If that werent problem enough, Wagner is not organized or trained to mount defenses in depth, which means it is unlikely to offer as much value against the Ukrainian offensive as it did as an assault force. JL
Tatarigami UA reports in Twitter:
Wagner convicts have limited value and only make advances when heavy artillery fire is present. If the artillery is suppressed or runs out of ammunition, they don't make progress. Without artillery ammo, Wagner is ineffective, and they can only move forward with huge losses they cannot sustain. The MoD seems reluctant to provide more support, due to their fear of counter-attack. Without artillery superiority, Wagner's tactics yield no results, leading to fruitless casualty ratios. Wagner troops lack training and experience in preparing complex defenses, establishing firing positions, and managing logistics. Wagner is not designed or equipped for it. Given the recent speech by Prigozhin, it is important to clarify the situation in Bakhmut. Based on compiled information that I am allowed to publish, it is true that Wagner is responsible for assaults and advances in Bakhmut. So why do things look grim on their end?
Wagner convicts have limited value and only make advances when heavy artillery fire is present. If the artillery is suppressed or runs out of ammunition, they don't make progress. Unfortunately, the lack of ammunition on our side hinders counter-battery fire.
Serious tensions exist between Wagner and the Ministry of Defense. These tensions exist not only at the top level but also at the regular level. Some Wagner units act as policing forces, commit crimes, and openly disrespect military commanders with impunity. Poor cooperation between Wagner and MoD results in a lack of coordination between them. The MoD only establishes control over territories captured by Wagner, while Wagner continues to assault forward without proper coordination.
The emergence of multiple "PMCs": Wagner, Potok, Veteran, Yenisey, Skif, Tigr, Irbis, Rys' and Wolves have created additional coordination complexities, including logistical challenges, a lack of clear command chains, and insufficient intelligence exchange and coordination. Example: A newly formed "Wolves" squad drove to Ukrainian lines without coordination, attempting to "gain reputation". However, due to their lack of knowledge about the area and the situation, they drove into a landmine and died. The wounded members had to be evacuated.
In Bakhmut, Wagner manages to move forward by turning defensive positions into rubble with intense artillery, mortar, TOS, and air support fire. They are also aware of the Ukrainian forces' lack of artillery ammunition and are not afraid of counter-battery fire. However, Prigozhin himself admitted that without artillery ammo, Wagner is ineffective, and they can only move forward with huge losses that they cannot sustain. The MoD seems reluctant to provide more support, likely due to their fear of a counter-attack at any moment. Without artillery superiority on the field, Wagner's tactics don't work and yield no results and lead to fruitless and unsustainable casualty ratios. We need much more ammo, artillery and other counter-battery means to nullify their assault capabilities.
Wagner troops lack both training and experience in preparing complex and organized defenses. Organizing defenses, establishing firing positions, and managing logistics in a well-structured manner is difficult, and Wagner is not designed or equipped for it. While it's unclear if our command will decide to counter-attack in the area, it's quite possible that what russia was able to achieve in the course of 9 months will be reversed within a week and result in a breakthrough and encirclement of Horlivka and the rears of Donetsk. While this is mere speculation on my part, considering the poor state of their troops in Bakhmut, launching a counter-offensive in this direction could cause a serious blow to russian morale. This is just one of many potential directions for such an attack.
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