How Ukraine Is Preparing For Its Next Offensive

War is not a constant series of exciting advances. What Ukraine is doing is preparing for its next series of offenses. 

And Russia, reduced to a mostly defensive posture, is preparing to try to fend them off. JL 

Mick Ryan reports in War In the Future:

A stalemate in war implies a situation of geographic, economic, military and intellectual stasis. This is not the case in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Army presses on with its methodical advance towards the Kreminna-Svatove-Starobilsk triangle. Unlike the battle to the south, this offensive will have important strategic outcomes if the Ukrainians succeed. Within these towns are key transport and logistic support hubs for the Russian Army in Luhansk Oblast. If Ukraine secures this critical triangle of cities, the Russian position in Luhansk is probably untenable

At the beginning of 1915, the war on the Western Front had reached a stalemate. There were technical, strategic and doctrinal reasons for this. The machine gun changed tactics and killed soldiers by the hundreds, as did more accurate and concentrated artillery. Poor communications hampered the co-ordination of the different elements of the massive armies. A lack of protected mobility meant that even when a breach was made in enemy lines, the enemy could more quickly fill the gap than the attacker could exploit it.

Recently, this has become the analogy of choice for some writing about the war in Ukraine. Articles in publications from in the United States, Britain and beyond have all touted theories of the current “stalemate in Ukraine”. It makes for good headlines, but there is one problem: it just isn’t true.

The Collins dictionary defines stalemate as a “deadlock, draw, impasse … a situation in which neither side in an argument or contest can win or in which no progress is possible”. War is a complex tableau of military, diplomatic, technological, economic and societal endeavours. Therefore, a stalemate in war implies a situation of geographic, economic, military and intellectual stasis. This is not the case in Ukraine. Both sides in the conflict, and their supporters, have an enormous range of tactical and strategic options available to them in 2023.

What we are seeing instead is the normal ebb and flow of a long war being fought by well-resourced countries with external sources of support. After the initial burst of activity where each side seeks large, hard blows against the adversary to hopefully compel them to concede quickly, most wars settle into a cycle of pulses and pauses.

The most recent pulse, with the Ukrainian offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson, saw huge amounts of territory returned to Ukraine through the courage and innovation of its military forces, and the military, intelligence and technical support of the West. These offensives provided a boost to the morale of the Ukrainian people. They also reinforced that the Ukrainians are quite capable of defeating the Russians.

Importantly, the offensives also resulted in a lower tempo of operations. Humans, even well motivated ones, need a break from operations to reflect, reinforce and relax before the fighting begins again. This is the low ebb of the cycle of war that we are seeing right now.

It is a very long way from a stalemate. There is a huge amount of activity being conducted even in this low tempo phase. Most of it remains invisible to the layman because it is not as exciting to report or because it is hidden by operational security and the normal fog of war.

The Battle of Bakhmut is draining away Russian and Ukrainian lives. Over the past several months, the Russian Army and the mercenary Wagner Group have competed to hurl tens of thousands of Russian soldiers against Ukrainian defensive lines which have been developed and improved since 2014. The town of Bakhmut has no strategic importance beyond its propaganda value for a Russian Army that has had no battlefield victories since the early days of this war. Yet, the fighting there is as bitter as any in this war and is resulting in mass casualties that few armies can sustain.

To the north, the Ukrainian Army presses on with its methodical advance towards the Kreminna-Svatove-Starobilsk triangle. Unlike the battle to the south, this offensive will have important strategic outcomes if the Ukrainians succeed. Within these towns are key transport and logistic support hubs for the Russian Army in Luhansk Oblast. If Ukraine secures this critical triangle of cities, the Russian position in Luhansk is probably untenable, and its forces in Donetsk will be forced into a dilemma about how to orientate their troops.

There is much more occurring that we don’t see directly. Tactical reconnaissance on the ground, in cyberspace and in the air is occurring across the entire front, seeking weaknesses to exploit in the offensives to come. Training and equipping of new troops and formations is occurring – quickly - for these future offensives. Once trained, these formations are being deployed behind the lines and being readied to join the more experienced forces who are defending, scouting and preparing to advance. And changes in command are being made in preparation for attacks in the northern spring, such as the appointment of the Russian general Valery Gerasimov last week.

The strategic fight also rages unabated. Russian missile and drone attacks continue to cause the death of civilians and impact on power supplies, as they did again over the past weekend. The Russians probably have sufficient drones and precision missiles and rockets for several large-scale attacks on Ukraine each month. At the same time, both Ukraine and Russia continue to be energetic in the conduct of information operations in their own nations and beyond, seeking to retain the support of their partners and allies.

So, while we may not be witnessing the rapid advances of late 2022, there is still much activity going on in Ukraine. More importantly, both sides retain the military, economic and intellectual potential to innovate and act in creative ways to win battles and drain the resources of their adversary.By no means are the main belligerents or their supporters yet in a position where “neither side in an argument or contest can win or in which no progress is possible”.

We may be in a lower tempo phase in this war, but this is a long way from a stalemate.