Basic Training: How Defense Secretary Robert Gates Became One of the Most Respected Public Leaders of His Generation

This is a study in leadership contrasts. Robert Gates had a prominent act to follow. Donald Rumsfeld, his predecessor, was loud, opinionated and limelight loving. A politician in a stateman's position, he seemed to revel in flashing his power or from offending others publicly if it suited his purposes.

Gates, by contrast, has hugged the shadows as perhaps befits a former CIA operative. He has employed quiet persuasion based on thoughtful assessments of allies and opponents needs or interests. He has, as a result, earned the respect and cooperation of political, diplomatic and military associates.

Both styles have their proponents. Gates' success serving Republicans and Democrats across the management of wars, strategic reassessments and epochal resource allocation decisions suggests that for executives in any sector there is much to learn from the way in which he learned so much. JL

Julian Barnes reports in the Wall Street Journal:

"After four-and-a-half years as defense secretary, under both Republican and Democratic presidents, Robert Gates has earned a reputation as an adept manager in a department long resistant to change.

While his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld, came to the Pentagon having written a guide to managing called "Rumsfeld's Rules," Mr. Gates—who is due to leave his post at the end of the month—said he began his role as defense secretary having never read a management book. But over time, he developed his own guidelines, some of which include the need to listen to professionals, as well as to hold them accountable.

When he first took office in December 2006, Mr. Gates decided to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their conference room, known as the "Tank," rather than have the generals come to him, Mr. Gates said in a recent interview in his Pentagon office.

Showing respect to the professionals who staff and help lead an institution is critical, Mr. Gates said. Without that respect, top managers will quickly find their ideas ignored, or actively resisted. His long study of the Kremlin while an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency taught him that symbols, and symbolic gestures too, are important, he said.

Less than three months into the job, Mr. Gates got to show off another of his emerging management guidelines: holding people accountable. An investigative series by the Washington Post had revealed that wounded soldiers were receiving sub-par treatment in deteriorating facilities at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

When Army leaders responded by criticizing the media, Mr. Gates swiftly sacked the Army secretary.

A little more than a year later, after a pair of mishaps involving the military's stewardship of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Mr. Gates acted again, forcing the Air Force secretary and chief of staff to resign.

Mr. Gates said in neither situation did he hold people accountable for not knowing about a problem. "This place is too gigantic to expect that," Mr. Gates said. "What created the problem was not taking it seriously enough once they were apprised of the situation."

Although he is planning to eventually write a book about managing and reforming large public institutions, such as the Pentagon and Texas A&M University, where he served as president, Mr. Gates joked that the only management training he received was with the Boy Scouts when he was 14 years old.

Mr. Gates wasn't always a good manager. When he received his first senior management job as head of the Central Intelligence Agency's analytical division, he earned a reputation as a bully. His tactics turned many subordinates against the changes he pushed. "I learned a lot of lessons," he said.

Gordon England, who served as deputy defense secretary under both Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Gates, said the two men's differing management styles were right for the period of time they served.

Mr. Rumsfeld's aggressiveness and demand for detail were needed in the immediate aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks. Mr. Gates's approach of soliciting a wide range of views was right for a period of time when the U.S. needed to remake its war strategy, first in Iraq and then Afghanistan.

Mr. Rumsfeld wasn't available to comment for this article.

Current and former aides said Mr. Gates has an open leadership style and doesn't dominate meetings, but relishes making decisions at their conclusion. "He encourages participation, so people have a lot of say, until the decision is made and then, like all good leaders, he expects people to toe the line," Mr. England said.

Mr. Gates has had his detractors. Many in the Air Force, particularly allies of the top officials he ousted, complained that he wasn't open to alternative points of view. They argue that some of his decisions were wrong headed, most notably his decision to kill the F-22 fighter jet.

Michael Wynne, who was pushed out by Mr. Gates as Air Force Secretary, said it was hard to know where one stood with him. "Secretary Gates has a friendly personality, but is quietly intimidating," Mr. Wynne said. "This uncertainty leads subordinates to continuously check back and eliminates individual initiative as time goes by."

For his part, Mr. Gates has said he has become too cautious as the years have gone by. Most notably, he was skeptical of the intelligence that said Osama bin Laden was hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and was initially reluctant to support the raid that killed the al Qaeda leader.

Mr. Gates said he believes new leaders shouldn't bring a large group of their own people into a new job, but should instead arrive alone. When appointed by President George W. Bush, Mr. Gates kept Mr. Rumsfeld's aides in place. And when President Barack Obama decided to keep him on as defense secretary, he asked to keep only a few key staff members, allowing the new Democratic administration to build its own team at the Pentagon.

Throughout the Defense secretary's tenure, Mr. Gates worked to ensure his ideas were embraced not just by the top generals, but also mid-ranking and junior military officers, teaching classes at the service academies and giving speeches to the various war colleges.

Alluding again to his longtime interest in the Kremlin, Mr. Gates said studying the Soviets taught him that when multiple generations of lower-ranking officials believe in reforms, they are much harder to undo.

"That is the Kremlinologist in me," Mr. Gates said. "A big institution can always outlast one or two reformers. So it is not just seeding ideas, but seeding people."