Ukraine Advances On Strategic Donbas As Russia Sacrifices Thousands At Soledar

Unable to take Bakhmut, it's goal all fall, Russia settled for the suburb of Soledar. 

But as it did so, at a cost unimaginable to civilized countries, Ukraine has strengthened its positions around Svatove and Kreminna in preparation for liberating more of Luhansk and Donetsk. JL 

Mark Sumner reports in Daily Kos:

Reports today of fighting less than 5km NW of Svatove, if true, would be the first time Ukrainian forces had reached this location. The difference between what Ukraine is doing and what Russia did at Soledar comes down to cost and goals. In terms of the losses it was willing to sustain, Russia had no limits. (But) the Ukrainian advance near Balakliya broke Russian defensive lines, opened a route deep into occupied territory, and resulted in the liberation of12,000 square kilometers in three weeks. Taking Soledar offers the opportunity to try and take the next small town, at an equally high cost. Soledar was about Russia needing a win so badly it reset the bar of victory so low and raised acceptable loss so high.The Netherlands confirms that they will transfer a Patriot battery to Ukraine, with the PM saying that the Dutch will join Germany and America on providing missile protection.

On Tuesday, Russian forces reportedly attempted at breakthrough at Kurdyumivka, 10km south of Bakhmut. UA reports that this assault has been “stabilized,” with artillery and infantry working against the Russian forces. It’s unclear if any actual advance has been made.

Unconfirmed reports today of fighting near Zmiivka, less than 5km NW of Svatove. If true, this would be the first time Ukrainian forces had reached this location.

There’s be a tremendous amount of back and forth in a small area west of the highway near Svatove over the last two weeks. Tomorrow I’m planning to catch up on what’s happening there along with the latest around Kreminna.

It’s inevitable that, once Challengers and Leopard 2s (and M1A2?) reach the front lines in Ukraine, we’re going to see news of losses. However, I don’t think they’re going to go down with the frequency that we’re seeing from T-90Ms. It was clear Ukraine had this location, as well as nearby Kuzmyne, at the first of the year, with fighting going on east and north of Dibrova. On Monday, the Ukrainian military reported a Russian attack toward Dibrova which was noted as “repulsed.” This may be part of that attack rather than a sign of a continuous Russian presence.

or more than a week, Russia has been claiming to have captured all of the town of Soledar. On Monday morning, that was still not completely true. However, during the day on Monday, Ukrainian forces either withdrew from or were pushed out of the Silj area on the extreme northwest of the town. With that, it was over: Russia really has captured all of Soledar.

What they got doesn’t amount to much—2 kilometers in which not a single building remains intact and most of the structures are absolutely flattened. Comparing satellite images of Soledar made a year ago to the current state is almost like looking at before and after images of construction, except in the wrong order. The Russians have unmade Soledar. Erased it. As with every town and village along this front going back to Popasna, they have removed Soledar from the Earth then parked their equipment on the space where it once stood.

The Russian media calls this “liberation.”

kos has already illustrated some of the costs Russia paid in walking troops over the open fields east and north of Soledar to attack this town with a pre-war population of under 10,000 and a current population of 0.

Just to repeat what we’ve said before, the tactical or strategic value of Soledar is extremely limited. Holding the town does give Russia fire control over the TO503 highway. That highway was already under threat, but now it’s likely difficult or impossible for Ukraine to move forces between Bakhmut and Siversk without taking a several-kilometer jog to the west. That highway was of high importance when Ukraine was engaged with Russia in Lysychansk and Severodonetsk. Russia’s ability to disrupt traffic along this highway could be a factor when Ukraine moves to liberate those cities. Likely not. The important highway in supplying this area was the T1302, and that one has been impassable for months. Taking Soledar makes no difference there.

The destruction of Soledar may also better position Russia for another of its endless runs at Bakhmut. It certainly extends the area of contact along the north side of the city. However, should Russia turn the forces in this area south, it would make them vulnerable to attack from the north and west, where other Ukrainian troops are positions at Vesele and Rozdolivka. It seems more likely that Russian forces that moved into the space-that-was-Soledar will continue in an attempt to press west, hoping to isolate Bakhmut or threaten other locations rather than make an immediate swing to the south.

Still, none of that is really what Soledar is all about. 

Soledar was captured because Russia identified it as a weak point in the line, a point where it could bring together more pressure than the defenders could withstand, and where an advance could be made to capture territory. That’s what every army does. That’s what Ukraine did when it moved against the area north of Balakliya in early September and kicked off the Kharkiv counteroffensive. Right now, Ukraine is maneuvering, as best the mud and weather allows, along the front line just 40 km north of Soledar, looking for the best way around Russian defenses at Kreminna.

The difference between what Ukraine is doing and what Russia did at Soledar comes down to two things: cost and goals. In terms of the losses it was willing to sustain to take the location, it appears Russia had no limits. Just look to kos’ post from Monday to see one of the Russian units getting smashed as they attempt to take Soledar. There are many such videos.

That willingness to sustain any level of loss to achieve an objective is sometimes necessary for almost any army in a critical situation. Any number of battles in World War II could be named where generals knew taking the target would come at a high cost, but still judged that cost worth paying. (Note: These costs are never measured in generals.) 

Only we just got through discussing how Soledar isn’t a great strategic target and doesn’t provide some immense tactical advantage. The Ukrainian advance near Balakliya broke Russian defensive lines, opened a route deep into occupied territory, and resulted in the liberation of over 12,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory in the next three weeks. Taking Soledar offers … the opportunity to try and take the next small town, at an equally high cost.

Even so, there have been many reports that capturing Soledar, at any cost, was exactly the order that had been laid down to both Wagner group mercenary leaders and other Russian commanders in the area. So why? Well … 

Russia didn’t manage to capture Kyiv. So it redefined victory down to taking the eastern and southern areas of Ukraine. Then it failed to hold Kharkiv, so it redefined victory to capturing all of Luhansk and holding the sea coast. Kherson is Russia forever! Then Russia lost Kherson in an absolutely humiliating defeat. Then Russia decided that taking Bakhmut, Bakhmut would be a victory! Only they couldn’t capture Bakhmut.

Russia threw everything at Soledar because it needed a “win.” And any win would do. The strategic value of taking this flat space that used to hold a town is negligible, except in terms of the media reports announcing “Russia scores its first victory in months,” backed by the sound of 10,000 cheering tankies.

Which does make you think. Not so much about Soledar, but about exactly why Russia felt it needed a win so badly that it was willing to reset the bar of victory so low and raise the level of acceptable loss so high. It’s fair to say that the importance of Soledar isn’t well understood, and the answers won’t be found on a map of Ukraine.