Why Putin Didn't Declare War And Mobilize As Russia Marked Victory Day

The quick answer is that he knew it would only make things worse: unlike Ukraine, he does not have tens of thousands of young and middle aged men and women clamoring to join the military. In fact, just the opposite as soldiers sabotage their equipment, frag their officers and those potentially eligible hire lawyers or pay bribes to get themselves out while the most desperate burn down recruiting centers in Russian cities.  

And even if he could inspire new recruits, he has neither the equipment to arm them, the industry to make new weapons nor the trade relations to import them. Nor does he have trainers to train new soldiers. The looming question is what an exit strategy might look like. JL

Mick Ryan reports in the Sydney Morning Herald, image Mikhail Klimentyev, AFP:

If Putin had used this commemoration to declare war, he would have highlighted to the Russian public that (his) special military operation, supposedly a quick intervention, had been neither quick nor special. By now, Russians are aware of the flow home of dead soldiers. Spotlighting this would make Putin seem weaker, and not stronger. Mobilising would be an acknowledgment that things were not going well in Ukraine. It would also be very expensive. Expansion of the Army does not offer any guarantee of success in Ukraine. Its problem does not stem from size but from poor leadership, brutal behaviour, poor combined arms and terrible support services. Mobilisation (will not) address these.
Western analysts were watching President Putin’s Victory Day speech with intense scrutiny this year. It was, as expected, full of patriotic statements of great past deeds and the sacrifices of the Russian people. His words were in part a commemoration and in part a declaration of Russian intent. Putin praised the military personnel of Russia. He acknowledged their sacrifices – and those of their families – while reserving special praise for army medical personnel. 

The extra attention paid outside Russia came on the back of intense speculation about a possible declaration of war, announcement of a national mobilisation, or even a victory declaration. It didn’t happen, and Putin offered no escalation in the war. It is worth reflecting on why not. 

If Putin had used this commemoration to declare war, he would have inadvertently highlighted to the Russian public that their special military operation, supposedly a quick military intervention, had been neither quick nor special. By now, the Russian people are probably aware of the flow home of dead and disfigured soldiers. Placing a spotlight on this issue would only make Putin seem weaker, and not stronger. 

Mobilising his nation, or at least declaring it in such an overt way, would also be an acknowledgment to the Russian people that things were not going well in Ukraine. But beyond the symbolism of national mobilisation, it would also have been a very expensive option for Putin and for Russia more broadly. It would take men and women from normal occupations that generate taxes for the Russian state. 

Mobilisation would also demand a huge influx of resources to train and arm a force that has suffered hideous losses of people and equipment since February 24. And it would require Russia to increase its output of military hardware to replace losses in Ukraine and equip an expanded army. This would have been a significant challenge given how the sanctions regime has cut Russia off from many of the advanced technologies necessary for modern weapons manufacture. 

Importantly, an expansion of the current Russian Army does not offer any guarantee of success in Ukraine. After all, the problem with the Russian army in Ukraine does not stem from its size but from its poor leadership, brutal behaviour, poor combined arms integration and terrible supporting services. Mobilisation is unlikely to address these cultural issues. 

However, just because Putin announced none of these things on the parade, it does not mean they are off the table. A declaration of war is something that is necessarily public and would have significant diplomatic implications. But the Russian Army is in deep trouble in Ukraine and will need a larger force if it is to hold the territory it has already captured. A quiet mobilisation of an expanded military force is a distinct possibility in the near future. 

This was a speech designed mainly for domestic audiences. Putin directly linked the wartime sacrifices of the Soviet Union to contemporary operations in Ukraine. As he noted to the thousands of soldiers assembled in their parade uniforms in Red Square to commemorate victory over Nazi Germany, “you are fighting for the homeland, for its future, for no one to forget the lessons of World War II”. 

Like the Soviet Union in the Second World War, Putin described how external forces pose an existential threat to the modern Russian state. And, he again connected the Ukrainian government to the Nazis to delegitimise the Ukrainian state.While Putin did not escalate the war during his speech, he is not backing down. His demeanour and his words reinforced his justification for the invasion of Ukraine. And it reinforced the words of Ukrainian President Zelensky in his Victory Day speech yesterday when he described how “this is not a war of two armies. This is a war of two world views.” 

Putin has once again provided us with an insight into his world view. It is one where the threat from fascists and Nazis was not extinguished on that first Victory Day in 1945. And Putin’s perspective is that Russia faces an existential threat from the forces of the West. The great irony for Putin is that this world view has done nothing to make his country more secure or more prosperous. Indeed, it has only united Europe and many other nations to more vigorously oppose the overt and aggressive ambitions of authoritarians – just like him.