The Reason Recent Russian Attacks On Vuhledar Have Been Such A Disaster

The Ukrainians used remote artillery-delivered small but powerful mines to force Russian columns onto narrow approach roads. Ukrainian artillery and anti-tanks crews guided by drone then destroyed the attacking armor. 

It got so bad that Ukrainian troops joked about the Russian strategy of using tanks to de-mine. The problems were exacerbated by untrained and underequipped infantry who panicked and failed to dislodge the Ukrainians taking out the tanks. The result has been an abject failure to take a strategic location just as the Kremlin is demanding a victory. JL

Kos reports in Daily Kos:

It can’t be overstated what a disaster Vuhledar has been for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. The area around Vuhledar has been a graveyard for Russia’s supposedly elite naval infantry since last November. Mass mining of the approaches and inadequate use of all available electronic warfare [to suppress surveillance drones] led to the predictable result of a narrow mine-free breach, into which armored vehicles plunged. Their entire route was tracked by UAVs and shot by artillery and anti-tank crews. Delayed engagement of Russian motorized rifle units and ensuing destruction of the convoy was because of  unpreparedness of the infantrymen engaged.

It just can’t be overstated just what a disaster Vuhledar has been for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine. 

The area around Vuhledar has been a graveyard for Russia’s supposedly elite naval infantry since last November, when they got smacked on their way to taking the nearby town of Pavlivka. Eventually, Ukraine retreated from Pavlivka, but only because Vuhledar sits on high ground overlooking a valley. It was just easier to defend. Pavlivka is gray territory these days, sitting empty.

Unlike Bakhmut, Vuhledar has actual strategic value because of, you guessed it, logistics. From that perch, Ukraine has fire control over key Russian supply lines in the “land bridge” connecting mainland Russia to Crimea. After reportedly reconstituting those naval decimated infantry units three times, Russia launched a new operation to take Vuhledar in late January. The results were the same. But thing is, repeated disaster hasn’t dissuaded Russia from trying, and trying again. In fact, Vuhledar is currently the hottest part of the front. Though, unlike Bakhmut, the heat is all being felt by just one side. The biggest reason? Mines. And not the mines we’re used to seeing, buried by engineers along suspected approaches.

They are only 12cm x 6cm, with 1.8 kgs of explosives in them. In inches, that’s 4.7’ x 2.35’, and 4 lbs of explosives. Those little guys sure do pack a punch! Russian sources note that these vehicles were destroyed on routes that had already been supposedly cleared by combat engineers. That’s the beauty of these rounds—Ukraine can plug any hole immediately. 

Russia has reported seeing them around the entire front lines, from Kreminna-Svatove up north, all the way down to here. Undoubtedly more have been laid on the approach to Zaporizhzhia, in case Russia tries to advance in that direction. 

Yesterday, Russia resumed its attacks on Vuhledar, but this time, they lacked armor. Just like around Bakhmut, Russia attacked with human waves of hapless infantry.

The “cottage area” is also referred to as the “dachas.” This was a residential single-family home neighborhood, as opposed to the apartment buildings on the west side. Russia did, at some point, reportedly reach the dachas, and the area was home to fierce fighting, but it’s considered a gray zone now, occupied by no one. Rybar notes in its writeup the importance of remote mines in the city’s defense: 

Remote mining of streets and approaches continued – almost all the fields were covered with mines even before the Russian offensive, and during the week of fighting the Ukrainian Armed Forces installed over a hundred more barriers.

Rybar claims hundreds of Ukrainian losses in its failed attacks, which … whatever. Maybe, maybe not. Probably not. It’s an interesting alternate view of the battle; even if mostly fictional, elements of truth are likely embedded. And in the end, they admit what we all see in the videos above: 

The delayed engagement of the motorized rifle units and the ensuing destruction of the convoy was only possible because of the overall unpreparedness of the infantrymen who were engaged in the battle.

Mass mining of the approaches and inadequate use of all available electronic warfare [to suppress surveillance drones] means led to the predictable result of a rather narrow mine-free breach, into which the column of armored vehicles plunged.

Their entire route was tracked by UAVs and shot through by artillery and anti-tank crews.

This story has a happy ending, and we’re seeing much of the same with Russia’s other offensive attempts at this time. However, there is a cautionary tale here—Ukraine would face exactly the same challenges when it eventually launches its next major counteroffensive. 

Breaching open fields, against well-prepared defenses, under drone surveillance the entire time, through minefields, and under intense artillery barrage is brutally difficult, and will be bloody. This is why combined-arms warfare is so critical, it’s why the U.S. is currently training Ukrainians in it in Germany, and why it will take months more to drill the troops to execute this complicated choreography.