Why Ukraine Retains the Advantage In Donbas Artillery Slugfest

The Russian army is using its advantage in artillery and air power inefficiently because its ground forces are both so decimated, ill-equipped and poorly led that they are incapable of following up. 

Ukraine has intelligently used its knowledge of the terrain and its technological sophistication to target Russian forces with increasing accuracy and impact. In a war of attrition, intangibles like accuracy, leadership, intelligence and morale will win. JL 

Mark Hertling reports in Twitter:

The Donbas fight is a slugfest, with RU using artillery to set conditions they can't follow up on. UKR is smartly using limited forces and precise targeting. They are using ever-increasing & PRECISE counter-fire, drones, and air attack (very different than RU). UKR leadership, incorporation of battlefield intel, & mission focus is good. What's important, Ukraine's strategy & operational goals have not changed: Defend the country/culture/people, regain territorial integrity. RU strategic goals & operational objectives have changed significantly & that confuses commanders and troops on the ground. The RU army that continues to use imprecise artillery & indiscriminate air attacks. On 2/24 I posted a long twitter thread on why I thought Ukraine would win. On 4/4 I posted another on what to expect in Russia's "phase 2." On 5/26, I provided additional details on how RU plans were (& weren't) playing out.n April & May, there's been a lot of movement on the battlefield by both forces.

 

What's important, Ukraine's strategy & operational goals have not changed: Defend the country/culture/people, regain territorial integrity. On the other hand, RU strategic goals & operational objectives have changed significantly & that confuses commanders and troops on the ground, an RU army that: -uses massive & imprecise artillery/air -has not trained on & has difficulty executing combined arms maneuver (i.e., coordinating tanks, infantry, artillery, air, engineers, logistic support). -is poorly led Truthfully, I knew RU's strategic & operational objectives when the war started...I don't know what they are now.I *think* (guess?) RU operational objectives are: -Expand stronghold in Donbas -Gain & expand foothold in 3 other Oblasts (Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Kharkiv) -Control all Black/Azov sea ports Not sure what Putin's *new* strategic objectives are...but they are beyond reach.A critical difference in objectives: Ukraine's strat & oper'l objective are focused on destroying the Russian invaders (thus defending their land) Russians strat & oper'l objectives are focused on gaining territory. This distinction is important for the will of the army.At the end of phase 1, the RU army has also been increasingly plagued with -a need for regeneration of forces -the death of high/mid level leaders -increasingly low morale -unwilling conscripts/mercenaries to fight -numerous battlefield defeats, very few temporary victories.RU continues to use imprecise artillery & indiscriminate air force/helicopter attacks. Make no mistake, these assist in breakthroughs, terrorize the population & physically/psychologically affect UKR soldiers. These attacks do prepare the way for RU gaining ground. BUT once RU "lifts & shifts" arty & their recon forces move to take ground, the inability of the RU to conduct combined arms operations is glaringly bad. It's VERY HARD to fix that during combat...it takes years to train this. Evidence: multiple failed river crossings.

 

For all those amateurs saying "this is the end of tanks on the battlefield," I'd suggest you not judge the future by the way the RUs are executing their campaign. Tanks are part of an infantry, artillery, air, air defense, SOF, engineer, logistics TEAM.UKR is currently overmatched in numbers of pieces of equipment. That's bad...and good (think resupply/maintenance of heavy equipment). They are using ever-increasing & PRECISE counter-fire, drones, and air attack (very different than RU).UKR leadership, incorporation of battlefield intel, use of dismounted infantry (with AT & AA weapons) & mission focus is good-to-excellent. UKR logistics operations if fair, but getting better. RU use of tanks/infantry, is bad; logistics support is terrible; leadership awful.A smart force, when attacked with massive artillery, will pull back (withdraw, not retreat). When the arty stops, they return. If attacker doesn't have arty/air supporting their attack & the defending force has prepared defensive positions to move back into, the attacking force will face a buzz saw. Combine that with a requirement by the attacking force (RU) to seize & occupy urban areas (like Sievierodonetsk, w/a population of 100k)...well, you see the problem.A key tenet of warfare: the defender usually (though not always) has a home field advantage. They know the terrain. The home team knows rivers, roads, ground undulation, weather, line of site, hide positions, dust, hills, Watch films of RU tanks, moving down rural roads. They're slow, hesitant...don't move off roads. They know there are many ways to die: AT ambush, artillery, drones, mines.While

@ISW

(and other) maps are great, they don't tell the entire terrain story. Example: Here's the Luhansk salient. What isn't shown: -the width/bends in the Donets River, west of Sievierodonetsk -undulating terrain & overwatch positions -rural roads -the M04 motorway .

 

On today's intense battlefield, every soldier/leader in any good unit fights for intelligence. There is a need for planning, driven by "intel-based operations," and "intel-based targeting.Ukraine is getting some great intel, gathering a variety of techniques & incorporating unique resources (drones, satellites, human intel, etc)The fight today isn't a stalement & it's not stalled. My gut (& reports) tell me the Donbas fight is a slugfest, with RU using artillery to set conditions they can't follow up on. UKR is smartly using limited forces and precise targeting.