Why Severodonetsk Won't Change Ukraine War's End But Requires Strategic Choices

The Ukrainian strategy has been to wear down Russian forces' use of men, equipment and ammunition by choosing to fight in  Severodonetsk, a militarily insignificant location, because, for political reasons, Putin wants to capture it so has focused his army's effort there. 

The strategic challenge is knowing when to withdraw - or sacrifice good troops - understanding that there are tactical opportunities in Kherson and Kharkiv which may present more optimal strategic advantages but dont offer the same chance to decimate Russia's limited warmaking capacity. JL  

Mick Ryan reports in War In the Future:

The outcome of the Battle of the Luhansk Pocket is unlikely to determine the outcome of this war. But the Russians have learned from their earlier failures. Both sides are approaching operational exhaustion from casualties, ammunition expenditure and other losses. Strategically, the Ukrainian high command will be thinking about what forces should be committed to defending the Luhansk Pocket versus holding Kharkiv and sustaining advances in Kherson. The allocation of western aid will need prioritisation at the strategic level.They are having to fight, maneuver and survive some of the worst combat since WW2.The outcome of the Battle of the Luhansk Pocket is unlikely to determine the overall outcome of this war. But, it is a demonstration that the Russians have learned from their earlier failures, and that the Ukrainians are now fighting a different war from that north of Kyiv. The Russian eastern offensive in Ukraine is making slow but measurable progress in the east (Severodonetsk area), in the north (Lyman area) and south (Popasna area). Operationally, these tactical advances have created a ‘pocket’ occupied by Ukrainian defenders.

 

For the attacker, there are considerations that range from political to tactical. At the tactical level, have the Russians concentrated sufficient combat power and support to sustain their advances on the eastern, northern and southern parts of the pocket to close it?At the operational level, the Russians have to balance their forces between those fixing the Ukrainians in the pocket with those that will close the jaws of the pocket. Shaping this will be the primary operational goal: capture ground or destroy Ukrainian forces.

 

Politically, the Russian focus is probably the seizure of terrain, with destruction of Ukrainian forces a supporting effort. Russian political statements about the war have been more about securing the Donbas. Winning this battle supports this strategic narrative. None of this is easy. While the Russians have clearly learned lessons from the war’s initial phase, and have better concentrated combat forces, the creating and closing of the Luhansk Pocket will still extract a heavy price from Russian combat forces.

 

The Ukrainians have a major challenge in the Luhansk Pocket. The forces of the JFO in the east have fought a courageous defensive campaign, but the significant Russian advantage in artillery, rocket and air delivered fires is taking a toll.The Ukrainians have a range of challenges from the political to the tactical. Politically, it will be difficult for President Zelensky to withdraw forces from #Severodonetsk, let alone from the Luhansk Pocket. It represents the last part of Luhansk held by Ukraine.

 

Strategically, the Ukrainian high command will be thinking about what proportion of their forces can or should be committed to defending the Luhansk Pocket versus forces for holding ground around Kharkiv and those required to sustain their advances in Kherson.This will be compounded by the need for the Ukrainians to hold a strategic reserve of forces for unforeseen circumstances or some type of operational disaster on one of the key fronts. And, can they also hold other forces in preparation for future counter offensives?

 

The allocation of western aid will need prioritisation at the strategic level. Every senior Ukrainian commander will be crying out for Western artillery systems, ammunition, air defence and other weapons. There will not be enough to satisfy all of their needs.Finally, the Ukrainian high command will be doing worst case planning in case they have to withdraw from the Luhansk Pocket. What are the key decision points and who makes the final decision?

 

At the operational level, there is a need to balance support to several fights in the pocket. Tactical tasks include delaying the Russian advance from the east, holding open the ‘shoulders’ of the pocket in the north & east, and provision of logistic support / reinforcements.And, given the high level of casualties (especially due to artillery), what might be the priority for reinforcements - the forces fighting in the east, those blocking Russian advances from the north & south, or those conducting rear area security to keep open important roads?

 

Operational planners will also be thinking about, if the worst happens, how much of the Ukrainian force in the Luhansk Pocket can be saved. Can Ukraine afford another Mariupol-like siege in the Donbas where it loses thousands of combat and support troops? Tactical commanders, while focussed on fighting for survival, will also need to understand some of the operational context I have described above. It will guide the level of risk they take, and how long they hold ground for.But, the most important task for these tactical combat leaders right now is leadership and providing purpose to their soldiers. They are having to fight, tactically maneuver and survive in some of the worst combat conditions since WW2.

 

Both sides are probably approaching operational exhaustion from casualties, ammunition expenditure and other losses. However this battle concludes, it might be the event that sees the end of the initial pulse of combat in this war.And while the full context and importance of this battle will only be understood in hindsight, we are potentially approaching the ‘end of the beginning’ for this war. There is a long way to go in defeating the Russian invasion.