Why US Aid To Ukraine May Be the Best Bargain In US Military History

At a cost lower than annual expenditures in Iraq - and without the commitment of a single US soldier - the US has helped destroy the Russian army, reduced the already-unimpressive Russian economy even further, humiliated Russian leadership and tarnished Russia's global reputation. 

Not a bad year's work. JL 

Gwynne Dyer reports in the Hamilton Spectator:

The war in Ukraine is a very low-cost solution to a problem Americans didn’t even know they had. Putin’s regime is a de-industrialized minnow (smaller economy than Canada’s). Russia isnt a military threat to NATO. Russian missile attacks are more a temper tantrum than a strategy. Ukrainian civilian casualties are in single digits most days, and the local power outages rarely last more than half a day. The US doesn’t have to commit a single American soldier to keep Russia fully occupied and drifting toward bankruptcy. U.S. military aid to Ukraine is less than the annual cost of its war in Iraq, and 10% of the current U.S. defence budget. This is the best bargain in U.S. military history.

 

It’s still unseasonably warm in Ukraine, but there’s a chance of a hard freeze next weekend. By midmonth it should be reliably below zero almost all the time: the ground will be hard and the smaller streams will have frozen over. Expect the next Ukrainian offensive in late January or early February.

Do not be distracted by the Russian missiles and drones bombarding Ukrainian cities. Ukrainian civilian casualties are in single digits most days, and the local power outages rarely last more than half a day. These attacks are more a Russian temper tantrum than a strategy, because the Ukrainian electricity supply system is among the least vulnerable in the world.

So, then, where will the next big Ukrainian ground offensive hit? It will definitely happen, because Kyiv feels obliged to show it is making progress in the war in order to keep its supporters committed. .

Ukrainian generals have about a thousand kilometres of front to choose from, and enough artillery now, including fifty HIMARS long-range rocket systems (counting some equivalent non-U.S. systems) to isolate almost any bit of the Russian front from its rear support. They will try to take another big bite out of it, and the likeliest choice is Melitopol.

The goal would be to cut Russian road and rail links across the Russian-occupied stretch of Ukraine’s south coast and roll up the forces west of there. Barring a wholesale collapse of the Russian army, it would not culminate in the reconquest of Crimea, but it would bring Ukrainian forces to the peninsula’s northern border.

An alternative would be an attack to retake the parts of Luhansk province that were under Ukrainian control until the Russian invasion last February. The Ukrainians have been hacking away at the Svatove-Kreminna line for a while already, and it may be ready to crumble.

This was where the Ukrainians had their first big victory last September, and although it’s of little strategic or economic importance it would serve well enough as a demonstration that their army is still making progress.

Or the Ukrainian attack could fail, of course: this is a war, not a movie. But they are past the point where one defeat would be decisive.

The constant journalistic speculation about how long the West, and in particular the United States, will be willing to bear the cost of this war misses the point. The war in Ukraine is a very low-cost solution to a problem Americans didn’t even know they had.

Until last year, Russia ranked fourth or fifth on Washington’s list of foreign policy concerns. Putin’s regime was unattractive and sometimes aggressive toward its immediate neighbours, but it was an de-industrialized minnow (smaller economy than Canada’s) with a lot of nuclear weapons and legacy status as a great power.

Putin’s astonishingly foolish invasion of Ukraine rapidly promoted Russia to second place (after China) in terms of getting Washington’s strategic attention. But it still wasn’t a major military threat to NATO Europe or the United States, apart from the nukes — and the Russian invasion of Ukraine created its own antidote: the Ukrainian military resistance.

The United States doesn’t have to commit a single American soldier to combat to keep Russia fully occupied and drifting toward bankruptcy. U.S. military aid to Ukraine so far is less than the annual cost of its long war in Iraq, and about one-tenth of the current U.S. defence budget. This is the best bargain in U.S. military history.