Ukrainians In Bakhmut Hold and Advance At Kreminna As Russians Attack Again

There continue to be rumors of Russian counterattacks with thousands of lightly armed but evidently suicidal troops. 

The Ukrainian strategy continues to be to bleed them through attrition until NATO arms, armor and trained troops are ready. JL 

Mark Sumner reports in Daily Kos, image Agence France-Presse/Getty:

After two months of fighting to get beyond those last few kilometers, Ukraine is literally on Kreminna’s doorstep. They currently hold positions in the forest south of the town that, at times, have included some of the city’s outer streets. Ukraine has also taken both the small villages immediately west of Kreminna. About Kreminna counterattack rumors, something shared with attacks at Vuhledar and Bakhmut: This isn’t Wagner. Does this mean that Wagner has run out of prisoners to feed the grinder? Has Moscow lost patience with Prigozhin? In any case, elite Russian units have, so far, been repeating the  success the VDV demonstrated at the beginning of the invasion, when they were slaughtered

This is Saturday’s map of the area around Kreminna. How do things look today? Pretty much the same.

Kreminna area on Jan 28, 2023. Open imagine in another tab for a larger view.

After two months of fighting to get beyond those last few kilometers, Ukraine is literally on Kreminna’s doorstep. They currently hold positions in the forest south of the town that, at times, have included some of the city’s outer streets. Ukraine has also taken both the small villages immediately west of Kreminna and has moved toward both Pryvillya and Shypylivka to the east. But they may not be positioned well to receive a counterattack from the Russian side. 

One thing that’s likely to blunt the impact of any Russian attempt to follow those arrows on the map above: The area east of Kuzmyne has been described as a sea of mud. That’s why both Kuzmyne and Dibrova are more accurately described as a “gray zone” than fully under anyone’s control. It’s nearly impossible to move armor through that area right now without their progress being slowed to the point where they’re extremely vulnerable to artillery, drones, and hand-carried weapons.

There’s also something else interesting about those Kreminna rumors, something that is shared with the news of those attacks down at Vuhledar in the south and with the latest assaults in the area south of Bakhmut: This isn’t Wagner. None of these attacks are apparently being lead by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mercenary forces. Instead, they’re being attributed to the VDV in the north, and to the equally vaunted Guards Naval Infantry Brigade down at Vuhledar.

Does this mean that Wagner has run out of prisoners to feed the grinder? Has Moscow lost patience with Prigozhin and decided to reduce his power and influence on events in Ukraine? There’s been a huge level of infighting between Prigozhin and more traditional elements of the Russian military, so anything is possible. Wagner might actually have finally culminated in the people-bit stew down along Patrisa Lumumby Street (Hey folks, yesterday Russia was almost at the winery … again.) There are even reports that Wagner is being completely moved out of the Bakhmut area, with regular troops taking over the task of dying somewhere between the hardware store and the scrapyard.

In any case, those elite Russian units have, so far, been repeating the level of success that the VDV demonstrated back at the beginning of the invasion, when they were slaughtered in an attempt to take and hold Gostomel Airport just north of Kyiv. Those naval forces at Vuhledar in particular have come in for losses that would make you feel sorry for them … if you didn’t take one second to think about what they’re doing, or what Russia has done so far in this war.

However, on Wednesday, Russia is once again attacking at Vuhledar. Actual fighting is also reported near Kreminna, though it’s unclear if Russia is seriously trying to drive through Ukrainian positions, as earlier posts have indicated.

So … here’s that No. Maybe. And Yes.

No, Belarus is not about to join the war. It’s been extremely unlikely from the outset, and it still is. Belarus will not join unless Vladimir Putin literally has a gun to Alexander Lukashenko’s head. Lukashenko understands that if they do join, he’s as good as dead anyway. Plus Lukashenko is 68. Putin is 70. Neither one of these men is healthy. If Belarus delays long enough, one of these jackasses will no longer have to worry about it. Lukashenko may feel that time is on his side. Stalling is his major skill.

Maybe Russia is serious about pushing out of Kreminna and Vuhledar. There are strategic reasons why they want to secure the area about both these locations. Russia’s logististics are poor in the worst of times, and without these locations their options get worse. Kreminna and the highway to the north is essential for holding on to other locations — including Lysychansk and Severodonetsk — as well as making it a good deal easier to move supplies to the south. Russia would like to push Ukraine back so that it doesn’t have fire control over this area.

Vuhledar provides Ukraine with a location from which it can shell rail lines in Russian-occupied territory that have become especially vital since the railroad bridge into Crimea was taken out. Russia is likely feeling the pinch, and if it can push Ukraine back a few miles, they may be able to move materiel with a lot more freedom.

And here’s the yes. Yes, Russia still wants it all.

Russia has not surrendered its ambitions to capture and occupy all of Ukraine—it’s just lost the fight on the battlefield. Going from all of Ukraine; to just Kharkiv, Kherson, Crimea, and the Donbas; to just Crimea and part of the Donbas, wasn’t by choice. It was forced on them by Ukrainian troops acting in a coordinated counterattack that defeated Russia repeatedly and soundly on both a tactical and strategic level.

If support for Ukraine falters, Russia will advance, and despite losing over 125,000 people so far, Putin isn’t backing off. If anything, he realizes that he’s in a win-or-die situation. If advancing in Ukraine requires him to pull down the Russian military along every other mile of border and fly in every plane that’s supposed to be watching China, he’ll probably do it. Russia is still counting on simply crushing Ukraine with the strategy that has worked for them forever—crush an opponent not just under sheer numbers of troops, but with an unending willingness to accept massive losses.

To overcome that, Ukraine doesn’t just need to maintain its existing force, it needs to upgrade its capabilities technically and tactically. The first M113 troop carriers arrived in Ukraine last July. The Ukraine counteroffensive in Kharkiv began in September. This is not a coincidence. The M113 helped provide Ukraine the ability for troops to better keep up with armor and position themselves to exploit breakthroughs. It was one of several tools that allowed Ukraine to step up its game.

Now Russia is occupying a smaller area with more forces. The quality of those forces may be declining every time Russia tries to employ its VDV or naval forces, but quantity … etc. etc. Ukraine needs to step it up again. The incoming wave of new Western hardware should help give them the necessary edge against Russia. 

But don’t think that Putin has surrendered the rest of Ukraine. He doesn’t think this is over. Not by a long shot.