Ukraine's Counteroffensive Goal Is To Erode Russia's Will To Continue

Ukraine's counteroffensive in the Kherson region is aimed in part at retaking territory and reducing Russian capacity to fight. 

But the longer term strategic goal is eroding Russia's will to continue an expensive and fruitless war. JL 

Lawrence Freedman reports in the Financial Times:

This campaign is not simply directed at retaking territory but at Russia’s will to continue with a futile and costly war. If it works, it will do so by convincing Moscow that its position is untenable. It will depend on the impact of stressed logistics, limited (room to) manoeuvre, the demoralising impact of high casualties, increasing concerns about units becoming stranded without means of escape as efforts to pacify the occupied territories are constantly thwarted. In this battle of wills one key difference remains: while the Ukrainians are fighting to survive as an independent nation, the Russians are struggling to hold hostile territory. Only they have the option of abandoning the war and going home.The great Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, took it for granted that defence was the strongest form of warfare, if only because a successful attack required superior numbers. For this reason the weaker side was obliged to defend. A state stuck on the defensive might prevent enemy gains but could not achieve its own objectives. They therefore had to use the time gained by the defence to create a more favourable balance of strength. Then they could strike. “A sudden powerful transition to the offensive — the flashing sword of vengeance,” he wrote, “is the greatest moment for the defence.”

 

On August 29 the Ukrainian government announced that an offensive in southern Ukraine had begun, and has since then revealed as little as possible about its progress.  Inevitably this has led to intense speculation. There have been occasional reports of significant breakthroughs, but also of fierce fighting and Russian counter-attacks. Russian propagandists insisted almost immediately that it had failed badly and that Ukrainian forces had suffered grievous losses. More reliable Russian sources were circumspect, acknowledging that Ukraine was attacking with fresher troops and better equipment than before, and inflicting considerable damage. Their assessments tend to fit with Ukrainian sources’ suggestions of modest but significant progress, with some Russian forces being pulled back and others taking heavy casualties even as they slow down the Ukrainian advance.  Ukrainian officials have also warned against expecting too much too soon. There is a lot of ground to cover. The front line in the south is some 350km long, from Zaporizhzhia — where Russia still plays a dangerous game around a nuclear plant — to the big prize, the occupied city of Kherson.

 

Although Ukraine has created a more favourable balance of strength, and may have parity in the south, superior numbers are normally considered necessary to create an irresistible force that could punch through the Russian positions. Moscow is resorting to desperate measures to find more front-line troops, and much of its equipment is old and unreliable. But it is not short of firepower, aircraft as well as artillery. Ukraine has an advantage in increasingly modern and capable equipment, though in many areas it is still stretched thin. As Russia’s armed forces have demonstrated, offensive operations in these conditions are difficult. They were at their most effective during the first days of the war when they had the advantage of surprise. Since then they have either been forced back because they were overstretched, as in the north, or have made slow, grinding progress in specific areas, as in the Donbas, where they made a few gains at huge cost. Two key objectives — the cities of Mariupol and Severodonetsk — were taken only after weeks of hard fighting against dogged Ukrainian defenders.

 

At any rate the Ukrainian forces will not replicate Russian tactics, which depended on persistent, intensive artillery barrages to wear down defending forces, destroying towns and cities in the process. Viewed as a traditional offensive, relying on concentrated mass to punch through the more vulnerable parts of enemy defences, the prospect is at best slow and steady Ukrainian progress, even as the harsher winter months approach.

 

But this is not quite a traditional offensive. What is currently under way may be best understood as part of a long campaign, containing a number of elements. Talk of liberating Kherson as the coming stage of the war began in late May, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reportedly gave the order to retake the south in July, after which there were a few limited pushes against Russian positions. Indeed, one reason the recent operations might have caught the Russians by surprise is that they were anticipated for so long there was speculation Kyiv had lost its nerve.

 

In practice, however, the campaign had already begun. Since late June, the Ukrainians have been taking out ammunition dumps, command posts, and air defences. More recently they have been cutting off lines of retreat and supply, by attacking bridges over the Dnipro river, notably the Antonivka, the crossing closest to Kherson. Attacks behind the lines have also stepped up — including on Ukrainians collaborating with the Russians — and some spectacular hits on military facilities in Crimea.

 

This campaign is not simply directed at retaking territory but at Russia’s will to continue with a futile and costly war. If it works, it will do so by convincing Moscow that its position is untenable. It will depend on the combined impact of stressed logistics, limited opportunities for manoeuvre, the demoralising impact of high casualties, increasing concerns about individual units becoming stranded without means of escape as efforts to pacify the occupied territories are being constantly thwarted. The Kremlin will be hoping that blocking serious advances and inflicting high costs on Ukrainian forces will provoke a sense of hopelessness in Kyiv and undermine support from western capitals, which are already suffering the economic fallout. In this battle of wills, however, one key difference remains: while the Ukrainians are fighting to survive as an independent nation, the Russians are struggling to hold hostile territory. Only they have the option of abandoning the war and going home.