Why Russia's Military Strategy and Organization Keep Failing In Ukraine

The current version of the Russian 'army' created by Putin is not an army as Churchill and Stalin understood it, with centralized command, logistics and strategy. It is a collection of independent militias and gangs who report to a specific leader who in turn reports to Putin. 

It is akin to medieval warlords who banded together to fight a common enemy, primarily for self interest and profit. And it is apparent that this structure cannot work in the digital era. JL 

Chris O translates Ivan Matveev, reporting in Twitter:

The Russian army in Ukraine is not a single mechanism, but several factions with their own commanders, control system and structure. Some have heavy weaponry. Others do not. Some have transport, while others are bumming around without socks.For some, war is a job for money and pleasure, for others it is a compulsory obligation (the L/DNR), others have no idea what they are doing here (the Army). It is therefore difficult to expect cooperation between these groups. Is Prigozhin going to work under the orders of some general? He answers to Putin personally, who is this general to him?Why was the Russian army defeated and forced to flee the Kharkiv region? Not only local mistakes and a great attack by the Armed Forces of Ukraine were to blame, but also the fundamental problems of the Russian grouping in Ukraine.

 

In recent days it seemed that something fantastic was happening. However, if you remember everything that analysts have been writing about and that we have been talking about, it becomes clear that the defeat near Izyum is a logical development.Moreover, we may well expect a repeat of such an offensive in the near future. At the end of the thread I will explain why, and I will also briefly discuss the actions of the AFU, because a successful offensive is not only the fault of the losers, but also of the winners!What happened in Kharkiv oblast is the result of a sum of gross mistakes and unresolved problems in the Russian army: A) Lack of unified command B) Supply failures C) Lack of replenishment D) Poor training of the army E) Tactical mistakes Let's look at each in more detail.To start with, I want to stop describing what invaded Ukraine and is still fighting on Putin's side as "the Russian army". It is not the Russian army, it is a kind of military grouping in which the army is not in command everywhere and not always. Let's start there.

 

Lack of unified command. Over the three summer months, it has become clear that the Russian grouping consists of several military formations. Not only do they not have a unified command, but they are also often at odds with each other.There are also problems with the local authorities - propaganda regularly publishes complaints that drones, thermal imaging cameras and other equipment bought by volunteers for the military are not allowed across the border.

 

The Wagner PMC is the most privileged group. Apparently they only report to the centre and can use LNR/DNR and army units for their tasks. They even have their own aviation, handed over by the air force (Su-25s cannot be bought in a military store) and their own targeting.Prigozhin really feels he is a separate commander and even a leader in this war - a title he snatched from Kadyrov, who was promoting himself until the capture of Mariupol. Prigozhin and his PMC can do anything - even freely recruit in prisons.The 3-5,000 "Wagnerites" are not subordinated to the general army structure and fight autonomously. At the same time, Wagner is the most professional part of the entire Russian grouping in Ukraine.hey are the ones who have achieved at least something in recent months - they took Uglegorska TPP and reached Kodema.

 

Troops from the terrorist DNR and LNR are the most disenfranchised. They are sent anywhere, for example, some militia are defending the Kherson front.There have been many examples of LNR people recording videos complaining that they are being sent to fight for the DNR. And this is not their territory.The "LNR" militia are the worst equipped, they are literally ragamuffins who have to collect helmets, flak jackets, socks and other things from volunteers. They are the most unmotivated. Most of them are displaced residents of the occupied territories.

 

The Russian army is not much better at fighting than the L/DNR, but still has more adequate heavy equipment. However, after the losses of the start of the war, it seems to me that the Russian army in Ukraine now has only a few paratroopers, marines + artillery and aviation.There are many questions about their professionalism, I will have a separate section on this. But we see that most often some kind of air assault detachments fight, if we are talking about the army. And the main thing that regular units do is shelling.

 

The most enigmatic participants in the conflict are the Rosgvardia. They also include the "Kadyrovites", who, judging by Ramzan's statements, will soon be back at the front again. Well, bushmen, look out, this time you're definitely finished.The Rosgvardiya is not designed for warfare. They have no tanks or BMPs, only armoured vehicles like Tigers and Typhoons, which can be killed by almost anything.Judging by Zolotov's report to Putin, the Rosgvardiya are not just protecting the rear, but actually fighting.Moreover, judging by the same report, and by Kadyrov and his Chechen Rosgvardiya, the security forces are not part of the army group and act as they wish. Well, within certain limits, of course, but still. And in the defeat at Balakliia, Rosgvardiya played a decisive role.

 

To summarise: The Russian army in Ukraine is not a single mechanism, but several factions with their own commanders, control system and structure. Some have heavy weaponry. Others do not. Some have only transport, while others are bumming around campfires without socks.For some, war is a job for money and pleasure (PMCs), for others it is a compulsory obligation (the L/DNR), others have no idea what they are doing here (the Army) and the Rosgvardiya may be well motivated, but it is not very combat-ready on its own. It is therefore difficult to expect good cooperation between these groups. Is Prigozhin going to work under the orders of some general? He answers to Putin personally, who is this general to him?Or the OMON, they are answerable to Zolotov, their losses are not even counted in the military. Hence, there are lapses in communication, a slow response (until they agree at the top) and a lack of versatility.How would you throw the Rosgvardiya against enemy tanks? And will the Wagner PMC go to die for the sake of a platoon from the "DNR"? A fragmented army is always a big problem.Supply failure. The Russian army's poor supply situation in general has been discussed many times before, but specifically in the area of the Ukrainian offensive the situation was particularly unfavourable. This is noticeable if you look at a map.The Oskil River restricts cargo transfer – there are only three available crossings. And the railway only goes as far as Kupiansk. The roads to Izyum and Balakliia were easily closed by Ukrainian artillery).An interesting detail: in the captured warehouses in Balakliia we see a pile of HEAT shells for tanks. Tank duels are very rare, most are destroyed by howitzers or anti-tank missiles. These shells are trash brought in instead of more useful landmines.

 

It should not be forgotten that in recent months the Ukrainian armed forces have been actively destroying shells along with their depots. And it does not matter that this happened more often in other areas. If there were fewer shells in general, then they were being taken to active sections of the front. And here there the fighting paused for two months. Why bring them in?As a result, during the AFU's attack, the Russian army found itself with a bare ass in the area.But shells and fuel are not everything. Supply is also the quick delivery of reinforcements. But we should remember that any redeployment of forces by the Russian army takes at least a week.