The Reason Broad Russian Mobilization Is A Lose-Lose Choice For Putin

Following up on the 'three day war' failure around Kyiv, Putin has embarked on a different strategy, entailing a general offensive in the Donbas. Which is going...not so well either. 

One major problem, for such a large country, is that Russia is resource-constrained. The most essential resource being 'human capital' which in Putin's army means cannon fodder. Without a general mobilization, he doesnt have enough soldiers. And reports indicate those he does have, including this years conscript class, are already using whatever connections or money they have to get out of serving. Plus, he doesnt have enough weapons to arm them because of sanctions and even if he had the men and the weapons, he doesnt have the personnel to train them (who are mostly already fighting or dead) or the logistics to get them where they are needed. All of which means he loses if he doesnt mobilize and he loses if he does because he'll be embarrassed by his army's ability to organize it and even he seems to sense the Russian people wont stand for it anyway. JL

Kos reports in Daily Kos:

While Ukraine’s forces grow, Russia’s are finite, attriting rapidly. They’ve run out of Donbas separatist cannon fodder, Syria never sent its promised 15,000 soldiers, none of Russia’s allies like Belarus are lending a hand, and Wagner mercenaries can’t fill the void. So Putin has a difficult choice: whether to announce a general mobilization. His reluctance to mobilize, despite Russia’s difficulties in Ukraine, signal fear of … something. Is Russian support for the war skin deep? Putin may be afraid of mobilization because it is difficult to organize logistics for a larger Russian army. (But) he may be also afraid of provoking a political disaster, with a majority of conscripts trying to evade the draft. To execute a different strategy, Russia needs a different army.

On the main Donbas front, Ukraine General Staff reported repelling 14 attacks, none gained purchase. And yet again, we see Russia incapable of organizing a single, massive, coordinated push to crack Ukrainian defensive lines. It’s just more of the same we’ve seen all war—a slow grinding effort to erode Ukraine defenses by sending wave after wave of small, under-resourced attacks, except with more artillery prep. The tactic has had some successes! But at severe cost to the invaders.

And it’s slooooow going. Russia captured Izyum on April 1, and yet four weeks later, it has only managed to push out 30 kilometers (~19 miles). That’s about a kilometer a day. Only 5,000 more square miles to go! It doesn’t help that Russia is pushing in four different directions, as usual failing to concentrate its efforts in a single axis.

Russia’s scattered attacks have had some local successes, at a cost of broader strategic advance.

Russia’s wanted to parade Ukrainian victories at its May 9 victory, er, parade. Oh well, they can’t even claim the carcass of Mariupol, as Ukrainian resistance continues at the massive Azovstal steel factory and its surroundings:

(Note, you don’t actually see any of the injury, as it’s far from the camera. You do see Russians trying to help their fallen comrades, which might be a first and I found it strangely life affirming.) 

Ukraine, aside from some tactical pickups here and there, seems content to chip away at Russian forces with artillery, guerrilla ambushes, and drones, trading ground for blood when absolutely necessary, but mostly holding firm in their extensive prepared defenses along the entire Donbas front. They just need to hold out a couple more months, to allow all that sweet new Western gear to arrive—drones, armored, and artillery, of course, but also body armor and helmets that will allow reservists to join the fight, and medical supplies that will save many lives. Also, lots and lots of armor.

The US has already committed to sending 170,000 155mm shells. That’s a lot of shipments from California and elsewhere. And now, with lend-lease authority granted by Congress, the US will keep supplying as many of these as Ukraine needs. The spigot is wide open to anything the Pentagon thinks will help push Russia entirely out of Ukraine. Russia’s defeat is official U.S. policy. 

Ukraine has a near unlimited supply of soldiers and potential soldiers. Unlike Russia, their bottleneck isn’t willing volunteers, it’s equipment. With the U.S. fully committed to the war effort, the new bottleneck is training Ukrainians and shipping the equipment. That’s why the stalemate out east is such a blessing for Ukraine. 

While Ukraine’s forces grow, Russia’s are a finite resource and attriting rapidly. They’ve run out of Donbas separatist cannon fodder, Syria never sent its promised 15,000 soldiers, none of Russia’s allies like Belarus are lending a hand, and Wagner mercenaries can’t fill the void. So Vladimir Putin has a difficult choice: whether to announce a general mobilization.

Many conscripts and contract soldiers have used Russia’s kafkaesque bureaucracy to get themselves out of deployment to Ukraine. All of that reportedly disappears with a declaration of war and mobilization. With 135,000 conscripts currently mobilizing, that alone would more than double Russia’s forces in Ukraine. 

It’s curious that Russia hasn’t blamed Ukraine for the spate of attacks on fuel depots and other military infrastructure on Russian territory. Russia even pretends the sinking of their Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva was an accident. That doesn’t speak to a government whipping its populace up into a war fervor. 

On the other hand, Russian state propaganda has been all about whipping up war fervor. Check out Julia Davis’ entire Twitter feed.

The disconnect between state propaganda and the Russian government is stark, and creates genuine uncertainty about Putin’s direction. Yet his reluctance to mobilize thus far, despite Russia’s difficulties in Ukraine, signal fear of … something. Is Russia’s support for the war, supposedly in the 70-80% range, just skin deep—as long as it’s someone else’s skin in the game? 

[Russian political scientist Sergei] Sazonov argued that Putin may be afraid of mobilization because it is difficult to organize logistics for a much larger Russian army. He may be also afraid of provoking a political disaster, with a majority of conscripts trying to evade the draft, Sazonov added.

Putin is reluctant to begin mobilization because people will be disappointed with their relatives’ deaths in Ukraine, [Russian political analyst Dmitry] Oreshkin said.

“Mobilization is like pension reform – it concerns everyone,” he said. “It would be bizarre if Putin resorted to mobilization for something he calls a special operation. It would mean he has admitted his failure in Ukraine. It would be his last resort.”

We may already be seeing anti-mobilization panic. 

Even if Russia corrals more of its youth, then what? How will Russia train hundreds of thousands of new conscripts, when they’re already maxed out training the spring class of 135,000? How will these new soldiers be equipped given Russia is already scraping the bottom of the barrel in Ukraine, their reserves looted by rampant grift, and sanctions hindering the manufacture of new gear.

And will Putin really admit they are losing the war. Winners in a “special military operation” don’t need more troops. Sure, he’ll blame NATO, but “we’re losing, send me your sons” will be a tough sell. 

Thus, Putin is damned if he calls a general mobilization and damned if he doesn’t. A week before the war I wrote what ended up being a war preview titled, “Putin has backed himself into a lose-lose corner. How much will the world have to pay as a result?” The story has held up surprisingly well, but the headline? Even better. 

To execute a different strategy, Russia needs a different army