How Ukraine's Planning For the Campaign To Defeat Russia Is Evolving

The goal of a new Ukrainian counteroffensive might be to retake Kherson, or to surround and capture of the now exposed and under-supplied Russian army in the south or to force their retreat.

But the strategic objective will be to further depress Russian morale, convincing the the Russian people and their leaders that continued fighting will be wasteful and fruitless. That is the ultimate goal. JL

Mick Ryan reports in War In the Future:

The Ukrainian government feels pressure to undertake an offensive before the northern winter to sustain western support, seeking a balance of reclaiming Ukrainian territory and retaining Western support. Ukraine's design might an enemy-centric objective such as ‘destruction of all Russian forces west of the Dnipro. (Or) it might be isolation to force their withdrawal. Or it could be a geographic, centred on ground re-captured or cities retaken. But the objective will include the degradation of Russian morale. And it will aim to impact on the confidence of the Russians (and their people) to continue this war.Today, I explore Ukraine’s potential counteroffensive in the south, and the considerations for planning and conducting such a large-scale campaign.

 

First, a little history. In 2002-3 I attended the

@USMC

School of Advanced Warfighting. Its focus was campaigning and campaign design. We used history to foster these skills, including designing a campaign to successfully invade Russia in 1812 with Napoleon! So campaign design is something that I really enjoy studying, and I have done a bit of it for real overseas as well. Why does this matter? Well, I use my experience, my schooling and my studies over two decades when I look at the Russian and Ukrainian campaigns in this war.

 

Let’s discuss the southern campaign by starting at the beginning – it is important context. Russia has made many errors in this war. It commenced with a bad strategy, underpinned by flawed assumptions.From this has flowed multiple military shortfalls. Russia’s poor tactics & logistics meant it wasted large amounts of manpower and weapons in unsuccessful advances on #Kyiv and #Kharkiv. This & its troubled reinforcement system has constrained its offensive capacity since.

 

To make some progress somewhere, the Russians had to concentrate a large proportion of their offensive capacity (not all their forces) in the east to meet Putin’s declared outcomes for the Donbas. This left the Russians vulnerable elsewhere. And since the start of the invasion, #Ukraine has played its inferior hand well. It is a country that is smaller in size, population, economy & military forces than Russia. As I have written previously, in this war Russia got the mass, but Ukraine got the brains and the heart.

 

While for a time the Ukrainians were drawn into an attritional fight in the Donbas, the introduction of #HIMARS allowed them to ‘break contact’ in some respects and return to targeting Russian operational vulnerabilities in the east and south.And while the Ukrainians still face a difficult defensive campaign in the east, they have been able to conduct operations to take back territory in the south, which is probably the most important and decisive theatre in the war.

 

So, we are at a point where many are waiting on a large Ukrainian offensive in the south. Over the past two months, the Ukrainians have been shaping the environment for this, including deep strikes. What might be some of the important considerations in such an offensive?

 

Politics. The Ukrainian government probably feels pressure to undertake an offensive before the northern winter to sustain western support. The Ukrainian President will be seeking a balance of reclaiming Ukrainian territory and retaining Western support.This objective exists in tension with military capacity (this is normal in war). Remember, war is about achieving political objectives. And as

@MassDara

notes, Ukraine can’t afford static front lines to be normalised. Russian annexation is pending.

 

Operational Design. Operational design is an important component of military professionalism. Through good operational design, commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions to meet strategic and political objectives.For Ukraine, their design will be to achieve an operational outcome in the south. It might an enemy-centric objective such as ‘destruction of all Russian forces west of the Dnipro’. Alternately it might be their isolation to force their withdrawal.Or it could be a geographic objective, centred on ground re-captured or cities retaken. But either objective will also include the degradation of Russian morale. And it will aim to impact on the confidence of the Russians (and their people) to continue this war.

 

A vital aspect of a Ukrainian campaign design will be prioritization for allocation of forces, logistics, intelligence, transport, and inter-service collaboration. This demands a design that considers how many offensives at once, and how each advance is sequenced.

 

Timing. In war, the clock is always ticking. The ability to exploit time is one of the most important considerations in the planning and execution of military campaigns. Colin Gray writes that “every military plan at every level of war is ruled by the clock.”he Ukrainians will be wargaming the best time to conduct an offensive. This is a more significant activity than most appreciate. It will require excellent intelligence on Russian reserves, combat potential & logistics, particularly in light of recent Russian reinforcements.There will be a political dimension to timing. Even if the military are not fully ready for an offensive (there could be multiple reasons for this), political imperatives might force the timing.

 

Importantly, timing will be influenced by Ukrainian ability to concentrate & coord forces required for close combat, engineer support, artillery, air support, communications, logistics, psyops, EW, etc. This is really hard!Offensive operations are expensive in recon assets (to find, fix and kill the enemy), artillery, long range strike, armour and mobility support (engineers. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades and Divisions, will be needed. It is all underpinned by training & rehearsals.

 

Finally, strategic support will also be necessary. Ukrainian industry, and western aid donors, will be required to provide weapons, ammunition, intelligence, and other support for an offensive. Offensive ops are enormously expensive in military material and munitions.There have been many speculative articles on when a Ukrainian offensive in the south might occur. My aim here is not to discuss exact timings or outcomes, but to discuss how Ukrainian campaign planners might think about the fight ahead.