"But," the confused visitor plaintively inquired, "where are the yachts of their customers?"
The moral of the story - if the word moral can fairly be used in a post about financial services - is why those providing advice were reaping so many more benefits than those whose interests they were ostensibly serving.
The corollary question this raises about the prognostications of economists and other vocal if not otherwise necessarily gifted seers is, as the old saw has it, 'if you're so smart, why aren't you rich?'
We abhor uncertainty so we rely on a variety of wise and presumably knowledgeable guides to help us peer into the future and improve our odds of succeeding. We are particularly dependent on economists, a profession which heatedly insists that their discipline is a science rather than merely a social science. And yet, as the following article explains, their record is far from reassuring.
Are we being unfair? Or, perhaps, are we simply ignoring the obvious: if their projections were really that accurate, why would they be wasting time talking to all of us rather than just enjoying the fruits of their intelligence? JL
Wade Slome comments in Investing Caffeine:
If these economists/strategists/analysts/etc. were so clairvoyant, then how come we do not find any of them on the Forbes 400 list or see them captaining massive yachts?
“Where Are the Customers’ Yachts?” was a book first published about 75 years ago in 1940 by Fred Schwed, Jr. Before he became an author, Schwed was a professional trader who eventually left Wall Street after losing a significant amount of money during the 1929 stock market crash. The title of Schwed’s book refers to a story about a visitor to New York who admired the yachts of the bankers and brokers. Naively, the visitor asked where all the customers’ yachts were? Of course, none of the customers could afford yachts, even though they obediently followed the advice of their bankers and brokers.
The same principle applies to economists. The broad investing public, including many professionals, blindly hang on to every economist’s word. And why not? Often these renowned economists are quite articulate – they use big words, crafty jargon, and wear fancy clothes. Unfortunately in many (most) cases the predictions are way off base. What’s more, if these economists/strategists/analysts/etc. were so clairvoyant, then how come we do not find any of them on the Forbes 400 list or see them captaining massive yachts?
Recently, the Washington Post highlighted the spotty forecasting track record of the Federal Reserve, as it related to past projections of economic growth. As you can see from the chart below, the Board of Governors were consistently too optimistic about future economic growth prospects.
The Federal Reserve has repeatedly proved it is no slouch when it comes to poor forecasting. The example I often point to is the infamous 1996 “irrational exuberance” speech (see also NASDAQ 5,000 Déjà Vu?) given by then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. In the talk, Greenspan warned of escalated asset values and cautioned about a potential decade-long malaise similar to the one experienced by Japan. At the time, the NASDAQ index stood at 1,300, but despite Greenspan screaming about an overvalued market, three years later, the tech-laden index almost quadrupled in value to 5,132.
There are plenty more errant economist forecasts to reference, but despite the economists’ poor batting averages, there is virtually no accountability of the pathetic predictions by the media outlets. Month after month, and year after year, I see the same buffoons on cable TV making the same faulty predictions with zero culpability.
While I have attempted to keep some of the economists/strategists honest (see The Fed Ate My Homework), credit must be given where credit is due. Barry Ritholtz, the lead Editor of The Big Picture, last year wrote a smart piece on the accountability (or lack therof) in the prediction industry.
In the article Ritholtz described some of the shenanigans going on in the loosely regulated prediction industry. Here’s part of what he had to say:
Ritholtz also describes another time-tested strategy I love…The 40% Rule:Pundits are highly incentivized to adhere to the following playbook:
- make a brash prediction
- if wrong, don’t worry…. no one will remember
- if right, selectively tout for self-promotion
- repeat cycle
“The 40% rule is the perfect way to make a splashy headline and cover your butt at the same time. Forecast that there’s a 40% chance that the Dow Jones Industrial Average clears 12,000 by year end: If it does, you’ll look like a sage, and if it doesn’t, well, you didn’t say it’s the most likely outcome.”
Whatever your views are of predictions made by high profile economists and pundits, the media archives are littered with faulty forecasts. It is difficult to dispute that the projection game is a very tough business, and if you don’t share the same opinion, please explain to me…where are the all the economists’ yachts?
1 comments:
While I agree that economic projections are about as good as predicting the weather (which, by the way, are decently accurate over very short terms), I find that there are several potential problems in the message.
The first problem is that it implies the value of economic advice and projection is personal wealth. In fact, that more the field of financial advice, not economists. If an economist provides policy advice and projections as far as say, job growth, how to increase disposable income of the population, or trade policies to benefit the population, these aren't means by which that economist can get rich, right or wrong. Even financial advice isn't necessarily about getting rich. If a financial adviser recommends index funds as a way to grow your wealth, and that anything else is just gambling, then that is arguably sound financial advice without it being advise how to get rich quickly; if they follow it themselves, they will grow their wealth over time and not likely have a yacht.
Generally speaking, such a system would be self-defeating anyway. If somebody had reliable projections that allowed them to get rich, then most people would tend to follow that advise and *that* would become the market which would either stop it from being a means to get rich (if it was a zero-sum game approach) or just settle to the market growth tied to productivity, in which case index funds would be just as good an approach.
The second problem is that it implies an "all-or-nothing" value of economic advice or projection. Economies are chaotic systems, but not random systems, much like the weather. Economists, in general, are more comparable to climate scientists than bankers. The Yachts come to those that bet on the weather and win, not those that study the climate. Yachts also come from gaming the system, like insider trading or the ultimatum game (taking the bulk of generated wealth because you are in a position to take it).
Of course, the article is correct that economics is more social science than hard science, so perhaps the (hard) climate science isn't a perfect analogy. But I think it's important to recognize that economist value isn't in making individuals rich, including themselves, but in understanding the underlying dynamic properties. Analysts might be good meteorologists with the weather over the short term, and economics might be good at the climate level over the long term. You can't get rich from either though.
Finally, in terms of the accuracy of projections, I don't think you can lump everything together. Take a look at the work of Philip Tetlock and his 18+ year study. He found that when it comes to sociopolitical projections (even less scientific than economics), that pundits are worse than random, and the only class of people to do better than random, or simple projection algorithms, were scientifically-minded analysts. You need to parse the projections into how they were generated.
The same problem is seen with projections from pollsters and pundits versus model-based projections like Nate Silver. There are plenty of details of this battle, Silver's clear win, and discussion of applying Tetlock's work, here: http://adnausi.ca/post/35268348489
So, yes, I agree with your article in principle. But I think you've oversimplified the issue.
Post a Comment