ISW has recently reported that Prigozhin began appealing to the Russian MoD to provide Wagner with necessary ammunition once again after a brief period during which it seemed that relations between Prigozhin and Russian military leadership had improved.[4] Prigozhin’s renewed anger reached its peak in the May 4 video of Prigozhin essentially screaming at Gerasimov and Shoigu and accusing them of the deaths of Wagner fighters.[5]

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The losses suffered by Wagner in Bakhmut, alongside the likely de-prioritization of the Bakhmut effort by the Russian MoD, may leave Prigozhin and Wagner in a particularly bad spot. It is not immediately clear whether Prigozhin actually intends to withdraw from Bakhmut on May 10 or whether he made the announcement in a last-ditch attempt to secure MoD support. If Wagner does withdraw, then it will likely need Russian MoD equipment to protect and facilitate the retrograde. The Russian military lacks the reserves needed to man positions Wagner might abandon in Bakhmut, moreover. The massive losses suffered by Wagner in Bakhmut for the sake of tactical gains, as well as the overall shift of the Russian military towards a more cautious posture preparing for defensive operations, appears to be offering Ukrainian forces opportunities for fruitful counterattacks in various areas of the front. Ukrainian forces appear to be seizing some of these opportunities, as noted below, but ISW does not assess that these counterattacks are necessarily part of the anticipated counteroffensive.

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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces made additional gains within Bakhmut as of May 5. Geolocated footage published on May 5 shows that Russian forces have advanced in northwestern Bakhmut towards Khromove (directly west of Bakhmut).[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions east of Novomarkove (12km northwest of Bakhmut), west of Klishchiivka (6km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued fighting in Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Markove (14km northwest of Bakhmut), Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), and Niu York (30km southwest of Bakhmut).[27] Geolocated imagery posted on May 4 shows a destroyed Ukrainian bridge over the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal west of Bakhmut near Chasiv Yar.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces blew up the bridge, but the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck an unspecified bridge near Chasiv Yar.[29] ISW has not observed signs of a Ukrainian withdrawal from positions east of the Siverskyi Donets Donbas Canal, suggesting that Ukrainian forces retain at least one critical ground line of communication (GLOC) into Bakhmut.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it prevented a Ukrainian assassination attempt against an occupation deputy of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on May 5.[36] The FSB claimed that its operatives stopped two agents of Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) before they were able to attack an unnamed member of the ZNPP’s occupation leadership board.[37] The FSB likely made these claims in order to obfuscate a May 3 report from the Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel at the ZNPP found that Russian forces placed military weapons, equipment, and explosives in the turbine room of the ZNPP’s Reactor No. 4.[38]

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