Stalingrad, Falaise...And Kherson. Has Ukraine Finally Trapped Russian Forces?

When an attacking army traps a defending army in an area from which it is hard to escape, it has created a pocket, such as the allies did to the German army in the Falaise pocket following the Normandy invasion in 1944 or it has created a cauldron (a very, very large pocket) such as the Russians did to Germany at Stalingrad in 1942-43. 

Kherson is more of a pocket than a cauldron, though given the depleted nature of the Russian military at this stage due to their rank mismanagement, it might have the impact of a cauldron battle. Either way, if Ukraine can close the pocket, trap the 20-25,000 Russian troops there and force them to retreat or surrender, it will be a signal victory for Ukraine. JL

General Mark Hertling (US Army ret) reports in Twitter:

The "Kherson pocket" is a smaller version of the WWII "Falaise Pocket." Shifting to Kherson as the main attack was brilliant for many reasons.After successfully defending in the Donbas against repeated unsuccessful RU attacks, UA began shifting forces to Kherson when they saw an opportunity.That opportunity was a large RU force in Kherson, with a river at their back & limited supply lines. Poor RU leadership pushed many BTGs over the Dnipro because Putin wanted Kherson City and, eventually, Odesa. But on the M14, there are only 2 Bridges across the Dnipro. Destroy those bridges and logistics & a trapped force becomes a problem. UA has used HIMARs to "drop" the bridges, while also attacking RU forces who are falling back to the Beryslav Bridgehead. Once there, it'll be hard for them to get back across the VERY WIDE river to escape

While it's not on the news, I'm watching the current fight in Kherson (and the renewed fight in the Donbas). The "Kherson pocket" (a smaller version of the WWII "Falaise Pocket" I mentioned a few weeks ago) is not a large "counteroffensive," but it is interesting.

 

Without battlefield intel, I don't know details of what General Zaluzhnyi or Col-Gen Shaptala see, but these are my thoughts.

 

1st, some geographical reminders about Kherson. -It's both a city & an Oblast (like a province) -The Oblast is about the size of Maryland, the city is about 1/2 the size of Baltimore. -The wide Dnipro River dissects the Oblast and runs to the Black Sea.

 

The main M14 motorway runs from Rostov (in Russia), thru Mykolayiv & Odesa, into Moldova It's a key logistics route (or, in Army talk, LOC or Line of Communication) East is Zaporizhzhya, west is Mykolays'ka, to the South is Crimea. Kherson is central & critical to S fight.A few weeks ago, UA started "shaping operations." I won't go into a doctrinal definition, but that means countering the enemies ability to affect ur maneuver. UA used LONG & SHORT range artillery strikes, SOF, small unit teams, resistance/territorials.When the enemy (RU) is on the defensive & trying to secure ground, UA can strike at the time & place of their choosing. That's the advantage of the offense. Having precision weapons (HIMARS) & good Special Operating Forces (SOF) contributes to that.Not only do these actions destroy (and shape) the RU forces so they are more vulnerable to attack, they also lower RU morale by killing a lot of RU soldiers & destroying equipment. All that contributes to UKR - even with a smaller force - having greater freedom of maneuver.So as a commander, what would I do with that small force? Same thing I would do with artillery: Target key enemy elements. Attack those that are the most vulnerable. Shifting to the Kherson as the main attack was brilliant for many reasons.After successfully defending in the Donbas against repeated unsuccessful RU attacks, UA began shifting forces to Kherson when they saw an opportunity. That opportunity was a large RU force in Kherson, with a river at their back & limited supply lines. Poor RU leadership pushed many BTGs over the Dnipro because Putin wanted Kherson City, Mykolayiv, and eventually Odesa. But on the M14, there are only 2 Bridges across the Dnipro. Destroy those bridges...and logistics & a trapped force becomes a RU problem.In the last few days, UA has used HIMARs to "drop" the bridges, while also attacking RU forces I won't draw military arrows or objectives, but reports indicate UA has been involved in intense fighting in Vysokopillya, Arkhangelske & Potemkine.There are also indications RU troops are falling back to the Beryslav Bridgehead (see box area on map) as part of a "refit" & "reconsolidate" operation. Once there, it'll be hard for them to get back across the VERY WIDE river to escape (Note only 2 Bridges in Kherson). UA is targeting key RU w/ precision weapons, confusing a RU force that already has very low morale and poor leadership, with a relatively small combined arms (tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, logistics, etc) force. All while RU has depleted BTG w/ little supplies.So while there is the potential for a lot of RU prisoners in this significant battle in the next few weeks, there's more... There are early reports in the Donbas that UA forces have launched an attack over the Severski Donets River and seized the town of Ozerne.While a relatively smaller victory, this action by UA in the Donbas is *after* the RU pulled forces to head south, again showing offensive spirit by Ukraine.Because I've been asked in the last few days "how's it going in Ukraine?" I thought these few tactical observations might show: -the slow pace of what we should expect in coming weeks -the offensive spirit & skill of the UA -the quandary RU finds itself in